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Separation of powers is typically understood in terms of constraint. In this view, 
the Constitution provides a static legal framework intended primarily to control and limit 
politics. The purpose of this dissertation is to consider how separation of powers values are 
undermined by an overly literal conception of the textual provisions that bring the political 
branches into contact. Indeed, this dissertation argues that the Constitution was not 
intended to be a static legal framework unadaptable to the needs and exigencies of modern 
circumstances. Rather, as argued most persuasively in The Federalist, the Constitution 
instantiated a dynamic political order in which differently-constructed institutions advance 
the aims and prerogatives of their institutions in political conflict, this conflict meant to 
achieve the overlapping and at times competing goods of the constitutional order. A narrow 
focus on the literal strictures of the textual provisions that bring the branches into contact 
can frustrate — and potentially undermine — this dynamic process. The burden of this 
dissertation is borne by three case studies — on the legislative veto, executive agreements, 
and recess appointments. Each case study evaluates the constitutional dimensions of 
departures from the literal strictures of the text, demonstrating how such departures are 
 viii 
both fostered and limited by the purposes undergirding the constitutional text — and how 
legal resolution based on the literal meaning of the text undermines robust constitutional 
politics. This dissertation thus argues that interbranch disputes regarding the limits of the 
political branches’ powers — insofar as those conflicts do not infringe upon the rights of 
individuals — should be left to the political negotiations of the branches. Such political 
negotiation, however, is not standardless. Rather, the branches engage (or should engage) 
the constitutional text at a higher level of abstraction, arguing about the purposes of 
assigned powers in light of the duties and prerogatives of their offices. Brightline, legalistic 
rules that settle the constitutional text — without reference to the particular contexts that 
give rise to textual departures — are inattentive to, and potentially subvert, the higher order 




Table of Contents 
List of Tables ..................................................................................................................... xi 
Introduction ..........................................................................................................................1 
Traditional View of Separation of Powers .................................................................7 
Legal Notions of Separation of Powers ..........................................................8 
Checks and Balances .....................................................................................16 
Conclusion of the Traditional View ..............................................................20 
Separation of Powers as a Political Architecture ......................................................21 
Textual Boundaries and Higher Order Principles .....................................................33 
Constitutional Reasoning ..............................................................................40 
Case Study Overview ................................................................................................42 
The Legal Undermining, and the Persistence, of Constitutional Politics: The Case of 
the Legislative Veto .....................................................................................................46 
Introduction ...............................................................................................................46 
The Problem (and the Necessity) of Delegation .......................................................51 
The Legislative Veto and Constitutional Politics .....................................................62 
Chadha and the Legal Undermining of Constitutional Politics ................................78 
The Court’s Legalistic Premises ...................................................................80 
Legislative versus Adjudicatory Legislative Vetoes .....................................88 
Political Criticisms of the Legislative Veto ..............................................................93 
The Effectiveness of the Legislative Veto Given the Scale of Delegation ...93 
The Legislative Veto and the Politics of Negotiation and Compromise ......99 
The Legislative Veto and the Problem of Interest Groups Politics ............103 
Invalidated. Nevertheless, It Persisted ....................................................................107 
 x 
Executive Agreements, Treaties, and the Constitution’s Political Architecture ..............117 
Foreign Affairs and the Limits of Constitutionalism ..............................................124 
Executive Power in Foreign Affairs .......................................................................127 
The Use and Control of Executive Agreements .....................................................138 
Ex Ante Congressional-Executive Agreements ..........................................138 
Sole Executive Agreements ........................................................................147 
Transparency Problems: A Failure of Congressional Oversight ............................150 
Congressional Involvement in International Agreements ......................................165 
Constitutional Versus Legal Claims .......................................................................180 
Conclusion: Instances of Constitutional Health and Congressional Abdication ....191 
Perverse Politics: Recess Appointments, Noel Canning, and the Limits of Law ............194 
Standard Legal Account of Recess Appointments .................................................197 
The Appointments Process and the Constitution’s Political Architecture ..............209 





List of Tables 
Table 1: Number of Pages in the Federal Register by Year ..............................................57 
Table 2: Types of Legislative Vetoes ................................................................................64 
Table 3: Veto Provisions Classified by Form, Pre-Chadha ...............................................75 







 According to a prominent narrative in political science today, the concept of 
separation of powers is in a state of crisis, suffering, as Adrian Vermuele and Eric Posner 
argue, “through an enfeebled old age.”1 Indeed, the static legal framework the separation 
of powers principle embodies, with its strict separation of different types of powers and 
checks and balances, is viewed as a (if not the) fundamental problem of American 
government today. The Constitution’s governmental framework, the narrative goes, was 
designed for the relatively simple agrarian society of the 18th and 19th centuries, but has 
proven unworkable in light of the demands of modern government in the contemporary 
world. Perhaps the most striking recent indictment of the American constitutional order’s 
institutional arrangement comes from prominent political scientists William G. Howell 
and Terry M. Moe in their book aptly titled Relic: How Our Constitution Undermines 
Effective Government. Howell and Moe criticize the separation of powers framework — 
and especially the parochial Congress at its center — as ultimately creating an ineffective 
government due to its emphasis on constraint:  
If government is to address the myriad problems that arise in the modern world, it 
must be able to act, and act effectively. But it literally wasn’t designed for that. It 
was designed for a different, pre-modern world. It is folly to think that what may 
have worked quite well in that world will also work in ours. Why would it? The 
founders had no idea what a modern society would look like, no idea what 
demands and problems it would generate, no idea what governmental 
 
1 Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic (Oxford 
[England] ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 208. 
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effectiveness would require in such a context. They could not provide us with a 
government suitable for modern times even if they intended to.2 
 
 This indictment of the Constitution’s inability to provide for effective governance 
should perhaps come as no surprise given the extent to which the separation of powers 
itself has, throughout American history, been characterized by its negative purposes. 
Justice Louis Brandeis famously wrote that “the doctrine of the separation of powers was 
adopted by the Convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the 
exercise of arbitrary power.”3 Brandeis’ dictum that the separation of powers doctrine 
favors safety over and against efficiency and effectiveness, moreover, has carried the day 
in Supreme Court jurisprudence as the Court has increasingly policed the boundaries of 
the political branches.4 In striking down the legislative veto, for example, Chief Justice 
Burger asserted that “convenience and efficiency are not the primary objectives — or the 
hallmarks — of democratic governance,” and that “the fact that a given law or procedure 
is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government, standing 
alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution.”5  
 This dissertation is diagnostic in purpose.6 The diagnosis it makes, however, is 
fundamentally different from those cited at the outset of this introduction. The problem 
with the separation of powers is not that it is a static legal framework meant primarily to 
 
2 William G. Howell and Terry M. Moe, Relic: How Our Constitution Undermines Effective Government--
and Why We Need a More Powerful Presidency (New York: Basic Books, 2016), 23. 
3 Myers v. United States, 272 US 52, 293 (1926). 
4 Jessica Korn, The Power of Separation: American Constitutionalism and the Myth of the Legislative Veto, 
Princeton Studies in American Politics (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1996). 
5 INS v. Chadha, 462 US 919 (1983) 
6 Charles U. Zug, “Could Political Science Become Diagnostic? Restoring a Forgotten Method,” 
Perspectives on Political Science, December 2017. 
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frustrate the arbitrary use of power, thus hindering the ability of the government to adapt 
itself to meet the needs and contingencies of unforeseen circumstances. Rather, the 
problem is that the separation of powers has been wrongly understood in terms of 
constraint rather than in terms of positive purposes, and that this flawed conceptualization 
has been incorporated into modern understandings of separation of powers — especially 
by the judiciary — in ways that have undermined effective constitutional government. As 
this dissertation will argue, however, this misunderstanding is not a blatant 
mischaracterization of the nature of the Constitution’s governing apparatus as much as it 
is a failure of the framers to fully and self-consciously develop and articulate the type of 
separation of powers system the Constitution embodies. Even so, I will argue that the 
separation of powers framework articulated in this dissertation is not only the best 
interpretation of the nature of separation of powers principles in The Federalist, but that 
it is also a superior understanding of separation of powers on its own terms — a claim 
that is best borne out through case study analysis as opposed to proof-texting. 
Contrary to the constraint-oriented focus of many contemporary diagnoses of 
American constitutional ills, this dissertation argues that the Constitution’s legal 
assignments of powers and checks and balances are subordinate aspects of a larger 
political conception of separation of powers that emphasizes the achievement of 
constitutional ends through conflict within and between differently structured political 
institutions.7 By focusing on the political dimensions of separation of powers I show that 
 
7 Jeffrey Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1987), 41–45; 
Mariah Zeisberg, War Powers: The Politics of Constitutional Authority (Princeton [New Jersey]: Princeton 
University Press, 2013). 
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the Constitution provides every resource for meeting the needs of modern society while 
preserving its basic shape as the institutions respond to each other in politics, making 
political claims about the purposes underlying specific assignments of power rather than 
advancing narrowly legalistic (and overly literal) conceptions of their assigned powers, or 
turning to the judiciary to settle their political disputes (as the branches increasingly have 
done). Political contestation between the branches regarding both the substance of 
politics as well as their respective boundaries, I argue, is a virtue of the constitutional 
order, not a pathology that should be overcome through legal determinacy and settlement. 
In fact, as this dissertation will demonstrate, legal settlement of interbranch boundaries 
(whether by the branches’ own narrow, and overly literal, conceptions of their assigned 
powers, or through judicial intervention) not only misunderstands the fundamental nature 
of the Constitution’s separation of powers system, it pathologizes, rather than removes, 
political contestation from the constitutional order.  
A robust constitutional politics, however, is not standardless, the result of any 
political resolution agreed upon by the branches. It is not, in other words, politics all the 
way down. Rather, the branches should be guided by constitutional criteria deduced both 
from the text and from the underlying purposes of specific constitutional provisions in 
service of the aims and goals of their particular institution vis-a-vis the other. The kind of 
reasoning appropriate to the political branches in interbranch contestation, however, 
differs substantially from the way the Court reasons about the meaning of the 
Constitution because, by its very nature, the judicial function is about settling the 
meaning of constitutional provisions, drawing bright-line rules in ways that foreclose 
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future contestation — and this, ultimately, without any reference to the political 
circumstances animating the interbranch dispute in the first place. Legal settlement 
premised upon an overly literal conception of constitutional clauses, however, is, in 
general, inappropriate to interbranch disputes regarding the textual boundaries between 
the branches.8 Rather, in addition to the literal level, the branches engage (or should 
engage) the constitutional text at a higher level of abstraction, making arguments about 
the purposes underlying particular clauses (and the institutional duties signified by the 
constitutional text) vis-a-vis each other in specific political controversies.9 At times, a 
branch might have a valid constitutional claim to violate the express terms of the 
constitutional text based on the underlying purpose of that textual provision, depending 
on the political circumstances that give rise to the claim. Settling the meaning of the text 
in an overly literal or legal sense, on the other hand, can thwart constitutional purposes 
rather than advance them, and, over time, can corrode the ability of the branches to 
reason about the Constitution politically. In short, this dissertation is concerned with the 
larger constitutional commitments signified by, but not reducible to, their textual 
instantiations. 
This introduction will proceed by laying out what might be referred to as the 
“traditional” conception of separation of powers with which this dissertation contends. 
 
8 There are, of course, instances where judicial intervention into interbranch disputes between the political 
branches is justified. As I will argue, judicial intervention is appropropriate when the judiciary's own 
processes are implicated by a particular dispute or when the dispute concerns the rights of individuals. Such 
circumstances, however, are fairly limited. In general, the Court should avoid policing the boundaries of the 
political branches. 
9 This is true, moreover, regardless of how self-consciously the branches make constitutional arguments. 
This is a point that will be elaborated in the conclusion. 
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By calling it the traditional view, I do not mean to suggest that there is one particular 
theorist, or theorists, to whom this conception can be attributed. Even so, it is possible to 
distill the basic underpinnings of widespread understandings of the purposes of 
separation of powers and to highlight the ways in which essential aspects of the 
traditional view inform constitutional analysis. The conception of separation of powers 
articulated in The Federalist is more complex than commonly recognized. Something like 
the traditional conception is articulated in places, most clearly in Number 51. The 
Federalist as a whole, however, articulated a more dynamic conception of the separation 
of powers than the common, constraint-based understanding. According to this view, 
separation of powers and checks and balances are subsidiary, though essential 
components, of a larger, and—as Jeffrey Tulis and Nicole Mellow have argued—
altogether new political design that emphasizes the ways in which conflict between 
institutional structures can advance the positive purposes of the constitutional order, 
rather than merely restrain or limit the government in order to make it safe.10 
This dissertation builds on work by Tulis and Mellow, as well as Mariah Zeisberg 
to consider what it means for the political branches to be guided by political criteria that 
is constitutional but not legalistic. In other words, even when the branches depart from 
the literal strictures of the constitutional text, the branches can and should be guided by 
the underlying values signaled by the text, a task that is undermined by focusing too 
strictly on the letter of the law. The bulk of this dissertation, therefore, consists of case 
 
10 Jeffrey K. Tulis and Nicole Mellow, Legacies of Losing in American Politics (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2017), http://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/L/bo27315255.html. 
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studies — on the legislative veto, executive agreements, and recess appointments — to 
demonstrate how the branches can negotiate their boundaries according to the 
constitutional principles undergirding the text through their own interactions (whether 
self-consciously or not) and, moreover, how this process is undermined by judicial 
resolution based on an overly legalistic reading of the text, or by the branches’ own 
failures to be sufficiently motivated by higher order principles during interbranch 
conflict. In other words, this dissertation considers how the Constitution’s textual 
assignments of power signal a hierarchy of constitutional goods that are not reducible to 
those specific textual instantiations of power. Attentiveness to the overarching purposes 
of the text thus provides a way to both constitutionally evaluate departures from the 
literal strictures of the text while also showing how strict adherence to the text, in a literal 
sense, can undermine those purposes. This chapter thus concludes by discussing the three 
case studies and the reasons for their selection. 
TRADITIONAL VIEW OF SEPARATION OF POWERS 
As noted at the outset, separation of powers is generally understood in terms of 
constraint. The Constitution, in this view, established a legal framework in order to 
channel governmental action within specified limits, the preservation of liberty — or 
natural rights — often serving as the justification for the emphasis on constraint.11 While, 
in general, separation of powers is understood in terms of constraint, different aspects of 
 
11 Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 2013); Michael P. Zuckert, The Natural Rights Republic: Studies in the 
Foundation of the American Political Tradition (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997). 
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the constitutional design are emphasized by different sets of scholars and practitioners. 
Legal scholars — and, perhaps more importantly, jurists — tend to focus on the legal 
aspects of separation of powers, whereas political scientists emphasize checking and 
balancing. It is worth dwelling on each of these distinct and interrelated features of the 
constitutional design in turn. This is especially important given that an overemphasis on 
either feature of the traditional understanding, as I will argue, is problematic. To focus 
too much on the literal meaning of the constitutional text, when it comes to separation of 
powers disputes, can prevent the branches from negotiating their boundaries in politics to 
achieve the ends of the constitutional order, or can blind the branches to the duties 
signified by textual commitments. Similarly, an overemphasis on checks and balances 
inappropriately magnifies the political aspects of separation of powers, reducing 
interbranch contestation to pure struggle and negotiation without constitutional standards 
for evaluation. Disentangling these two interrelated features of the constitutional design, 
of course, is a theoretical exercise given the extent to which both features are intertwined 
in both theory and practice. Discussing these different, albeit connected, emphases 
separately, however, illuminates core features of the common understanding of separation 
of powers and how both emphases miss the ways in which the constitutional text signals 
a hierarchy of constitutional values undergirding the text. 
Legal Notions of Separation of Powers 
Legal scholars tend to emphasize a separation of powers doctrine by which the 
natures of different types of powers — legislative, executive, and judicial — are 
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discerned and assigned to the appropriate institution. The branches, moreover, are 
prohibited from exercising powers appropriately assigned to the other branches. This 
separation of powers theory or doctrine is clearly summarized by MC Vile in 
Constitutionalism and Separation of Powers: 
It is essential for the establishment and maintenance of political liberty that the 
government be divided into three branches or departments, the legislature, the 
executive, and the judiciary. To each of these three branches there is a 
corresponding identifiable function of government, legislative, executive, or 
judicial. Each branch of government must be confined to the exercise of its own 
function and not allowed to encroach upon the functions of the other branches. 
Furthermore, the persons who compose these three agencies of government must 
be kept separate and distinct, no individual being allowed to be at the same time a 
member of more than one branch.12  
  
This general principle of separation has been the basis for the judiciary’s 
intervention into separation of powers disputes, attempting to ensure that the branches 
remain within the specified limits of their powers based on the types of powers the 
branches purportedly exercise. For example, when the Court invalidated the legislative 
veto as an unconstitutional legislative usurpation of executive power it did so based on 
the presumption, noted by Chief Justice Burger, that the “Constitution sought to divide 
the delegated powers of the new federal government into three defined categories, 
legislative, executive, and judicial, to assure, as nearly as possible, that each Branch of 
government would confine itself to its assigned responsibility.”13 The Court 
acknowledged that the branches are not “‘hermetically’ sealed off from one another,” but 
 
12 M. J. C. Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers, 2 edition (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund Inc., 
1998), 11. 
13 INS v. Chadha, 462 US 919 (1983), at 951. 
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still concluded that when any branch acts it presumptively exercises the kinds of power 
granted to it by the Constitution. The Court thus settled an interbranch dispute based on a 
background principle that stresses the need for strict separation based on the types of 
powers appropriately wielded by different types of institutions.  
Legal understandings of separation of powers, however, do not necessarily 
depend upon some overarching background principle or doctrine of separation that can be 
invoked by the judiciary to settle interbranch disputes. In fact, as John F. Manning has 
argued, the Constitution embodies no separation of powers principle (an important 
concession, but one from which Manning, as will be shown in this dissertation, does not 
draw the right conclusions).14 Indeed, the Constitution does not have an express 
separation of powers clause limiting the different branches to the exercise of the types of 
functions appropriate to their institution (even though the judiciary has at times invoked 
background principles of separation in its jurisprudence). This, moreover, cannot be 
easily characterized as an oversight given that many of the state constitutions at the time 
of the founding had such express provisions in their constitutions that the framers could 
have easily adopted. For example, the 1780 Massachusetts state Constitution stated:  
In the government of this Commonwealth, the legislative department shall never 
exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them: The executive shall 
never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them: The judicial 
shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them: to the 
end it may be a government of laws, and not of men.15 
 
14 John F. Manning, “Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation,” Harvard Law Review 124, no. 8 
(2011): 1944–45. 
15 Part the First, Article XXX, of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780. Retrieved at: 
http://www.nhinet.org/ccs/docs/ma-1780.htm. Interestingly enough, this Clause has been cited to invoke a 
 11 
Beyond the fact that the Constitution does not have an express separation of 
powers clause like the one quoted above, the Constitution, by its own terms, violates a 
strict division of power by mixing the different types of powers within and between the 
branches. For example, the president wields legislative power with a qualified veto 
power. The House of Representatives wields an effectively executive power with its 
power to impeach executive and judicial officials (akin to an indictment), and the Senate 
wields a judicial power by its power to convict impeached officials. Such mixing of 
powers and the decision not to adopt an express separation of powers provision led Anti-
Federalists, during the ratification debates, to oppose ratification since the proposed 
Constitution so thoroughly violated separation of powers principles. In fact, in the First 
Congress, James Madison asserted that no charge during the ratification debates had been 
leveled against the proposed Constitution with as much success as the charge that the 
Constitution violated the principle of separation of powers.16  
Even without a background principle of separation of powers, an emphasis on 
legal limits and constraints — and the concomitant settling of interbranch boundaries in 
light of this emphasis — has dominated the ways in which the separation of powers is 
understood. Indeed, a fundamental feature of constitutionalism is that it limits by law 
what the government can do. As Jon Elster writes, “the constitution should be a 
framework for action, not an instrument for action.”17  In this way, the Constitution 
 
background principle of separation of powers, perhaps most notably by Justice Antonin Scalia at the outset 
of his famous dissent in Morrison v. Olson 487 U.S. 654 (1988), at 486. 
16 Annals of Congress 380 (1789). 
17 Jon Elster, Ulysses Unbound: Studies in Rationality, Precommitment, and Constraints (Cambridge, 
U.K. ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 100. 
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provides the procedural apparatus for government, providing static limits that constrain 
governmental action. Giovanni Sartori similarly observes that “constitutions are, first and 
above all, instruments of government which limit, restrain and allow for the control of the 
exercise of political power.”18 Although there are some exceptions to the view that the 
primary purpose of constitutionalism is to constrain and limit governmental action, this, 
as Jeremy Waldron recently observed, “goes against the general trend.”19 From a 
constraints-oriented notion of constitutionalism, the purpose of a constitution is to 
provide clear-cut rules to coordinate action, thereby creating the conditions for stability.20 
Consider an analogy: it does not matter whether drivers drive on the right or left hand 
side of the road, but it does matter that the “rules of the road,” so to speak, coordinate 
drivers through a fixed rule rather than to allow individual drivers to decide for 
themselves.21 In a similar way, it is not necessarily important how power is specifically 
allocated so long as the Constitution effectively coordinates action through a settled 
understanding of the law and its requirements.  
The textual boundaries between the branches, in this view, must be enforced to 
ensure that the branches perform their assigned tasks in appropriate ways. Absent a 
background principle of separation of powers, Manning argues that the judiciary should 
enforce textual boundaries between the branches in those instances where the 
 
18 Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and 
Outcomes (London: Macmillan, 1994), 196. 
19 Jeremy Waldron, Political Political Theory: Essays on Institutions (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 2016), 30. 
20 Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer, “On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation,” Harvard Law 
Review 110, no. 7 (1997): 1359–87. 
21 Alexander and Schauer, 1371. 
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Constitution is specific. The adoption of a specific, rule-like provision, by the rule of 
negative implication, suggests that other mechanisms are appropriately ruled out: “If a 
parent tells a young child who has asked for a drink, ‘you may have orange juice,’ it 
almost surely means that the child may not grab a Mountain Dew from the refrigerator.”22 
If, therefore, the Constitution provides a specific mechanism for lawmaking — 
bicameralism and presentment — the judiciary should enforce the specific provision 
chosen by the constitutional framers based on the plain meaning of the text. Hence, the 
legislative veto is unconstitutional according to Manning — and the Court — because it 
was a mechanism by which the Congress (or subsidiary parts of Congress) exercised 
lawmaking power outside of the Constitution’s textually-prescribed procedures for 
lawmaking.23 Similarly, and as the Court ruled in Noel Canning v NLRB (2014), there are 
clear textual limits to what counts as a valid recess appointment based on the specific 
meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause (even based upon the Majority’s broad 
construction of the clause in Noel Canning). According to the clear terms of the Clause, if 
the Senate is in session, at least in a technical sense, then there is no recess available for a 
recess appointment.  
What is important here is not necessarily Manning’s specific proposal for how the 
judiciary can properly decide separation of powers cases, but how he views the 
 
22 Manning, “Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation,” 2010; Harold Koh, “The President Versus 
the Senate in Treaty Interpretation: What’s All the Fuss About?,” The Yale Journal of International Law 
15, no. 2 (June 1990): 335. 
23 Though as I will demonstrate in my chapter on the legislative veto, the only way to characterize the 
legislative veto as an independent act of lawmaking is to invoke a background principle of separation of 
powers and to add to that background principle the unargued presumption that when any branch acts it 
wields the type of power granted to it by the Constitution.  
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Constitution as a series of textual provisions that must be enforced based on their clear 
and determinate meaning — insofar as provisions lend themselves to such analysis. It 
hardly bears mentioning that such an assumption largely undergirds modern approaches 
to separation of powers. Indeed, while this dissertation argues that the recess 
appointments controversy in Noel Canning should have been left to the political process, 
the Supreme Court ruled unanimously in that case (while splitting on the specific 
interpretation of how broadly the Clause should be construed), and there was broad 
consensus that the case posed a judiciable question and should have been decided by the 
judiciary. Few, if any, scholars argued at the time that the case posed a political question 
and should thus be left to politics.  
While it is not worth dwelling on at length at this juncture, it bears mentioning 
here that such an emphasis on enforcing textual boundaries between the branches — as 
will be argued more in depth in the conclusion — does not make sense of the ways in 
which constitutional practice has departed significantly from the literal strictures of the 
constitutional text, for example, in the areas of war powers or international agreements, 
areas in which, given the foreign affairs context, the judiciary has been reticent to 
intervene in interbranch disputes regarding the boundaries of the branches due to a lack 
of judicially manageable standards (even though to enforce boundaries, say, with regard 
to treaties and executive agreements would only require the judiciary to make the 
branches abide by the specific constitutional procedure for international agreements 
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rather than to engage the substance of agreements).24 Moreover, very few, if any, scholars 
or practitioners today would argue, for example, in favor of treaty exclusivity, given the 
extent to which executive agreements have superseded the use of the treaty since at least 
the Second World War and are viewed as an essential mechanism by which the United 
States binds itself internationally. Given this discrepancy between modern constitutional 
practice and the strictures of the text, some, while accepting modern practice as 
legitimate, see such innovations as instances of major constitutional change. The 
Constitution’s static legal framework, in this telling, has been overcome or “updated” — 
sometimes by the People based on a theory of higher lawmaking — to make it workable 
in the modern world.25 What is noteworthy about the idea that the Constitution has to be 
overcome or updated is the premise upon which the claim is based: that the Constitution’s 
legal framework provides static limits based on the literal meaning of the text. This 
premise, moreover, has also informed interbranch behavior as the Court has increasingly 
made itself the arbiter of interbranch boundary disputes over the last half century — 
especially in the domestic context — and as the political branches themselves have 
increasingly turned to the judiciary to settle their boundary disputes.  
Finally, many contemporary constitutional theorists view the Constitution’s 
separation of powers as a failure because its legal framework (insofar as it is understood 
as a legal framework) has proven incapable of restraining executive power. Some, like 
 
24 Jide Nzelibe, “The Uniqueness of Foreign Affairs,” Iowa Law Review 89, no. 3 (March 2004): 941–1010. 
25 Bruce A. Ackerman, We the People (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
1991); Bruce A. Ackerman and David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional? (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 1995); Stephen M. Griffin, American Constitutionalism: From Theory to Politics 
(Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1996). 
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Bruce Ackerman, propose creating new legal institutions to serve as a check on executive 
power.26 Others, such as Eric Posner and Adrian Vermuele, argue that we should not 
worry about the fact that the Constitution’s legal framework cannot constrain executive 
power because public opinion, properly channeled, can do so.27 In other words, while 
Ackerman would add new legal provisions to fix the constitutional system, Posner and 
Vermuele would cast the entire legal framework aside as unworkable in the first place. 
Even with their differing prescriptions, both accounts share a descriptive account of the 
Constitution’s separation of powers as a legal framework intended to constrain the 
overreach of the branches vis-à-vis each other by law. 
Checks and Balances 
 The second emphasis of the traditional view is on checks and balances. Noting 
that it is theoretically difficult to disentangle the different powers of government — 
legislative, executive, and judicial — political scientists have emphasized the extent to 
which the Constitution’s separation of powers is primarily geared to frustrating the 
exercise of power by dividing it between institutions. Central to the concept of checks 
and balances is the idea that if an institution has a power, another institution must check 
that power. Moreover, exercises of power are particularly difficult given the many and 
varied veto points throughout the constitutional system.28 For example, a bill can only 
 
26 Bruce A. Ackerman, The Decline and Fall of the American Republic, The Tanner Lectures on Human 
Values (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010). 
27 Posner and Vermeule, The Executive Unbound. 
28 The veto point is a common unit of analysis in political science studies of the separation of powers. For 
example, see: Keith Krehbiel, Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1998); Cameron, Veto Bargaining (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000). 
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become a law after it has been passed by both houses of Congress and signed by the 
President — and even then the legislation is subject to judicial review. Power, therefore, 
is easily frustrated as any breakdown along the way means that the government cannot 
act.  
The view that the varied veto points throughout the constitutional system are 
primarily geared towards making it more difficult for the government to act is a plausible 
reading of The Federalist, especially Madison’s famous argument in Federalist 51 that 
the division of the government into “distinct and separate departments” — as well as 
division between the national and state governments — would serve as a “double security 
to the rights of the people.”29 Philip Munoz, citing Madison’s famous line that “men are 
not angels,” argues that “[s]ometimes we forget the whole purpose of the separation of 
powers is to frustrate government action, to make it harder for government to act.”30 
Madison further argues in Federalist 51 that the purpose of bicameralism is to provide an 
antidote to the overwhelming power of the legislature (which he referred to as an 
impetuous vortex earlier in Federalist 48) in republican forms of government. By 
dividing up the legislature into component parts, Congress will be less likely to abuse its 
power by passing improvident laws. It is better that it be difficult for Congress to pass 
good laws than for it to be too easy for it to pass bad laws.  
 
29 Alexander Hamilton et al., The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter, 1 edition (New York, NY: 
Signet, 2003), 320. 
30 Vincent Philip Muñoz, “Constitutional Principles: Separation of Powers,” The Bill of Rights Institute and 
Jack Miller Center (Aug. 24, 2012).  
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The emphasis on checks and balances among political scientists, moreover, tends 
to emphasize constraint for its own sake. Woodrow Wilson’s critique of the separation of 
powers framework, for example, was based on what he took to be its mechanistic 
Newtonian underpinnings:  
The makers of our federal constitution followed the scheme as they found it 
expounded in Montesquieu, followed it with genuine scientific enthusiasm. The 
admirable expositions of the Federalist read like thoughtful applications of 
Montesquieu to the political needs and circumstances of America. They are full of 
the theory of checks and balances. The president is balanced off against Congress, 
Congress against the President, and each against the courts. Our statesmen of the 
earlier generations quoted no one so often as Montesquieu, and they quoted him 
always as a scientific standard in the field of politics. Politics is turned into 
mechanics under his touch. The theory of gravitation is supreme.31 
 
As Michael Zuckert notes, “[a]ccording to Wilson’s conception of separation of powers, 
how powers are divided and separated matters hardly or not at all; what matters is merely 
that they are separated and can check each other.”32 The Constitution, according to 
Wilson, needed to be reinterpreted and updated with Darwinian underpinnings so that it 
could overcome the inertia of ambition counteracting ambition.  
Wilson’s diagnosis of the problems with mechanistic checking and balancing has 
proven enduring among constitutional critics and reform advocates. Today, for example, 
political scientists William G. Howell and Terry M. Moe, in ways largely reminiscent of 
Wilson and the Progressives, argue that the Constitution’s checks and balances make it 
nearly impossible for the government to act, and, when it does, to produce good policy 
 
31 Woodrow Wilson, Constitutional Government in the United States, Columbia University Lectures ... 
George Blumenthal Foundation 1907 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1947). 
32 Michael Zuckert, “On the Separation of Powers: Liberal and Progressive Constitutionalism,” Social 
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given the varied veto points that stymie effective governmental action.33 Therefore, they 
advocate for a constitutional amendment that would give the president more agenda-
setting power (similar to fast-track trade authority, by which Congress delegates to the 
president the power to negotiate trade agreements while ensuring a timely vote without 
amendments). The Madisonian system, in their view, must be updated with a formal 
amendment because it has proven incapable of being adapted to the contingencies of 
modern government. What is particularly striking about Howell and Moe’s reform 
proposal, however, is that it is based on a successful institutional reform adopted by the 
political branches themselves through their own political negotiation.34 As will become 
clear in the chapter on the legislative veto, Congress and the president have often 
developed mechanisms by which executive power is harnessed through delegation while 
ensuring an attenuated role for Congress. The judiciary, however, has proven the enemy 
of such institutional adaptations, thus lending credence to the view, expressed by Howell 
and Moe, that the Constitution’s static legal framework was not intended for the kinds of 
adaptation that would make good and effective government possible. 
Much of the American politics literature today, moreover, accepts Richard 
Neustadt’s premise that there is no separation of powers. Rather, the Constitution 
establishes “separate institutions sharing power.”35 Power is thus construed as a single 
entity that is divided up between the branches rather than a principled division of labor 
 
33 Howell and Moe, Relic. 
34 Sharyn O’Halloran, Politics, Process, and American Trade Policy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1994), 139–75. 
35 Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power, the Politics of Leadership (New York: Wiley, 1960). 
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meant to achieve certain goods through differentiated institutions. Politics, in this 
formulation, becomes the skillful maneuvering and negotiation of political actors within 
and between the branches to get what they want through persuasion (in Neustadt’s 
formulation) — or how the branches can effectively mobilize their constitutional powers 
and institutional tools vis-a-vis the other branch.36 The Constitution’s static legal 
framework, therefore, establishes the rules of the game that can be exploited to achieve 
the policy goals of actors within the institutions. Such a focus on institutional actors and 
how they can maximize their preferences in politics provides no criteria for evaluating 
the constitutional dimensions of particular settlements in a normative sense (i.e. such 
analysis does not explain how the purposes of the constitutional text inspire the motives 
and actions of officeholders in political contestation).  
Conclusion of the Traditional View 
Whereas an overemphasis on the Constitution’s legal parameters prizes settlement 
for the sake of coordination and stability, an overemphasis on checks and balances 
stresses politics — or whatever the branches can get away with — within the parameters 
of the static legal text. While it is impossible to fully distinguish the Constitution’s legal 
framework from checks and balances (especially since political scientists who emphasize 
checks and balances take the legal framework as a given, as the rules of the game), what 
should be clear from the preceding discussion is the extent to which the Constitution’s 
 
36 See, for example, William G. Howell, Power without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential 
Action (Princeton [N.J.]: Princeton University Press, 2003); Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution: 
Legislative Authority and the Separation of Powers (Yale University Press, 2017). 
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governing apparatus is often understood in terms of constraint rather than positive 
purposes that can be achieved through differentiated institutions. This is not to say that all 
scholars and practitioners hold this view. However, it is a dominant enough conception 
that it is appropriate to characterize the emphasis on constraint as the “traditional” view. 
Moreover, the emphasis on constraint, as I will demonstrate in my case studies, 
undergirds modern understandings of the purposes of separation of powers and the Court 
has increasingly policed the boundaries of the political branches based on legal 
understandings of the Constitution’s assignments of power to the political branches. 
Hence, the traditional view of separation of powers is not merely a view held by 
academics. It is the view espoused by the judiciary when it settles interbranch disputes — 
and as the political branches increasingly legalize their disputes as well. 
SEPARATION OF POWERS AS A POLITICAL ARCHITECTURE 
While traditional accounts of the purposes of separation of powers — regardless 
of whether they emphasize the enforcement of legal boundaries or checking and 
balancing — tend to focus on how the constitutional design is meant to make it more 
difficult for the government to act, constraint is not the primary focus of the purposes of 
separation of powers as explained by The Federalist. Indeed, Both Hamilton and 
Madison make clear that the Constitution was not intended to be a static legal framework 
incapable of meeting the demands of modern government. Time and again, The 
Federalist responds to fears by Anti-federalists about the extensive powers of the 
proposed national government. For example, Anti-Federalists worried about the dangers a 
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standing army poses to republican forms of government during times of peace and 
opposed the Constitution on the grounds that there was no explicit constitutional 
prohibition on such a practice. The Federalists’ response to Anti-Federalist fears was to 
argue that legal limitations on powers granted inhibit the ability of the government to 
respond to the unforeseen exigencies of changing circumstances, and, consequently, can 
undermine the purposes of the constitutional order rather than advance them. As Madison 
wrote in Federalist 41: 
How could a readiness for war in time of peace be safely prohibited, unless we 
could prohibit, in like manner, the preparations and establishments of every 
hostile nation? The means of security can only be regulated by the means and the 
danger of attack. They will, in fact, be ever determined by these rules, and by no 
others. It is in vain to oppose Constitutional barriers to the impulse of self-
preservation. It is worse than in vain; because it plants in the Constitution itself 
necessary usurpations of power, every precedent of which is a germ of 
unnecessary and multiplied repetitions.37 
 
 In other words, legal limitations on the power of the government meant to make 
government safe can actually serve to do the opposite, undermining the effective capacity 
of the government to respond to unforeseen circumstances. While a standing army might, 
as the Anti-Federalists urged, prove dangerous to the people’s liberty, the people’s liberty 
would be more imperiled without a government capable of effectively providing for the 
common defense. The Federalist thus argues that the powers of the national government 
“ought to exist without limitation, because it is impossible to foresee or to define the 
 
37 Hamilton et al., 253. 
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extent of national exigencies, and the correspondent extent and the variety of the means 
which may be necessary to satisfy them.”38  
 The question thus becomes how the framers attempted to construct a government 
with the capacity to achieve fundamental constitutional objectives while also ensuring the 
safety of the people. The answer to this question can be found in the ways in which the 
framers constructed a government that differed altogether from separation of powers as it 
had been traditionally understood (and as it is often incorrectly understood today) and 
substituted in its place, as Jeffrey K. Tulis and Nicole Mellow have recently argued, an 
altogether new political design meant to vindicate the competing aims of the 
constitutional order — expression of majoritarian will, vindication of national security 
aims and energetic administration of government, and the protection of individual rights 
— through differently configured institutions brought into conflict by their shared 
powers.39 The Constitution is thus an attempt to secure certain positive goods through 
differentiated institutions brought into political conflict. 
 As already noted, the Constitution does not have a free-standing separation of 
powers principle that can be easily invoked to settle interbranch disputes based on the 
type of power appropriately wielded by certain types of institutions, and, in fact, the 
Constitution violates the terms of what might be considered a pure separation of powers 
doctrine by mixing the different types of powers within and between the various 
 
38 Hamilton et al., 149. Emphasis in the original. 
39 Jeffrey K. Tulis and Nicole Mellow, Legacies of Losing in American Politics, 54–59; Tulis, The 
Rhetorical Presidency, 41–45; Zeisberg, War Powers. 
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branches.40 James Madison’s answer to the charge that the Constitution violated 
separation of powers was to argue in Federalist 48 that separation of powers was an 
unworkable concept on its own terms. Parchment barrier distinctions, Madison argued, 
were not sufficient to prevent the encroachment of the branches on the powers of the 
others:  
Will it be sufficient to mark, with precision, the boundaries of these departments, 
in the constitution of the government, and to trust to these parchment barriers 
against the encroaching spirit of power? This is the security which appears to 
have been principally relied on by the compilers of most of the American 
constitutions. But experience assures us, that the efficacy of the provision has 
been greatly overrated; and that some more adequate defense is indispensably 
necessary for the more feeble, against the more powerful, members of the 
government.41  
 
 Given that power is of an “encroaching” nature, Madison asserts, it is to be 
expected that the most powerful branch will subsume the powers of the other branches 
irrespective of the strictures of the law. In republican forms of government, Madison 
continued, the legislative power necessarily predominates, and is “everywhere extending 
the sphere of its activity, and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex.” Madison’s 
argument, moreover, was not merely theoretical. Rather, Madison argued, after 
canvassing governmental practice in the states at the time, that separation of powers 
principles on paper had proven insufficient in the practice of the state governments, 
resulting in legislative despotism as the legislative branches usurped the functions of the 
other branches.   
 
40 Manning, “Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation,” 1944–45. 
41 Hamilton et al., The Federalist Papers, 305. 
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The solution to this problem, therefore, was to make the legislative, executive, 
and judicial branches independent of each other by grants of power derived from the 
Constitution, and to give each of the branches all the powers necessary to achieve their 
governmental objectives while also giving them “partial agency” in the powers of the 
other branches — checks meant to influence, though not to control, the judgments and 
actions of the other branches. These checks rely on the ambition of office holders in each 
of the branches to advance and defend the prerogatives of their branches vis-à-vis the 
others — as Madison famously declared in Federalist 51, “ambition must be made to 
counteract ambition.”  
But what is important to stress is that the Federalist’s account of separation of 
powers is more than just an improvement on the older version of separation of powers 
urged by the Anti-federalists, just modified with the addition of checks and balances so 
that separation could be better maintained. Rather, the framers departed, although subtly, 
from the classical understanding of separation of powers advanced by the Anti-
Federalists, pointing to the difficulty, even impossibility, of differentiating different types 
of power from each other in the first place. Madison notes this theoretical impossibility in 
Federalist 37: 
When we pass from the works of nature, in which all the delineations are 
perfectly accurate, and appear to be otherwise only from the imperfection of the 
eye which surveys them, to the institutions of man, in which the obscurity arises 
as well from the object itself as from the organ by which it is contemplated, we 
must perceive the necessity of moderating still further our expectations and hopes 
from the efforts of human sagacity. Experience has instructed us that no skill in 
the science of government has yet been able to discriminate and define, with 
sufficient certainty, its three great provinces the legislative, executive, and 
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judiciary; or even the privileges and powers of the different legislative branches. 
Questions daily occur in the course of practice, which prove the obscurity which 
reins in these subjects, and which puzzle the greatest adepts in political science.42 
 
As Tulis and Mellow argue, The Federalist never attempts to define powers by their 
natures and to then assign those powers to the appropriate branch — as would be 
appropriate if the framers were merely concerned with maintaining strict legal division 
between the branches. Rather, the latter half of the Federalist (52-85) is about how 
differently designed institutions can serve positive functions in the constitutional order by 
bringing to bear different qualities and perspectives on politics.  
For example, Congress is the institution meant to reflect the views of a diverse 
citizenry, geographically dispersed across the nation, by bringing these voices into a 
plural body in such a way as to foster deliberation — or at least to make deliberation 
more likely. The different sizes and term lengths of the House and Senate — as well as 
differing modes of election — are indicative, moreover, of the fact that public opinion is 
not some monolithic entity, but, rather, that there are short-term and long-term interests, 
and that adequate provision should be made for the expression of these different 
majoritarian perspectives.43 In fact, Madison makes clear in Federalist 62-63 that the 
Senate is not merely a checking body, but a deliberative body meant to bring a different, 
more stable, perspective on issues of public importance. While democratic government 
should be close to the people, provision must also be made for the long-term views of the 
people. 
 
42 Hamilton et al., The Federalist Papers, 224. 
43 Federalist 62-63. 
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The independence and unity of the executive branch — as well as a more open-
ended grant of executive power — is meant to induce energy to ensure the effective 
administration of government and the ability to effectively wield the foreign affairs 
powers of the United States by structuring an institution to be able to move with great 
speed, secrecy, and dispatch.44 While deliberation on the merits of policy is an essential 
quality for democratic governance, so too is decisive action to administer the government 
and to summon the common strength in the foreign arena. As Hamilton wrote in 
Federalist 70, “[i]n the legislature, promptitude of decision is oftener an evil than a 
benefit. The differences of opinion, and the jarring of parties in that department of the 
government, though they may sometimes obstruct salutary plans, yet often promote 
deliberation and circumspection, and serve to check excesses in the majority.”45 
However, such delay — caused by plurality — is a dangerous quality in the executive, 
merely counteracting “those qualities in the executive which are the most necessary 
ingredients in its composition — vigor and exposition, and this without counterbalancing 
any good.”46 Providing for an energetic executive, moreover, was no small concern for 
the framers after the Articles of Confederation’s failure to make adequate provision for 
effective executive power, leaving the administration of the government for both 
domestic and foreign affairs in the hands of Congress and executive officials fully 
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responsible to it.47 The creation of the presidency was thus an attempt to increase the 
overall capacity of the government, to make government better and more effective. The 
structural dimensions of the executive branch — independence, unity, competent powers, 
and re-eligibility — are the ingredients for securing the energy sufficient to achieve these 
ends.48 
Finally, the Court is biased towards the protection of rights, and its mode of 
selection by the political branches (to ensure appropriately qualified people sit on the 
bench), life tenure, and a small, collegial body are meant to induce the quality of 
judgment in particular cases and controversies. Its insulation from public pressures 
enables it, moreover, to rule in a disinterested manner even against the majoritarian 
impulses more likely to be expressed through a legislature closely connected to swings in 
public opinion.  
The branches, therefore, based on their differing electoral constituencies and 
institutional designs make provision for different perspectives on the public good, 
perspectives, moreover, that at times conflict. Majoritarian will at times conflicts with the 
need for decisive action outside of the parameters considered by Congress. Individual 
rights are often in deep conflict with both majoritarian will and the decisive actions of the 
President to vindicate the aims of national security. Because of these different 
institutionally-induced perspectives, when confronted with the same question it is 
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possible, even likely, that the branches will reach different conclusions.49 For example, 
the President represents the people as a whole and the unitary nature of his office and his 
role as Commander-in-Chief induce the president to think more in terms of national 
security than Congress perhaps would. Congress, on the other hand, with its power of the 
purse and its conglomeration of viewpoints from local constituencies across the country 
might face a different set of criteria regarding, for example, the use of financial resources, 
which might place it at odds with the President’s judgments about how to use the nation’s 
resources to vindicate national security concerns. Buoyed by a sense of urgency during an 
international crisis, the political branches might adopt certain policies meant, at least 
ostensibly, to protect the nation, but do so in a way that infringes the rights of a particular 
minority group. The judiciary, at least theoretically, can intervene to ensure that laws are 
generally applicable and do not unfairly target minority groups.  
Checks and balances, moreover, are the mechanism by which each branch can 
defend its judgments vis-à-vis the other branches. For example, the President can veto 
legislation, and has a great deal of discretion to direct the administration of the laws with 
an eye towards the national interest. Similarly, Congress can maintain oversight of the 
executive’s discretion, and can enforce its own judgments through the legislative process 
by refusing to fund presidential initiatives it disagrees with, or by impeaching a President 
who consistently flouts the deliberative will of Congress.50 What is important to note here 
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is the dynamism of the constitutional framework as the branches engage in politics across 
time. The exigencies of political circumstances and the president’s structural capacities to 
act energetically mean that the president might at times act in ways unanticipated by 
Congress based on the needs of the moment. Congress, however, has regular checks — 
for example, through regular appropriations and power over appointments, investigations, 
and even impeachment — it can use to oversee, influence, or contest presidential actions 
up and to the point of removing the president from office.51 While the Constitution 
requires — as argued in The Federalist — an executive branch that can act with 
sufficient discretion and dispatch based on his own perception of the needs of the 
moment, Congress can influence how the president uses that authority by, for example, 
limiting the types of weapons available to the military. As Josh Chafetz argues, a 
Congress that is concerned about the United States’ assertions of power across the globe 
might refuse to fund new aircraft carriers or new weapons.52 Indeed, “[f]uture presidents’ 
decisions about whether or not to initiate a conflict, and how to do so, would be made in 
the shadow of those past appropriations decisions.”53  
What should be clear from this picture is that legal assignments of power are more 
than just about restraint, but about creating institutions that think and act in different 
ways in the service of securing the positive goods of the constitutional order. Checks and 
balances are not just about thwarting action, but about bringing these different 
 
51 For an overview of the tools and capacities Congress has available to contest presidential uses of political 
authority, see: Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution. 
52 Chafetz, 74–77. 
53 Chafetz, 74. 
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institutional perspectives on politics into productive contestation both in particular 
moments of conflict and across time. John Finn thus characterizes American separation 
of powers as essentially a “dialogic device, or a means of establishing constitutional 
conversation among the branches.”54  Moreover, there is not a legal principle that can 
adjudicate the branches’ competing political claims —  unless, of course, the law itself or 
the application of the law infringes rights. Rather, as Josh Chafetz argues, “political 
authority is largely generated through politics and is therefore not knowable in advance 
of politics.”55 What matters is not merely text, history, and structure, or some legal rule 
derived in advance about the functional uses of power. Rather, the branches gain political 
authority by the ways in which they use their determinate constitutional tools in politics 
to advance competing political claims in particular circumstances. For example, no legal 
rule can determine the scope of executive privilege in advance of the political 
circumstances that give rise to such claims. Indeed, both branches have political claims 
regarding such information — the president to withhold information from Congress for, 
say, national security reasons, and Congress’s need to have information to debate about 
presidential uses of authority.56 There is no meaningful legal principle that can be 
invoked that could possibly balance the competing claims beyond the branches’ own 
negotiation in politics. 
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If separation of powers is understood in this way — as a political architecture 
meant to achieve governmental ends by bringing differently structured institutions into 
productive conflict — then the unit of analysis for constitutional fidelity is different than 
if separation of powers is understood purely in terms of assertions of legal power. The 
institutions can be assessed by the ways in which they bring to bear the particular 
governance capacities that are unique to them. This is the argument Mariah Zeisberg 
makes in a sophisticated elaboration of the political conception of separation of powers.57 
Indeed, Zeisberg argues that it is possible to derive standards from the structures of 
differentiated institutions that can be used to evaluate how the branches engage in 
politics.58 How well does Congress engage in deliberation, bringing different (even 
marginal) points of view into robust debate? How well does Congress wield its 
investigative powers, debating the uses of presidential exercises of power and thus 
constraining presidential discretion in the future by making clear what it would consider 
acceptable executive action? These are important questions given Zeisberg’s topic of 
choice — war powers — insofar as many of the key definitions of the debate (such as 
what constitutes an act of war in the first place) require political construction and 
elaboration rather than stemming from clear-cut and determinate constitutional language. 
How well does the executive branch wield its unique intelligence and epistemic 
capacities? Zeisberg thus argues that the branches achieve what she refers to as 
“constitutional authority” not through mere assertions of their legal power, but in how 
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well the branches perform their unique governing tasks, engaging the other branches 
responsively in politics.59 The structures of the branches, in other words, point to political 
duties. The branches do not share power merely to check or frustrate the other branch in 
the exercise of their power, but to bring certain positive goods to the practice of self-
government. Why else have differentiated institutions in the first place if the structural 
dimensions of different institutions cannot provide insight into how to evaluate the 
functions of those institutions in politics? Constitutional fidelity is measured not by 
assertions of legal power but by how well the branches wield their institutional capacities 
in service of their powers. Constitutional authority, Zeisberg contends, is not solely 
derived from the legal text, but from how the branches mobilize their unique institutional 
capacities in service of governmental ends in politics, providing content-dependent 
reasons to obey.60 
TEXTUAL BOUNDARIES AND HIGHER ORDER PRINCIPLES 
 
This dissertation elaborates on the framework presented above, demonstrating 
how the political branches should be guided by the overarching constitutional principles 
undergirding the text. In particular, this dissertation is concerned with how the political 
branches should negotiate their respective boundaries in ways that are constitutional but 
not legalistic (i.e. based on the literal meaning of textual provisions). This dissertation 
thus builds on the notion — developed extensively by others, as outlined above — that 
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institutions are meant to perform positive functions in the constitutional order through 
their conflict rather than to merely provide a static legal framework that constrains 
governmental action. Understood as a dynamic political order in which the institutions 
advance their structurally-induced prerogatives and perspectives in politics it becomes 
possible to see — and to evaluate — how the branches can adapt and respond to changed 
circumstances while maintaining the basic character of the constitutional order through 
political negotiation about their respective boundaries — a political process that is 
subverted by an overly legalized conception of the powers of the branches. While similar 
to Zeisberg’s relational account of separation of powers, the argument of this dissertation 
differs from Zeisberg’s structural account insofar as the emphasis here is on how the 
legalization (or judicialization) of political disputes misses the higher order principles 
undergirding the text and the branches shared powers, whereas Zeisberg focuses on 
abstracting standards to assess the interactions of the political branches from the 
structures of institutions themselves.  
The central argument of this dissertation is that legal settlement of interbranch 
boundaries based on literal understandings of constitutional provisions subverts rather 
than perpetuates the purposes of the separation of powers system, substituting narrow 
legal reasoning for constitutional politics. Understanding the text in an overly legalistic 
sense, without attention to the positive purposes of the Constitution, moreover, can lead 
the branches to fail to fulfill their constitutional functions, using the letter-of-the-law as 
legal pretense for abandoning constitutional duties signified by their powers. This is true, 
moreover, whether overly literal interpretations of the text are issued by the judiciary 
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when it polices the textual boundaries between the branches or whether the branches fail 
to be sufficiently motivated by constitutional reasoning in their own political interactions. 
Furthermore, a central claim of this dissertation is that there are instances when a 
departure from the clear meaning of a textual provision might be justifiable from a 
constitutional perspective depending on the circumstances that give rise to the action and 
the types of arguments the branches make to justify such departures. These justifications, 
however, must be circumscribed by the particular circumstances that give rise to the 
conflict — hence the problem with bright-line, legalistic rules that do not allow for 
context-dependent negotiation or contestation between the branches.  
How, then, should the Constitution be understood such that what would be 
considered a clear violation of the constitutional text, from a legalistic point of view, can, 
in practice, be justifiable in certain contexts? An answer to this question requires 
understanding the extent to which constitutional provisions are attempts to achieve 
certain outcomes or constitutional goods — or, conversely, to prevent certain outcomes. 
The Constitution, in other words, rests on certain theoretical and normative 
underpinnings. The Constitution is an attempt, albeit imperfect, to instantiate principled 
commitments in the text in order to make provision for those goods or outcomes in 
politics.61 Hence, the Constitution is the framers’ attempt to structure the polity they 
envision in a text. We better understand the text according to its larger purposes and 
underlying presuppositions, interpreted in light of the polity it seeks to construct. As Will 
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Harris argues, unlike a will, letter, or novel, the Constitution “supposes itself to set up a 
structured world, a second text, where people live and act together.”62 Evaluating 
constitutional fidelity in interbranch disputes involving their textual boundaries, 
therefore, requires understanding how the branches are motivated by the higher order 
principles undergirding the textual provisions that bring them into contact with each other 
and can muster political arguments about the purposes of the text in light of their own 
institutional prerogatives in particular circumstances. 
 As I will show in my case studies, when the Court intervenes in a way that 
focuses on the literal meaning of the text, without considering its underlying purposes, it 
can undermine the deeper principle behind the constitutional provision in question. 
Textual provisions meant to bring about certain outcomes — or to prevent others — are 
premised upon empirical assumptions that may or may not hold true over time (or in 
particular circumstances), especially given the contingencies that are endemic to politics. 
Even the Court has acknowledged in other areas of its jurisprudence that the literal 
application of a textual provision to changed circumstances (or to circumstances not 
expected by the drafters of that provision) might undermine its larger constitutional 
purpose. A particularly striking example of this was Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes’ 
majority opinion in Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell (1934).63 Chief 
Justice Hughes argued that, in certain circumstances, upholding the underlying principle 
of the Contracts Clause required departure from the specific prohibition in the 
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63 290 U.S. 398 (1934) 
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constitutional text. At issue in the case was a moratorium law on home mortgages, passed 
in Minnesota at the height of the Great Depression, that briefly extended the time frame 
for payment and postponed foreclosure sales, thus violating the express terms of the 
contracts. The law was challenged on the grounds that it unconstitutionally impaired the 
obligation of contracts. In sustaining the law, Chief Justice Hughes acknowledged the 
purposes for which the Contracts Clause was enacted. Indeed, at the time of the founding 
the plight of debtors led to an “ignoble array of legislative schemes for the defeat of 
creditors and the invasion of contractual obligations” such that “the confidence essential 
to prosperous trade had been undermined and the utter destruction of credit was 
threatened.”64 The Clause was thus intended to ensure the rights of creditors in times of 
economic emergency. But Hughes pitched the purpose of the Clause at a higher level of 
abstraction to demonstrate that the Minnesota law — which merely delayed the 
enforcement of contracts — accorded with the underlying purpose of the Clause to 
“safeguard the economic structure upon which the good of all depends.”65 While at the 
time of the founding the economic well-being of the nation was undermined by 
legislative schemes to undermine creditors, the purpose of the delay in Minnesota was not 
a class-based act intended to undermine creditors, but, rather, a narrowly tailored attempt 
(insofar as the law merely delayed the enforcement of the contract for a short period of 
time) to buttress and safeguard the economic conditions upon which such contractual 
relationships relied in the first place. In other words, if the framers could see conditions 
 
64 Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell 290 U.S. 398 (1934), at 428. 
65 Ibid. 442. 
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as they are in the present they might do things differently than they did in light of their 
own circumstances.66 The principle, or the end to be attained, is more important than the 
literal, and context-dependent, application of that principle. 
While Blaisdell does not implicate separation of powers, it does demonstrate the 
ways in which constitutional provisions are intended to bring about certain fundamental 
purposes beyond the specific intentions of the framers and the possibility of reasoning 
about those principles. Indeed, it would be impossible to foresee every possible 
contingency to which a provision could apply. But it is possible, nevertheless, to infer the 
fundamental principle animating the specific application and to reason about how it can 
be appropriately applied in new contexts such that the fundamental principle expressed 
by the provision is not undermined by its mechanical application. This, moreover, is a 
fundamental task if the Constitution is to provide a framework for good governance as 
opposed to a static legal text to be applied without reference to constitutional goods and 
how those goods can be achieved in new and unanticipated circumstances.67  
Returning to separation of powers, this dissertation analyzes the purposes behind 
the branches’ shared powers in an attempt to show how those powers ultimately point to 
and are meant to foster a type of politics that is undermined by too narrow a focus on the 
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literal instantiation of the textual commitments. By leaving political disputes about the 
limits of their shared powers to be worked out between the branches, political actors are 
thus encouraged to make constitutional arguments about the merits of their case — 
arguments framed in terms of the prerogatives of the institution they inhabit — that 
advance their position in politics subject to contestation from the other branch. This 
political contestation about interbranch boundaries — guided by constitutional concerns 
as opposed to narrow legal reasoning — plays out in front of the public which, in turn, 
has political criteria to evaluate the branches rather than technical legal reasoning that is 
obscure to the uninitiated in the legal profession. Judicialization of political disputes, on 
the other hand, is much more likely to take on the language of law in a technical sense, 
thus obscuring the political and constitutional issues animating interbranch disputes in the 
first place. Hence, the argument of this dissertation, to be elaborated through the case 
studies, is that interbranch disputes should be left solely to the political branches insofar 
as the dispute only affects the power dynamics between the branches and does not, in any 
immediate sense, adversely affect the rights of individuals. And yet, those interbranch 
disputes should not be understood in purely political terms, either. This dissertation, in 
other words, does not advocate an abandonment of the Constitution as law. Rather, it 
seeks to consider how the Constitution instantiates a political order through law and how 
the law signals larger commitments that should guide the branches in their negotiations 
about their respective boundaries. To lose sight of these overarching commitments, on the 
other hand, subverts and undermines the purposes of the constitutional design. 
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Constitutional Reasoning 
Finally, before introducing the case studies and the rationale behind their 
selection, it is worth briefly discussing in more depth what it means to reason 
constitutionally in the sense with which this dissertation uses the term. Constitutional 
reasoning is not meant to suggest that the best way to reason about the constitutional text 
should harken back to the specific intentions or views of the framers. Indeed, it is 
possible to come up with solutions to problems that would have been anathema to the 
founders but actually advance the aims they sought to achieve (as perhaps demonstrated 
by the reference to Blaisdell in the above explication). For example, the framers were 
adamantly opposed to political parties and consistently warned Americans against the 
dangers of party spirit.68 As James Ceaser has argued, however, political parties, as 
theorized and developed by Martin Van Buren, did a better job during the 19th Century 
of controlling demagoguery — which the framers believed posed one of the greatest 
dangers to constitutional democracies — than the elaborate electoral design intended to 
do so. Strong political parties based on consistent programmatic appeals to the people 
thus restrained personal ambition in the service of the party insofar as political success 
required loyalty over time to the party’s platform.69 The party system as theorized by Van 
Buren, therefore, can be seen as a more constitutional way of controlling demagoguery 
than the original electoral design, despite the framers purported views regarding the 
inefficacy of parties.  
 
68 See George Washington Farewell Address. 
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To reason constitutionally, as this dissertation uses the term, is thus to make 
principled arguments about how an action or a proposed use of power is in service of the 
larger purposes of the constitutional order. When it comes to interbranch disputes, these 
arguments are not issued as bright-line rules from the judiciary, but are subject to 
political contestation and public evaluation. At times, this dissertation relies on 
arguments from The Federalist to explain the purposes of shared powers — such as in the 
case of the Senate’s involvement in treaty ratification and the underlying purposes 
signified by that particular design choice. The Federalist, of course, is not necessarily 
representative of the views of the drafters of the Constitution in an originalist sense. Even 
so, it is perhaps the best account of the type of constitutional reasoning appropriate to the 
constitutional enterprise insofar as it attempted to give the best reasons for the specific 
design choices and how such design choices are reflective of positive goods. At other 
times, this dissertation — as in the recess appointments case study — points to what 
could have been a valid constitutional argument advanced by a branch, even as the 
particular interaction under study took on an overly legalistic frame given judicial 
interference in the contestation. In that sense, this dissertation is prescriptive of a type of 
political contestation. Finally, there are times when the branches do not engage the 
constitutional text per se, but are induced to reason about the purposes undergirding their 
institution and adapt mechanisms that advance both the aims of the constitutional order 
while also preserving the purposes of the institution in the first place — as in the 
development of the legislative veto. The needs of government and the ambition of 
officeholders (in the Madisonian sense) guide the debate as the branches negotiate their 
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boundaries in politics. The point here is that insofar as the Constitution’s institutional 
structures and its assignments of power are means to ends, the branches should reason 
about constitutional purposes in their interactions, this reasoning guided by and 
constrained by their legal powers, but not reducible to specific textual instantiations of 
their powers. The examples this dissertation uses at times are not legalistic standards but 
are meant to be reflective of a way of thinking about the Constitution (whether self-
consciously or not) that seeks to advance its aims in politics rather than to allow a letter-
of-the-law understanding of the Constitution undermine it.  
CASE STUDY OVERVIEW 
The burden of this dissertation is borne by three case studies. Ultimately, the 
veracity of the claim that an overly legalistic notion of the Constitution’s assignments of 
power cannot capture the capaciousness of (and indeed can subvert) constitutional 
politics is more easily shown through an examination of case studies than by theoretical 
explication. The purpose of the case studies is not to prove that the separation of powers 
system is understood too legalistically in an empirical sense, but to show how to think 
politically about the Constitution in different contexts and how narrowly legalistic 
reasoning about the Constitution’s assignments of power can undermine constitutional 
purposes. Insofar as the aim of this dissertation is to analyze higher order principles in 
separation of powers disputes, there are any number of potential case studies that could 
serve to illuminate the core issues of the dissertation.  
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This dissertation will examine three cases: the legislative veto, executive 
agreements, and recess appointments. The cases thus cover three major issues of 
governance — delegation and lawmaking, foreign affairs and international agreements, 
and the modern appointments process — and are, therefore, reflective of a broad array of 
constitutional concerns. The case studies, moreover, are also fairly representative of 
different types of interbranch conflict. The legislative veto case study is about judicial 
intervention into, and disruption of, a working relationship between the branches based 
on several decades of constitutional practice. The case study thus shows how the 
branches had adapted the lawmaking process to both achieve governmental aims — 
insofar as both branches agreed that delegation was necessary to do so — while ensuring 
the involvement of both branches, even if in an attenuated capacity. Judicial resolution 
based on a literal interpretation of the Presentment Clause, however, undermined the 
branches’ working relationship, subverting the larger aims of separation of powers 
insofar as the Court sanctioned widespread delegation, thus allowing the concentration of 
legislative and executive power within the executive branch and the administrative state.  
The executive agreements case study is about an issue where the judiciary has not 
intervened (given the foreign affairs context) and, therefore, provides some insight into 
how the branches negotiate their boundaries without the looming presence of the 
judiciary. Moreover, the executive agreements case study examines the extent to which 
constitutional practice largely reflects the kinds of constitutional concerns that the Treaty 
Clause points to even as practice, at least upon first glance, departs significantly from its 
literal terms. In other words, as executive agreements have largely displaced treaties, 
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constitutional practice largely reflects a principled division of labor insofar as there seems 
to be a qualitative difference between the types of agreements that are conducted as 
treaties versus executive agreements. While many legal scholars and practitioners treat 
the varying types of international agreements as completely legally interchangeable, 
constitutional practice reveals that such agreements are not politically interchangeable. 
Finally, the recess appointments controversy presents perhaps the hardest case for 
the dissertation insofar as it argues that the Court should have refused to rule on the 
merits of the case in Noel Canning even though President Obama violated the clear and 
express terms of the Recess Appointments Clause by making recess appointments during 
pro forma Senate sessions. As will become clearer in the case study, the Court’s 
intervention obscured the higher order commitment of the Clause to maintain 
governmental functions. This subverted the political dynamics by changing the terms of 
the debate. The branches were induced to argue about the technical meaning of recess 
rather than to engage, and to make arguments about, the particular circumstances that 
gave rise to the recess appointments in the first place.  
These case studies, taken together, show how the constitutional text signals a 
hierarchy of values that are typically missed by focusing purely on the literal level of the 
law. Understanding the separation of powers as a dynamic political order instantiated by 
the Constitution thus reveals how the Constitution is adaptable to the various crises and 
exigencies of changing circumstances. The Constitution, however, could not be 
completely elastic and maintain its fundamental character. The limits to its elasticity, 
however, are better maintained through political negotiation by the branches, tethered to 
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legitimate constitutional claims deduced from, but not reducible too, the text. While 
enforcing the letter of the law seems to better maintain the Constitution’s fundamental 
character, this dissertation demonstrates how a narrow focus on law can undermine rather 
than maintain the fundamental character of the constitutional order. 
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The Legal Undermining, and the Persistence, of Constitutional Politics: 
The Case of the Legislative Veto 
INTRODUCTION 
There is little doubt that the legislative veto was one of the most consequential 
constitutional innovations in the history of American government before it was 
invalidated by the Supreme Court in INS v. Chadha (1983) in one of the most sweeping 
judicial acts in American history. The legislative veto was a mechanism by which 
Congress delegated legislative power by statute to the executive branch or to bureaucratic 
agencies while retaining the ability to veto executive actions or proposed bureaucratic 
rules in particular instances. Congress used several variants of the legislative veto, 
including joint resolutions that required the president’s signature (or veto). However, the 
most controversial legislative vetoes — the vetoes at issue in and invalidated by the Court 
in Chadha — were those that did not meet the Constitution’s requirements for lawmaking 
(bicameralism and presentment). For example, Congress could pass a concurrent 
resolution of approval, thus requiring that both houses approve a proposed rule before it 
could go into effect. Alternatively, Congress could allow proposed rules to go into effect 
after a specified period of time (usually 60 days) unless one or both houses disapproved 
by passing either a simple or concurrent resolution of disapproval, respectively.   
Legislative vetoes were first passed in appropriations acts dealing with executive 
re-organization in 1933, granting the President wide discretion and latitude to re-organize 
the executive branch by executive order unless Congress passed a resolution of 
disapproval within 60 days. Presidents, of course, lobbied for re-organization authority so 
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that such reorganizations would not be stymied by going through the full, and 
cumbersome, legislative process where such bills were often easily defeated. Congress, 
on the other hand, assuaged worries about congressional abdication by attaching 
legislative vetoes to this vast transfer of legislative power to the executive branch.  
While the legislative veto was only used sporadically over the course of the next 
few decades, during the 1960s Congress began to use it frequently, especially as it 
increasingly delegated legislative power to the executive branch and to bureaucratic 
agencies. Legislative vetoes were included in a number of statutes that were part of the 
legislative response to fears of an “imperial presidency” during the Nixon era, including 
the War Powers Act of 1974, the Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974, the Federal 
Trade Act of 1974, among many others. During the 1970s Congress enacted 353 
legislative veto provisions, an increase of more than 300 percent from the previous 
decade.70 This increased use of the legislative veto makes sense given the vast increase in 
regulatory authority and rulemaking that occurred during the same time period. For 
example, from 1955-1960, Congress enacted 37 regulatory statutes compared to 119 
passed by Congress between 1966 and 1975.71 As bureaucratic rulemaking skyrocketed 
in the 1970s, many government reformers called for a generic legislative veto by which 
all agency regulations would be subject to some form of the legislative veto.  
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Given the expansion of the national government’s prerogatives following the New 
Deal, and the huge growth of government in the decades after, supporters of the 
legislative veto viewed it as an essential mechanism for Congress to retain control of its 
delegated powers and ensure democratic accountability over the administrative state. 
Such delegation was regarded — as well as sanctioned and endorsed by the judiciary — 
as essential given the complexity of modern government and the vast array of issues that 
require national attention. Without such controls over delegation many contended that 
Congress commits “legiscide,” surrendering democratic oversight by ceding power to 
unelected and unaccountable bureaucrats.72 Others, however, viewed the increased use of 
the legislative veto as an assault on presidential power and an example of congressional 
overreach.73  
The purpose of this chapter is to show that the legislative veto, while seemingly a 
departure from the literal strictures of the constitutional text, was actually an example of 
the dynamism of the Constitution’s separation of powers, an attempt to realize the energy 
of the executive branch while balancing that efficiency with the aims of republican 
government.74 That the legislative veto is a political invention meant to bring to bear 
separation of powers values on the problems of modern government is particularly 
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evident given that the legislative veto merely alters the order of interbranch action 
without changing the substantive involvement of the two branches when it comes to 
lawmaking. In other words, the legislative veto — itself authorized by a statute passed by 
both houses of Congress and signed by the president — merely reverses the sequence of 
interbranch action, allowing the executive branch to engage in the lawmaking function 
reserved to Congress by the Constitution while ensuring that such rules (which are 
themselves legally binding on citizens) only go into effect so long as both houses of 
Congress agree. The first part of this chapter will trace the development of and rationale 
for the legislative veto in light of the need to delegate, noting, where relevant, how the 
legislative veto worked in varying policy contexts, such as executive re-organization, 
budgets and impoundments, foreign policy, and administrative rule-making. In short, this 
section will demonstrate how the legislative veto was an essential mechanism for 
bringing to bear the competing desiderata of American constitutionalism on the complex 
problems of modern government. This, of course, is not to say that the legislative veto is 
devoid of problems, as amply noted by many political science critics of the veto.75 The 
benefits of the veto, I argue, outweigh the costs.  
The Supreme Court, however, ruled the legislative veto unconstitutional in INS v. 
Chadha (1983), claiming it violated separation of powers doctrine. The Court’s sweeping 
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decision thus invalidated over 300 laws — more laws in this one instance than in all other 
Supreme Court actions combined.76 According to the Court, once Congress delegates to 
executive officials any subsequent action it takes to exercise control over those 
delegations must meet the constitutional requirements for legislation — including 
bicameralism and presentment — outlined in Article I, Section 7, Clause 2. While the 
Court conceded that the legislative veto is an efficient mechanism for adapting the 
government to modern circumstances, it was nevertheless struck down as an 
unconstitutional shortcut through the separation of powers framework because Congress 
acted in a non-legislative way, thus meddling in the administration of government.  
The Court’s decision in Chadha, however, was deeply problematic insofar as the 
Court attempted to make tidy categorizations about types of powers based solely on who 
wields those powers — i.e. when power is wielded by an executive official it is 
presumptively executive. In this way, the Court not only mischaracterized the 
fundamental nature of the constitutional design by overly emphasizing “parchment 
barrier” distinctions, but ultimately, as Justice White argued in his trenchant dissent, led 
to the very phenomenon the Court attempted to avoid with its formalistic reading of the 
Constitution: the concentration of legislative, executive, and judicial power in the same 
hands. Moreover, the scope of the Court’s decision was particularly troubling given that 
the legislative veto at issue in Chadha differed substantially from other contexts in which 
Congress implemented the veto because the particular veto in Chadha dealt with quasi-
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judicial power in an adjudicatory setting rather than the wielding of Congress’s delegated 
legislative power. In this light, then, the Court went well beyond the question at issue in 
the case, disrupting decades of interbranch negotiation and compromise. 
Finally, this chapter will conclude by considering the impact of the Court’s ruling 
on legislative vetoes. While Congress’s ability to retain oversight of its delegated 
legislative power has been substantially curtailed — as evidenced by the failure of the 
Congressional Review Act’s (CRA) joint resolution of disapproval mechanism — the 
legislative veto has survived in other forms.77 Legislative veto surrogates, though not as 
powerful in a formal sense, operate much like the legislative vetoes invalidated by 
Chadha. The persistence of the legislative veto points to the vitality of the Constitution’s 
political architecture. 
THE PROBLEM (AND THE NECESSITY) OF DELEGATION 
The legislative veto was invented as the size of the national government 
expanded. While several administrative departments were established during the 
founding era — the departments of state, war, and treasury — the growth of the modern 
administrative state began in the 1880s, following rapid changes in industrialization and 
urbanization. Moreover, the scope of the national government and the rise of the modern 
administrative state occurred with great rapidity during the 1930s as the national 
government responded to the unprecedented economic challenges during the Great 
Depression.  
 
77 Louis Fisher, “The Legislative Veto: Invalidated, It Survives,” Law and Contemporary Problems 56, no. 
4 (Autumn 1993): 273–92; Berry, The Modern Legislative Veto, 84–107. 
 52 
Article I of the Constitution explicitly states that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein 
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States.” Even so, Congress found 
itself increasingly incapable of legislating effectively given the vast array of complex 
issues on the national agenda. The national government’s role expanded into complex, 
and increasingly technical issues like transportation, communication, employment, wages 
and prices, labor relations, race relations, and the environment, among others. While 
Congress had been better equipped to handle the comparatively simple tasks of 19th 
Century government, it increasingly delegated broad legislative powers to the executive 
branch and to bureaucratic agencies.  
Such delegation has not been without controversy. Throughout the 19th and into 
the 20th Century, the judiciary followed the common law maxim of delegate potestas non 
potest delegari. This was the idea, most prominently associated with John Locke, that the 
legislature cannot delegate away its power.78 Central to the non-delegation doctrine is the 
idea that the lawmaking function cannot be delegated away from the legislature, which is 
the most representative and democratically-accountable body. In Schechter Poultry Co. v. 
United States (1935) — the last case in which the Court struck down a statute for 
excessive delegation — the Court stated that Congress can certainly delegate to others the 
responsibility for “the making of subordinate rules within prescribed limits,” but the 
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“necessity and validity of such provisions, and the wide range of administrative authority 
which has been developed by means of them, cannot be allowed to obscure the 
limitations of the authority to delegate, if our constitutional system is to be maintained.”79 
In other words, delegation of legislative power to the president or administrative agencies 
in ways that allows Congress to avoid choosing between political alternatives (as opposed 
to merely administrative or logistical options) subverts the constitutional design by 
leaving law-making authority in entities that are not electorally accountable or 
representative of the range of diverse interests in the general public.80  
The commonly received narrative is that the non-delegation doctrine played a 
crucial role in American constitutional government before it was decidedly and 
dramatically repudiated at the end of the New Deal. There is substantial evidence, 
however, that this narrative is exaggerated. Even if delegation did not occur on the scale 
with which it has since the New Deal, legislative delegation of rulemaking and 
adjudicatory power to administrators was a central feature of the national government 
almost as soon as the Constitution was ratified in 1789.81 This has perhaps been obscured 
by the fact, noted by Keith Whittington and Jason Iuliano, that the judiciary created a 
rhetoric/reality distinction in the 19th Century by coupling “strong judicial statements 
about the importance of the non-delegation principle” with “weak judicial enforcement of 
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the doctrine.”82 In the words of one constitutional commentator, the Court was able to 
have its “constitutional cake” and eat it too by upholding delegations of legislative power 
while at the same time declaring, “as hale and hearty as ever,” that Congress cannot 
delegate its legislative power.83  
The Court managed this by starting from the premise that legislative power cannot 
be delegated, while also acknowledging, as a minor premise, the necessity that some 
powers be delegated if Congress was to effectuate its will.84 The Court, therefore, 
concluded in most instances that the powers delegated must not be legislative, but, rather, 
the mere “filling in of details” of a legislative scheme, or giving the president “fact-
finding” power to determine if certain contingencies had taken place that would trigger a 
certain governmental response.85 Such obfuscations by the Court, however, masked the 
extent to which Congress’s delegated powers often involved substantial discretion to 
choose between policy alternatives that exceeded mere “fact finding” or the “filling in of 
details.”86 In short, the Court gave “lip service” to the non-delegation doctrine while at 
the same time “yielding to necessity” in light of the overwhelming need to delegate.87 
From this perspective, then, the two cases in which the Court enforced the non-delegation 
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doctrine during the New Deal for excessive delegation of legislative power — Schechter 
Poultry Corp v. US (1935) and Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan (1935) — were mere 
exceptions to the Court’s general acceptance of the need to delegate if Congress was 
going to see its legislative purposes achieved and implemented.88  
Regardless, since the New Deal era widespread and open-ended delegations of 
legislative power have been an entrenched feature of the American constitutional order 
on a scale that is not likely to be dialed back.89 While the Court today ostensibly requires 
that legislation have an “intelligible principle” that constrains the discretion of executive 
branch officials as they implement law in accordance with congressional will, the Court 
has yet to find a delegation that violates this standard — and this even as delegations 
have grown increasingly vague and open-ended, at times essentially transferring the 
legislative power of Congress in toto to the executive branch.90  
From a practical perspective, of course, such delegations of legislative power are 
justifiable for a number of reasons, especially if the national government is to have the 
ability to deal effectively with issues of national concern.91 First, given the number of 
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issues on the legislative agenda Congress can delegate to alleviate its workload, 
prioritizing and focusing on issues it deems especially important. This is particularly 
important given the number of federal regulations that reach into nearly all facets of 
American life. In 2016, for example, the Federal Register included 3,853 final rules, 
taking up 38,652 pages, exceeding the previous record set in 2013 by 46 percent.92 While 
page counts provide an imperfect assessment of the number of annual regulations, they 
do underscore the massive level of federal regulation that has existed for much of the past 
century, at an ever-increasing pace. Without the ability to delegate, the national 
government would clearly be unable to deal with all of the issues that it deems of national 
importance.  
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Table 1: Number of Pages in the Federal Register by Year93 
Moreover, many issues require expertise that average legislators are unlikely to 
have, especially given the wide range of issues confronting Congress in the modern 
world. Hence, while Congress can legislate with general goals in mind, it is often best to 
leave the specifics to those with the appropriate training and expertise. For example, it is 
not hard to imagine the difficulty with which Congress would write, say, nuclear power 
plant safety regulations (and perhaps even less difficult to imagine why most citizens 
would not want Congress to undertake such a task!). Delegation to entities that have 
resources in both time and expertise, therefore, allows Congress to ensure that federal 
 



























regulations are adapted well to the various nuances and contingencies of specific 
problems, a task that surely exceeds the capabilities of a deliberative body of 
generalists.94 Finally, the hierarchical decision-making structures in the executive branch 
and in bureaucratic agencies often produce more efficient and deliberate outcomes than 
can a deliberative body organized around committees.95 Indeed, vigorous executive 
leadership — for the sake of injecting energy into government — was one of the central 
achievements of the Constitution of 1787 after the lack of an independent and energetic 
executive branch had proved a colossal failure under the Articles of Confederation.96  
 However, even if legislative delegation to the executive branch and 
administrative agencies is a necessity for modern government on the scale with which it 
has existed during the past century — allowing the national government to deal with the 
wide range of technical issues that constitute the modern national agenda with the 
necessary flexibility and discretion — this does not necessarily entail that widespread 
delegation is an unqualified good, its benefits notwithstanding. In fact, delegation is 
deeply problematic from the perspective of democracy and public accountability, even if 
the judiciary found it nearly impossible (and completely impractical in light of modern 
demands) to enforce non-delegation as a judicial doctrine. If Congress has carte blanche 
authority to delegate its lawmaking power to other entities, then who ultimately bears 
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responsibility for the laws that citizens live under, and what control do citizens have over 
the government instituted in their name?  
Delegation can thus be contrary to constitutional structure by writing Congress — 
the most democratically-accountable and diverse governmental body — out of the 
lawmaking process, leaving the lawmaking function in the hands of unelected and 
unaccountable administrators.97 There are clear benefits to delegating to an expert 
administration for the sake of addressing particular policy questions with efficiency and 
specificity. Even so, expertise is no substitute for the political choices that a self-
governing community must make. In other words, there is not necessarily a “correct” 
answer to many public policy questions that an expert administrator will be able to 
produce outside of the political process.98 Nearly all of the questions of political life are 
certainly aided by expertise, but expertise is no substitute for the balancing of various 
commitments and political trade-offs that are central to government run by popular 
opinion.  
For example, vague congressional mandates to the EPA to issue regulations that 
ensure “clean air” (which assuredly a vast majority of Americans think is something 
worth having) do not answer the question of how to balance the need for clean air with, 
say, ensuring that businesses are not overly burdened by regulations in order to ensure 
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that unemployment rates stay low (also no doubt supported by a majority of Americans). 
As Russell Muirhead argues, the good of democratic government is not reducible to 
“getting things right.” Rather, democracy is ultimately about “making things right.”99 In 
other words, the good of democratic government is, in many respects, procedural, 
providing a space in which people can regularly adjudicate their competing claims and 
then to enact laws in accordance with the deliberative will of the majority. However, if 
the various political choices and trade-offs that constitute democratic life are not clear, 
then citizens will have a difficult time holding their government accountable and ensuring 
that laws and governmental policies reflect democratic demands.  
Many critics of open-ended delegation note that these political choices are exactly 
what delegation obscures. Theodore Lowi famously argued in his highly-influential study 
on open-ended delegations that such delegations can result in governmental “impotence” 
in the face of democratic demands.100 Because Congress often delegates with broad 
mandates that provide little, if any, guidance to administrators based on specific political 
decisions made by Congress, administrators thus have great freedom to make policy 
decisions that cater to the specific demands of the particular interest groups that are most 
impacted by regulations.101 Hence governmental policy is not the result of an overarching 
congressional plan wherein political trade-offs are made in light of general governmental 
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objectives. Rather, policy is made piecemeal in response to different interest groups 
across the bureaucracy.  
Congress can take advantage of the obscurity created by delegation. If 
administrators are making choices rather than Congress, members of Congress can pass 
the blame onto those administrators, praising or criticizing particular governmental 
decisions based on the particular audience.102 Jonathan Adler demonstrates how this 
phenomenon worked with the EPA’s decision to begin regulating greenhouse gases under 
the Clean Air Act.103 The Clean Air Act of 1970 (later amended in 1977 and 1990) 
authorized the EPA to regulate carbon emissions. During the Obama administration, 
however, the EPA began to extend its rulemaking to the regulation of greenhouse 
gases.104 While the Court sanctioned the EPA’s regulation of greenhouse gases under the 
Clean Air Act,105 Congress never passed a statute directing the agency to do this.106 In 
fact, the EPA acknowledged that to regulate greenhouse gases according to the same 
formula as carbon emissions would produce absurd results that would grind air pollution 
programs to a halt. Consequently, the EPA regulated greenhouse gases on an entirely new 
formula based on what it deemed to be reasonable absent congressional legislation on the 
matter.107 The result, of course, is that a bureaucratic agency essentially made law that 
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affects millions of people without any public deliberation or political accountability by 
elected officials in Congress. It is even more notable, according to Adler, that members 
of both parties in Congress criticized the EPA for either being too lenient or too strict “as 
if the decision to regulate greenhouse gasses was the EPA’s and the EPA’s alone.”108  
From a constitutional perspective, then, delegation can only go so far before it 
undermines core constitutional values, leaving both the legislative and executive function 
in the same hands. While such delegation might secure the energy that, according to 
Hamilton, is essential to good government,109 efficiency is only one constitutional value 
that must be held in tension with the need for public accountability. In other words, 
efficiency must be balanced with deliberation about the political choices and tradeoffs 
that any self-governing community must make.   
THE LEGISLATIVE VETO AND CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS 
The legislative veto was a political tool invented to bring the competing 
desiderata of American constitutionalism — majoritarian will and energy — to bear on 
the problem of big government by allowing Congress to approve or disapprove certain 
rules, regulations, or executive actions.110 What is important to note — and what should 
be clear from the previous section — is that the legislative veto was created in response 
to the fact of delegation of legislative power and the ways in which such delegation, 
without qualifications, can undermine core principles of separation of powers by placing 
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the lawmaking function in entities other than Congress. While there is significant 
evidence to suggest that delegation occurred long before its general acceptance by the 
Court during the New Deal — suggesting the practical impossibility of non-delegation 
given the demands of modern life — by the middle of the 20th Century such delegation 
was sanctioned by the judiciary and since that time has been a firmly entrenched feature 
of the constitutional order. As Congressman Elliott Levitas (D-GA), a primary advocate 
of the legislative veto put it: 
If you ask the man on the street who makes the laws in this country, he would 
likely tell you that Congress does. But he would be wrong, because more edicts 
regulating his life are promulgated by unelected bureaucrats than are passed by 
the elected Congress.111 
 
According to Levitas, the legislative veto was a mechanism meant to restore the political 
architecture of the Constitution by giving “the public, through their elected 
representatives, an input into and a control over the rules which govern their lives.”112 
That Congress viewed the legislative veto as an essential mechanism to restore the 
Constitution’s political architecture is evidenced by the increasing use of the legislative 
veto in all kinds of issue areas, including executive reorganization, budgets and 
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Types of Legislative Vetoes Explanation 
Concurrent Resolution of Approval Regulations only go into effect if both 
houses vote to approve 
Concurrent Resolution of Disapproval Regulations go into effect (usually after 
60 days) unless both houses vote to 
disapprove 
Simple Resolution of Disapproval Regulations go into effect (usually after 
60 days) unless one house votes to 
disapprove 
Committee approval or disapproval Regulations go into effect based on 
committee approval or disapproval 
Table 2: Types of Legislative Vetoes 
What must be noted first is that legislative vetoes were included in laws passed by 
both houses of Congress and signed by the president. Legislative vetoes were thus part of 
a political arrangement between the two branches whereby Congress agreed to delegate 
its legislative power to the executive branch (or to independent agencies) while reserving 
the right to approve or disapprove specific exercises of that legislative power.113 Often 
presidents asked for this power, and Congress at times only begrudgingly acquiesced to 
presidential requests for delegated authority. Congress attached legislative vetoes to its 
delegations of legislative power, recognizing both the need for delegation and the 
importance of reconciling such delegations with Congress’s constitutional role as the 
nation’s lawmaker. Insofar as presidents opposed the inclusion of legislative vetoes in 
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statutes (as one would expect), Congress could always refuse to delegate in the first 
place. Both branches often had good reason to compromise. 
For example, legislative vetoes were first included in laws granting the president 
the power to reorganize the executive branch by executive order rather than having to 
wait for Congress to legislate such plans. The legislative process is cumbersome and 
slow, and competing congressional pressures and compromises often stymie 
reorganization efforts rather than ensure that such reorganization efforts actually realize 
the overarching goal of efficient administration of the government. Such plans, therefore, 
are ultimately difficult to pass legislatively because opponents of the plan — perhaps 
agencies that will be discontinued or consolidated — can use all of the procedural 
mechanisms and hurdles of the legislative process to ensure defeat of a bill.  
When Congress debated whether to grant reorganization authority to President 
Roosevelt in 1938, one vocal senator at the time went so far as to say that the 
reorganization powers requested by President Roosevelt would result in “an absolute 
dictatorship,” while another said that such grants of power to the president meant that 
“pretty soon, there will not be any use for Congress,” and that lawmakers “might just as 
well stay at home and endorse Executive directives by mail.”114  When Congress finally 
granted the president re-organization authority in 1939, it only agreed to delegate power 
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by also attaching a legislative veto provision. Reorganization plans automatically went 
into effect after 60 days unless Congress passed a concurrent resolution of disapproval.115 
The benefits of this political arrangement are clear. Granting the president 
legislative authority to reorganize the executive branch subject to a legislative veto allows 
the executive branch to craft a coherent plan in an efficient manner, and opponents of the 
plan have to convince a majority in both chambers to oppose the plan rather than just a 
majority in one chamber. While the balance of power is shifted greatly to the executive 
branch, Congress still maintains a deliberative role and can prevent reorganization plans 
with which it disagrees, as it did several times during the Truman administration when it 
vetoed the creation of several proposed executive agencies. Moreover, Congress’s veto 
power gives it negotiating leverage — much like the president’s veto power in a normal 
legislative process — to ensure that plans reflect Congress’s own set of priorities. All in 
all, 102 executive reorganization plans were submitted to Congress from 1939 until 
Chadha; Congress disapproved 19 of them, demonstrating that Congress still had the 
final say even as it offered the president a more efficient alternative to the normal 
lawmaking process.116  
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The budget impoundment controversy during the Nixon administration similarly 
illuminates the logic of the legislative veto and how it was a vital component of healthy 
interbranch politics. Presidents since George Washington routinely impounded (or 
delayed the spending of) appropriated funds based on executive discretion, and this 
discretion makes sense given that changes in conditions on the ground might require 
adjustments to the actual spending of appropriated funds in ways not anticipated by 
Congress when it originally legislated. President Nixon, however, refused to spend 
money appropriated by Congress at an unprecedented level, at times attempting to change 
the policy choices made by Congress by refusing to spend money for certain programs 
that he disliked.117 While President Nixon’s motives were based on his policy 
disagreements, he translated his political motives into a sophisticated constitutional 
argument about the inability of Congress to develop coherent policy oriented to the 
national good because it was too beholden to parochial interests to make difficult 
decisions about budget cuts, continually increasing spending to satisfy various 
constituency groups. On the other hand, the president looked out for the national interest 
and, therefore, needed the ability to impound funds when Congress did not make difficult 
choices. 
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Of course, from a legal perspective, the president either has the power to refuse to 
spend appropriated funds or he does not have that power. Even so, Congress responded to 
the president in the realm of politics, acknowledging the veracity of President Nixon’s 
constitutional argument by admitting its own difficulties in crafting a coherent budget 
directed to the national good (especially since at the time the budgeting process was 
largely decentralized with overlapping jurisdiction among several committees), and 
recognizing both the legitimacy of the president’s superior budget resources and national 
perspective. Hence, Congress passed the Budget Control and Impoundment Act of 1974, 
formally granting the president the power to impound or even to permanently refuse to 
spend appropriated funds subject to a legislative veto. In addition, Congress centralized 
its budgeting process and created the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to give itself a 
national perspective on the national budget comparable to the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) in the White House. In short, the legislative veto mechanism was central 
to the political conflict over budget issues, giving the president the power to refuse to 
spend moneys appropriated by Congress (and to make arguments defending executive 
branch judgments) while ultimately ensuring that the most popularly accountable branch 
of government — tasked with constituting the national interest and its concomitant 
budget goals through its public deliberations — retained oversight over the national 
budget. The president’s position as chief executive officer might give him a certain 
national perspective at odds with Congress, but their differences on particular issues 
ultimately have to be adjudicated through interbranch conflict, and the legislative veto 
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proved a crucial element of this interbranch negotiation by de-escalating the legal battle 
and moving political questions back to the realm of politics. 
As these two examples demonstrate, the legislative veto was a mechanism 
Congress used to ensure that, in delegating legislative power to outside entities, it did not 
abdicate its constitutional responsibilities to enact laws in accordance with the 
deliberative public will. Indeed, given the bending of constitutional structure with regard 
to delegation of legislative power from Congress to the executive branch, Edward S. 
Corwin explained the basic constitutional rationale for the legislative veto as follows:  
It is generally agreed that Congress, being free not to delegate, is free to do so on 
certain stipulated conditions, as, for example, that the delegation shall terminate 
by a certain date or on the occurrence of a specified event; the end of a war, for 
instance. Why then, should not one condition be that the delegation shall continue 
only as long as the two houses are of opinion that it is working beneficially? As 
we have seen, moreover, it is generally agreed that the maxim that the legislature 
may not delegate its powers signifies at the very least that the legislature may not 
abdicate its power. Yet how, in view of the scope that legislative delegations take 
nowadays, is the line between delegation and abdication to be maintained? Only, 
I urge, by rendering the delegated powers recoverable without the consent of the 
delegate.118  
 
Yet, even if the utility of the legislative veto is manifest in these examples — as 
well as in areas such as bureaucratic rulemaking, as discussed in the previous section — 
the question becomes whether the legislative veto violates the stipulation in Article I, 
Section 7, Clause 2 which requires that  
Every order, resolution, or vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and the 
House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of 
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adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before 
the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by 
him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, 
according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill. 
 
This Clause suggests, at least ostensibly, that any action taken by Congress must meet the 
requirements for presentment to the president for his signature or veto, as well as 
bicameralism. However, the way the legislative veto worked in actual practice provides 
compelling evidence that the legislative veto fulfills the spirit of this Clause even if it 
contravenes the literal letter of the law. The veto power, as Hamilton expressed in 
Federalist 72, is important both for protecting the president from unconstitutional 
congressional encroachments upon his constitutional prerogatives and to give the 
president the ability to press his different political views vis-à-vis the Congress. The 
president’s veto power, therefore, is a primary mechanism by which interbranch conflict 
occurs.119 By analyzing the records of the Constitutional Convention, however, it 
becomes clear that this further stipulation that “[e]very order, resolution, or vote” that 
requires the consent of both houses must be presented to the president was an answer to 
Madison’s concern that the Congress would attempt to circumvent the president’s veto 
power by using semantic distinctions (like “orders,” “resolutions,” or “votes”) to pass 
what, in actuality, are bills in order to circumvent the president’s veto.120 
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If legislative vetoes, as already indicated, are part of political arrangements — 
established by statutes — that merely reverse the sequence of interbranch action without 
changing the major substantive involvement of the branches, then this concern is 
unwarranted. In other words, such statutes greatly empower the president (or subordinate 
executive officials), vesting the executive branch with the power to propose regulations 
or subsidiary laws pursuant to its authorizing legislation. The legislative veto merely 
ensures that such laws only go into effect if Congress assents to them. The veto power, 
therefore, is not implicated because legislative proposals come directly from the 
executive.121 Presumably the president would not veto his own legislative proposals. This 
was the position taken by Griffin Bell, Attorney General for President Jimmy Carter, 
regarding executive reorganization. Such proposals were constitutional, according to 
Bell, because reorganization statutes permit the president to “submit to Congress only 
those plans which he approves.”122 While Bell distinguished executive reorganization 
vetoes from other types of legislative vetoes, executive control, however, would 
seemingly extend to legislative vetoes more generally.  
For example, presidential control extends to bureaucratic rulemaking as well — 
even if such rulemaking is not directly handled by the president or members of the 
Executive Office of the President in the White House — because the president has 
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political control of the bureaucracy through his power to appoint (with advice and 
consent) and fire subordinates within the executive branch at pleasure. The Constitution 
also gives the president the power to request “the Opinion, in writing, of the principal 
Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of 
their respective offices.”123 This, as Javits and Klein argued, allows the President to 
require that any proposed policy action or subsidiary law be submitted to the president 
before prior review.124 In fact, before the Court invalidated the legislative veto in 
Chadha, the executive branch required that all proposed final rules be submitted to the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review and approval before they were 
transmitted to Congress for its approval or disapproval.125 Since that time, executive 
control over bureaucratic rulemaking has increased.126 Hence, it is unlikely, to say the 
least, that presidents or their subordinates will allow rules to be submitted to Congress to 
approve or disapprove, with which they disagree. While the president certainly cannot 
micromanage all aspects of the bureaucracy, the potential for control is certainly there. 
Moreover, the president can train his attention on issues that are particularly important for 
the administration. 
While some have contended that legislative vetoes are problematic in the case of 
Independent Regulatory Commissions because such commissions are politically insulated 
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from the president (and, consequently, the president does not have the same kind of 
control over the substance of rules and regulations proposed),127 this view is 
unpersuasive. Insofar as such commissions engage in rulemaking — which is in all its 
essentials substantive lawmaking — then it makes sense that Congress would use 
legislative vetoes to ensure that regulations emanating from these independent agencies 
reflect congressional intent. To disallow legislative vetoes in this instance would allow 
independent agencies to issue rules and regulations without any political oversight, even 
to ensure that such regulations ultimately accord with congressional mandates in the first 
place.    
In addition to this, legislative vetoes are not instances of substantive legislation 
because Congress is merely approving or disapproving — without amendment — 
specific rules or regulations issued by those wielding the legislative power delegated by 
Congress.128 If, on the other hand, Congress were to add amendments to legislative vetoes 
that altered the substance of the proposal coming from the executive branch, then those 
amendments would amount to substantive legislation that would require bicameralism 
and presentment. This, however, is not how legislative vetoes were designed or how they 
were used by Congress in practice. Hence, congressional invalidation of a proposed 
administrative action merely maintains the status quo. If Congress vetoes a proposed 
regulation before it goes into effect, the executive branch goes back to the drawing board 
and submits another rule. Similarly, if only one house votes to approve without 
 
127 Javits and Klein, “Congressional Oversight and the Legislative Veto,” 490. 
128 Javits and Klein, 486. 
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agreement from the other chamber, this just means that both Houses do not agree to the 
legislation in question, and so it does not go into effect.  
Finally, because legislative vetoes were not themselves acts of substantive 
legislation, bicameralism does not pose any major problems. In fact, the different veto 
mechanisms (one house versus two houses) provide the national government with 
flexibility to address political questions between the branches appropriately. 
Table 3 shows the various types of veto provisions used by Congress prior to the 
legislative veto’s invalidation in Chadha. A few things are worth noting. First, the vast 
majority of legislative vetoes that take place using chamber resolutions adhered to the 
general constitutional principle of bicameralism. Concurrent resolutions of disapproval 
are the only veto mechanism in which rules, regulations or administrative actions go into 
effect even if one of the two chambers disapproves (provided that the other house does 
approve). Murray Dry, however, notes that such arrangements were often beneficial to 
interbranch politics, adapting the power relationship between the branches in ways 
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Type of Veto 1932-1983 
Concurrent Resolution of Disapproval 
Concurrent Resolution of Approval 
Simple Resolution of Disapproval 
Simple Resolution of Approval 
Committee Disapproval by both houses 
Committee Disapproval by either house 
Committee Approval by both houses 









Table 3: Veto Provisions Classified by Form, Pre-Chadha130 
For example, the Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974 included two different 
types of vetoes for each of the ways that presidents might refuse to spend funds (deferrals 
versus rescissions). For deferrals (wherein the president merely postpones the spending of 
appropriated funds), the president had to issue a report to Congress explaining the reasons 
for the deferral. The funds had to be made available for their stated purpose, however, if 
either house passed an “impoundment resolution” disapproving the proposed deferral. 
For rescissions (wherein the president refuses to spend certain appropriated funds 
permanently), such appropriations had to be spent as Congress originally legislated unless 
Congress passed a concurrent resolution of approval. In short, the legislative veto 
mechanisms in this instance were set up such that the burden of proof rested with the 
president when he proposed permanent alterations to the budget passed by Congress 
 
130 Garcia, Rogelio and Clark Norton. 1984. “Congressional Veto Legislation in the 98th Congress.” 
Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service. 4-19. 
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whereas the burden of proof rested with Congress when the president merely tried to use 
discretion for when such funds should be spent.  
Similarly, the Arms Export Control Act put the burden of proof on Congress to 
disallow the sale of arms to foreign countries by a concurrent resolution of disapproval 
within 30 days of receiving notice of the pending sale. While this violates the principle of 
bicameralism (because the sale could go through if the two chambers disagree), Congress 
determined that this particular issue area required greater deference to presidential 
judgment. Hence, Congress adapted the legislative veto with a great degree of flexibility 
and attentiveness to the particularities of specific issue areas, departing from the principle 
of bicameralism when the issue area necessitated more deference to executive branch 
judgment.131 
This still raises the issue of committee vetoes, which were (and, as will be 
explained later, still are) the most dramatic departure from the principle of bicameralism. 
Such vetoes, however, are merely reflective of the way Congress divides its workload. 
Generally speaking, committees have a great deal of influence over their area of 
jurisdiction relative to the rest of the chamber, and, therefore, have a great deal of 
freedom to shape policy. Committees are generally representative of the chamber as a 
whole both in terms of the partisan breakdown of the chamber as well as reflective of 
different geographies, etc. It is difficult to imagine a committee operating at odds to the 
rest of the chamber for a significant period of time without some sort of backlash from 
 
131 Murray Dry, 212–13. 
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the chamber. Reflecting the ways in which Congress operates, committees have a great 
deal of power in developing the legislation that makes it to the floor. Barbara Hinkson 
Craig, for example, who is particularly critical of legislative vetoes — and especially 
committee level vetoes — demonstrates that even when Congress merely inserts report 
and wait provisions into bills, committees have a great deal of leverage to effectively veto 
administration proposals.   
In short, the legislative veto statutes merely reverse the sequence of interbranch 
action by delegating legislative power to the executive branch while retaining the right to 
approve or disapprove specific proposals. While the sequence with which the branches 
act has changed, the branches still perform the same substantive roles when it comes to 
the enactment of law in ways that bring their institutional advantages vis-à-vis each other 
— with regard to the competing desiderata of the constitutional order — to the fore. The 
president and his subordinates in bureaucratic agencies are granted vast amounts of 
power and discretion to make law for the sake of efficiency and the need for expertise, 
power that they would not ordinarily have absent congressional delegation. Such 
delegation, as previously argued, is greatly beneficial for harnessing the efficiency and 
expertise of the administration. Such delegation, however, is also deeply problematic 
from the perspective of democratic government. The legislative veto, therefore, is the 
mechanism by which the national government harnesses the benefits that come with 
delegation while ensuring that the most democratically accountable branch of 
government maintains its status as lawmaker by reserving the right to veto exercises of its 
delegated power. While the need for energy in government often requires delegation 
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given the scope and complexity of national concerns and issues, the need for 
responsiveness to the public will in a constitutional democracy, on the other hand, 
requires that Congress take responsibility for the laws that bind its citizens.  
From this perspective then, the larger purposes of the separation of powers, far 
from being undermined by the legislative veto, are actually realized by it. Insofar as 
separation of powers is ultimately meant to ensure competing perspectives on political 
questions through interbranch contestation — realizing the aims of having an effective 
and efficient government with the prerogatives of a government run on popular opinion 
— the legislative veto is a modern adaptation that ensures these competing perspectives.  
CHADHA AND THE LEGAL UNDERMINING OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS 
The legislative veto was a working political arrangement agreed upon by the 
political branches for several decades. This arrangement greatly empowered the 
executive branch by delegating to it lawmaking power — to secure the benefits of 
efficiency and expertise — while ensuring that the laws that govern citizens were only 
made in accordance with the deliberative will of the people expressed through Congress. 
The legislative veto, therefore, merely reversed the order of interbranch action while 
retaining the substantive political involvement of the two branches.  
The Supreme Court, however, invalidated the legislative veto in INS v. Chadha 
(1983) for its failure to abide by the Constitution’s requirements for legislation: 
bicameralism and presentment. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Warren Burger 
declared that while the legislative veto was clearly a useful and efficient tool for 
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congressional oversight of the executive branch, “the fact that a given law or procedure is 
efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, 
will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution.”132 The Court went on to assert that 
“convenience and efficiency are not the primary objectives — or the hallmarks — of 
democratic governance.”133  
Much can be said about the Court’s decision in Chadha, but the discussion here 
will focus on two particular concerns. First, the Court’s analysis stemmed from an 
overly-legalistic conception of separation of powers wherein the powers of government 
— legislative, executive, and judicial — are defined by their essences and then assigned 
to the appropriate branch. Starting from this premise, as I will demonstrate, led the Court 
to miss the actual facts on the ground, ignoring the reality of delegation and, 
consequently, giving the illusion that the legislative veto enabled an imperial and 
tyrannical Congress to usurp all the powers of government in contravention of basic 
separation of powers values. Far from vindicating separation of powers values, however, 
the Court’s formalistic approach, perversely generated precisely what it purported to 
curtail: the concentration of legislative, executive, and judicial power in the executive 
branch.  
The second issue concerns the sweeping nature of the Court’s decision in Chadha 
and the Court’s failure to distinguish between different classes of legislative vetoes. The 
type of legislative veto implicated in Chadha concerned whether a house of Congress 
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could pass a resolution overturning the Attorney General’s decision that a resident alien 
should not be deported due to certain hardship issues. The legislative veto in question did 
not concern oversight of Congress’s delegated powers, but, rather, dealt with a quasi-
judicial hearing and, therefore, the protection of individual liberties from arbitrary 
governmental action. Hence, the Court’s sweeping decision invalidated over 300 statutes 
and upset four decades worth of political negotiation between Congress and the executive 
branch when the actual issue of the case did not require that the Court reach the merits on 
all applications of the legislative veto.  
The Court’s Legalistic Premises 
The Court characterized the legislative veto as a mechanism by which Congress 
stepped out of its legislative role to usurp executive functions in violation of the basic 
purposes of the separation of powers. The legislative veto, therefore, proved problematic 
because it empowered Congress vis-à-vis the executive branch, flying in the face of the 
framers’ “profound conviction” that the powers of the legislative branch needed to be the 
“most carefully circumscribed” lest Congress dominate the constitutional system.134 As 
the Court argued, the presentment and bicameralism clauses need to be preserved because 
they serve “essential constitutional functions” by safeguarding the president from 
 
134 INS v. Chadha, 462 US at 947, 951. The Court quoted James Madison in Federalist 51 (sloppily 
misattributing it to Alexander Hamilton) to demonstrate the framers’ concern that the legislative branch 
would predominate without adequate constitutional safeguards: “In a republican government, the legislative 
authority necessarily predominates. The remedy for this is to divide the legislature into different branches; 
and to render them, by different modes of election and different principles of action, as little connected with 
each other as the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on the society will 
admit.” 
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Congress and protecting “the whole people from improvident laws.”135 As Justice White 
noted in his dissent, there is nothing wrong with the Court’s “truismatic exposition of 
these clauses.”136 The presentment and bicameralism clauses are essential to the 
lawmaking function for all the reasons the Court cited in The Federalist.  
The question, then, is why the Court viewed the legislative veto as legislation 
such that the constitutionally-prescribed mechanisms for legislation — presentment and 
bicameralism — applied. This is an especially important question given that the 
legislative veto — far from being an instance of congressional encroachment on 
executive prerogatives — was, in reality, a response to the need for congressional 
delegation of legislative authority to the executive branch. The legislative veto was a 
mechanism by which Congress retained its constitutional role, albeit in an attenuated 
sense, as it greatly expanded presidential power through delegation, transforming the 
president and executive subordinates into the nation’s primary lawmakers. Congress 
could merely approve or disapprove substantive legislative proposals from the executive 
branch without amendment, thus ensuring that Congress’s exercise of the legislative veto 
did not itself entail substantive legislation. In this way, legislative vetoes satisfied the 
 
135 INS v. Chadha, 462 US at 948. The Court quoted Alexander Hamilton’s discussion of the importance of 
the president’s veto power in Federalist 73: “It establishes a salutary check upon the legislative body, 
calculated to guard the community against the effects of faction, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly 
to the public good which may happen to influence a majority of that body…. The primary inducement to 
conferring the power in question upon the Executive is to enable him to defend himself; the secondary one 
is to increase the chances in favor of the community against the passing of bad laws through haste, 
inadvertence, or design.” Moreover, the Court quoted James Wilson who argued at the Constitutional 
Convention that dividing the legislative power into two distinct houses was ultimately an attempt to make it 
difficult for Congress to act. In a unicameral legislature, there are few checks to prevent arbitrary and 
unjust legislative action other than merely relying on the “virtue and good sense” of those who compose the 
legislature.    
136 INS v. Chadha, 462 US at 979. (White, J., Dissenting). 
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spirit, even if they violated its express letter, of Article I, Section 7, Clause 2’s 
requirement that “[e]very Order, Resolution, or Vote” must be presented to the President 
because legislative proposals were issued from the executive branch, thus meaning that 
legislative vetoes did not, in any substantive way, avoid the president’s veto power.   
The Court’s legalistic premises about the separation of powers, however, led it to 
mischaracterize the power dynamics between the branches, and, ultimately, to undermine 
the robust constitutional politics sustained by the legislative veto. Indeed, the Court 
asserted that the “Constitution sought to divide the delegated powers of the new federal 
government into three defined categories, legislative, executive, and judicial, to assure, as 
nearly as possible, that each Branch of government would confine itself to its assigned 
responsibility.”137 While not “’hermetically’ sealed off from one another,” the Court 
contended that when any branch acts it is “presumptively exercising the power the 
Constitution has delegated to it.”138  In other words, when an executive official acts, that 
action is presumptively “executive,” and when Congress acts it acts in a presumptively 
legislative way. This, of course, is a problematic presumption given that in Federalist 37 
Madison noted the difficulty of theoretically disentangling the different types of 
governmental power. Rather, the political science of the framers, as demonstrated at the 
outset of this dissertation, departed from the classical separation of powers’ emphasis on 
powers, focusing instead on bringing to bear competing perspectives on politics by 
inducing conflict between differently structured institutions — hence, the mixing of 
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different types of power, such as the president’s veto power (which is legislative in 
nature), and the Senate’s role in treaty making (a power traditionally assigned solely to 
the executive branch). These examples of shared powers, moreover, are more than mere 
exceptions to a general principle of separation. On the contrary, they point to the 
complete transformation of separation of powers from legal doctrine to political 
architecture. 
Beyond this problematic presumption, however, the Court concluded that the 
legislative veto must be characterized as an act of lawmaking for two additional reasons. 
First, the legislative veto was “essentially legislative in purpose and effect” because it 
altered the “legal rights” of citizens outside the legislative branch in ways that would not 
have occurred absent congressional use of the veto.139 As Justice White observed in his 
dissent, however, this ignores the fact that when the executive branch wields legislative 
power delegated to it by Congress — such as in bureaucratic rulemaking — the exercise 
of this legislative power by executive officeholders alters the legal rights of citizens, and 
this action is accomplished without the constitutional safeguards of bicameralism and 
presentment. While the Court acknowledged this conundrum in a footnote, it brushed it 
aside by claiming that executive officials act in presumptively executive ways. 
“Executive action under legislatively delegated authority that might resemble ‘legislative’ 
action in some respects,” according to the Court, therefore, “is not subject to the approval 
of both Houses of Congress and the President for the reason that the Constitution does 
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not so require.”140  In short, legislative power delegated to the executive branch becomes 
executive — i.e. non-legislative — based merely on the fact that such power is wielded 
by executive branch officials, and, therefore, is not subject to the Constitution’s 
requirements for lawmaking. 
Secondly, the Court asserted that the legislative veto had to be considered an act 
of lawmaking because there are only four constitutional provisions that allow one house 
of Congress to act outside of the legislative process.141 But the question is not whether the 
Constitution specifically authorizes legislative vetoes, but whether Congress can enact a 
statute — following constitutional procedures — delegating legislative power subject to a 
legislative veto. If the legislative veto is derivative of a statute, then it does not matter 
that the Constitution does not explicitly provide for it. Since the early days of the republic 
the Court has recognized that the Necessary and Proper Clause implies powers not 
explicitly stated in the Constitution that enable Congress to effectuate its will. As Chief 
Justice John Marshall declared in McCulloch v. Maryland, “we must never forget that it 
is a Constitution we are expounding.” As Marshall further explained:   
We admit, as all must admit, that the powers of the Government are limited, and 
that its limits are not to be transcended. But we think the sound construction of the 
Constitution must allow to the national legislature that discretion with respect to 
the means by which the powers it confers are to be carried into execution which 
will enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to it in the manner most 
 
140 INS v. Chadha, 462 US at 952, Fn 16. 
141 The House of Representatives alone was given the power to initiate impeachments (Art. I, Sec. 2, Cl. 
2); The Senate alone was given the power to conduct trials following impeachment on charges initiated by 
the House and to convict following trial (Art. I, Sec. 3, Cl. 5); the Senate alone was given final 
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beneficial to the people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the 
Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to 
that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the 
Constitution, are Constitutional. 
In Chadha, the Court explained that the Necessary and Proper Clause does not give 
Congress the power to review exercises of its delegated power with a legislative veto 
because the legislative veto was not a “constitutionally permissible means” of 
implementing its power.142 This, of course, begs the question, especially given that one of 
the reasons the Court asserted that the legislative veto was impermissible — and, 
therefore, could not be authorized by a statute under the Necessary and Proper Clause — 
was that the Constitution did not directly sanction this type of congressional action as one 
of the four ways in which Congress could act non-legislatively.  
What is particularly peculiar about this, as Justice White pointed out in his 
dissent, is that the Court was inconsistent on the question of whether Congress has the 
power to enact veto statutes based on its authority under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause. In fact, the Court had long upheld actions similar to the legislative veto so long as 
those vetoes are exercised by non-governmental entities. For example, in Currin v. 
Wallace (1939), the Court upheld a statute that allowed certain restrictions on agriculture 
commodities to go into effect once a prescribed majority of affected farmers voted for it. 
Similarly, in United States v. Rock Royal Cooperative (1939) the Court upheld a statute 
which gave producers of certain commodities the right to veto marketing orders issued by 
the Secretary of Agriculture.143 Hence, Congress could delegate legislative power subject 
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to a veto from a specified interest group, but it could not reserve to itself the power to 
approve or disapprove exercises of its delegated legislative power. This discrepancy is 
telling. Evidently, the Court believed that the framers were so fearful of a powerful 
Congress that Congress cannot even modify its own powers in response to the modern 
fact of executive-dominated government.144 According to the Court’s logic, Congress can 
only act in a strictly legislative way and cannot take any action to oversee its delegated 
lawmaking functions outside of enacting a new statute. This, even as other entities are not 
subject to the same constraints for the mere fact that those entities are not Congress.  
The Court’s formalism gave the illusion that Congress was stepping outside its 
constitutionally-prescribed role in an attempt to encroach on executive prerogatives 
when, in fact, the legislative veto was a tool that allowed Congress to empower the 
executive branch to make law — so that the government could adequately address the 
myriad complex issues on the national agenda — while ultimately ensuring that laws 
governing citizens still retained the consent of Congress, the most broad-based, publicly 
accountable, and deliberative branch of government. The Court’s failure to consider the 
legislative veto in light of delegation (in fact, the majority opinion does not mention 
delegation or the administrative state except in a passing footnote) kept it from 
recognizing that the legislative veto, far from undermining constitutional structure, 
incorporated basic separation of powers values into the practice of modern government.  
 
144 H. Lee Watson, “Congress Steps out: A Look at Congressional Control of the Executive,” California 
Law Review 63, no. 4 (1975): 983–1094. Watson similarly argues that the framers were so fearful of an too-
powerful Congress that Congress cannot act outside of enacting laws.  
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Hence, the Court’s reasoning in Chadha, beyond its departure from the political 
science of The Federalist, also fails on its own formalistic terms. A strictly formalistic 
interpretation of separation of powers, as ostensibly advanced by the Court, would mean 
that Congress cannot delegate legislative power. It would seem to follow from the 
Court’s legalistic premises that the Congress legislates, and that the executive branch 
administers the government. To be consistent, therefore, the Court should have revived 
the notion that Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the executive branch. 
Indeed, as Justice White wrote, the majority’s holding represented “a profoundly 
different conception of the Constitution than that held by the Courts which sanctioned the 
modern administrative state.”145 Although some prominent commentators at the time 
worried that the Court’s Chadha decision signaled a major shift in the Court’s 
jurisprudence for just this reason,146 the Court has yet to walk back its acceptance of 
widespread delegation.147  
The Court’s ruling in Chadha, therefore, ultimately and perversely undermined 
separation of powers values, notwithstanding Justice Burger’s purported intentions to 
safeguard constitutional structure and to vindicate the Constitution’s separation of 
powers. Categorizing delegated legislative power as executive solely because it is 
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146 Laurence H. Tribe, “The Legislative Veto Decision: A Law by Any Other Name,” Harvard Journal on 
Legislation 21 (1984): 17. “The Second, and more plausible, possibility is that Chadha represents only a 
transition to a more thoroughgoing repudiation of the constitutional upheaval that led to the approval, 
beginning in the mid-1930’s, of the modern administrative state. Even if Chadha makes little sense against 
a backdrop of nearly limitless judicial tolerance for delegations of lawmaking authority to federal agencies 
and commissions, the decision would at least be of a piece with a significant judicial tightening of the limits 
within which Congress may entrust anyone with lawmaking power.” 
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wielded by an executive branch official, and then narrowly defining the powers of 
Congress, actually frees the executive branch and bureaucratic agencies from separation 
of powers constraints such that they end up wielding legislative, executive, and judicial 
powers — the very definition of tyranny according to Madison.148 In sum, Congress 
enacted legislative vetoes to adapt the Constitution’s institutional framework to account 
for the problem of delegation. The Court’s inconsistent and futile attempt to confine 
different types of power in the appropriate branch, on the other hand, led to the 
consolidation of power in the administrative state, unmoored from the political controls 
of the larger separation of powers framework. 
Legislative versus Adjudicatory Legislative Vetoes 
 What is also deeply troubling about the Court’s decision in Chadha is that it 
invalidated an entire class of legislative veto statutes based on a particularly problematic, 
and easily differentiated, legislative veto. Consequently, the Court irresponsibly issued a 
ruling far more sweeping than the case necessitated, disrupting a decades-long working 
relationship agreed to by both political branches. The particular veto at issue in Chadha 
concerned whether one house of Congress could pass a resolution overturning an order of 
the Attorney General to suspend a deportation over a finding of hardship.  
 Jagdish Rai Chadha was an immigrant from Kenya who lived in the United States 
on a student visa. Chadha was scheduled for deportation but requested that the 
 
148 Hamilton et al., The Federalist Papers, 298. Madison wrote in Federalist 47, “The accumulation of all 
powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and 
whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced  the very definition of tyranny.” 
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Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) suspend his deportation because he met the 
statutory criteria for residence in the United States because of the hardship he would face 
if deported.149 INS granted Chadha’s request after a hearing, and, as required by law, 
reported to Congress the names of 339 other persons, along with Chadha’s, who also had 
their deportations suspended for meeting the statutory criteria. Congress thus had the 
opportunity to exercise its veto to overturn any of the INS decisions it deemed improper. 
After reviewing the list, the House Committee on the Judiciary determined that six of 
those people, including Chadha, did not meet the statutory criteria, and it introduced a 
resolution to the House floor, stating that “the House of Representatives does not approve 
the granting of permanent residence in the United States to the aliens hereinafter 
named.”150 The House then passed the resolution without further explanation and without 
a recorded vote.151 
 The problem with this application of the legislative veto in the immigration 
context is that it was adjudicatory, dealing with and altering the legal rights of particular 
individuals, rather than serving as a mechanism by which Congress oversaw its 
delegated, and generally-applicable, legislative power. As Justice Powell argued in his 
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150 INS v. Chadha, 462 US at 963–64. (Powell, J., Concurring). 
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 90 
concurring opinion, “[t]he House did not enact a general rule; rather it made its own 
determination that six specific persons did not comply with certain statutory criteria.”152 
Hence, the House of Representatives (acting like an appellate court) took on functions 
generally reserved to the judiciary without providing any of the safeguards normally 
afforded to citizens in judicial contexts, such as the right to counsel and the right to a 
hearing before taking legal action. While noting the imperfect parallel, Justice Powell 
argued that the “effect on Chadha’s personal rights would not have been different in 
principle had he been acquitted of a federal crime and thereafter found by one House of 
Congress to have been guilty.”153 Such trial by legislature, Justice Powell observed, is 
anathema to separation of powers values: “[The Bill of Attainder Clause], and the 
separation of powers doctrine generally, reflect the Framers’ concern that trial by a 
legislature lacks the safeguards necessary to prevent the abuse of power.”154 Congress’s 
job is to enact legislation that is generally applicable while leaving the adjudication of the 
rights of citizens in individual cases to those branches more appropriately structured to do 
so in ways that protect the rights of citizens from the whims and vicissitudes of the 
current political majority.155  
 Given the adjudicatory nature of the legislative veto at issue in Chadha, then, it is 
clearly easily distinguished from legislative vetoes as such. As Lawrence Tribe argued, 
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“if exercise of the legislative veto is objectionable because it amounts to a trial by 
legislature, that objection persists even if bicameral action and presentment to the 
President are assured.”156 In other words, Congress could not have overturned the 
decision of the INS and deported Chadha even by going through the full legislative 
process. The Court’s holding with regard to Chadha (and other immigrants subject to 
deportation based on congressional action) was the right decision given that the 
application of law to specific individuals should only occur within adjudicatory settings 
that provide proper legal safeguards, safeguards that a legislature — even acting in its 
purely legislative capacity — does not provide. The Court erred, however, in failing to 
distinguish this particular congressional action from traditional forms of the legislative 
veto. The vast majority of legislative vetoes did not pertain to the application of law to 
specific individuals in adjudicatory settings, but, rather, were merely mechanisms by 
which Congress ensured that the generally-applicable laws that govern citizens retain the 
consent of their representatives in Congress.  
Given this distinction, it is striking that the Court used Chadha as its vehicle to 
strike down all legislative vetoes, applying Chadha without comment in eight cases 
handed down the next month.157 The Court did this in two ways. First, it misdiagnosed 
the actual problem in Chadha by failing to notice that no congressional action would 
have been constitutionally legitimate given the adjudicatory nature of the issue. Secondly, 
it elided the difference between the adjudicatory nature of that congressional action and 
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legislative vetoes enacted to oversee Congress’s delegated legislative functions. The 
Court thus invalidated all legislative vetoes without having to substantively defend the 
expansiveness of its ruling. 
The adjudicatory nature of congressional action in Chadha no doubt shaped the 
Court’s perceptions about the problem of Congress altering legal rights, which, in the 
case at hand was deeply problematic. Such assumptions, however, do not easily translate, 
if at all, to the legislative context where rights are altered by executive officials wielding 
delegated legislative power (and, this, without the constitutional constraints of 
bicameralism and presentment). In Chadha, congressional action altered the legal rights 
of individuals in specific situations without the safeguards necessary for the protection of 
individual rights required in adjudicatory settings. In the legislative context, however, 
Congress used legislative vetoes to oversee the use of its delegated, and generally 
applicable, legislative powers. In this way, legislative vetoes employed in the legislative 
context protected individual rights by ensuring that laws made in the executive branch 
and in bureaucratic agencies were reflective of the public will. The Court’s unnuanced 
and simplistic reasoning led it to miss this crucial and fundamental difference. 
It is deeply unfortunate, therefore, that the Court invalidated over 300 laws (more 
laws struck down in one decision than in all other Supreme Court decisions combined!) 
without any consideration of how the differences between the specific issue in Chadha 
and legislative vetoes more generally might affect the constitutionality of legislative 
vetoes in differing contexts. At best, the Court’s decision in Chadha was breathtakingly 
sloppy. At worst, the Court was looking for a pretext to invalidate all legislative vetoes 
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and used the particular veto in Chadha as a smokescreen, collapsing the issues to more 
easily indict all legislative vetoes. If the latter case, the sloppiness of the Court’s 
reasoning disguised its indefensible activism. Either way, the Court went well beyond its 
constitutional role, policing the boundaries of the political branches and disrupting a 
working relationship meant to instill separation of powers values to the practice of 
modern government.  
POLITICAL CRITICISMS OF THE LEGISLATIVE VETO  
 Even if the legislative veto was intended to be a positive invention that reconciles 
the inevitable need to delegate in the modern world with the larger political purposes of 
the separation of powers framework, this does not necessarily mean that the legislative 
veto performed this function well. This section, therefore, considers plausible objections 
to the legislative veto from within the political perspective of separation of powers 
articulated in this dissertation. While the critiques assessed here are plausible, they 
ultimately do not prove that the legislative veto undermines constitutional politics in the 
ways contended. Even so, such critiques provide useful criteria for assessing 
congressional use of the legislative veto. 
The Effectiveness of the Legislative Veto Given the Scale of Delegation 
The first critique is that the legislative veto was largely inconsequential and 
prevented Congress from using better institutional tools at its disposal. The most 
prominent proponent of this view is Jessica Korn who, in an award-winning book, 
contends that the legislative veto, rather than serving as a tool that fosters substantive 
 94 
interbranch politics, merely gave the illusion of congressional power and engagement.158 
Korn argues that the veto was a Progressive Era shortcut through the separation of 
powers that allowed Congress to look powerful without actually mobilizing its 
institutional tools and capacities to engage in robust interbranch politics.159 In Korn’s 
account, legislative vetoes were inconsequential in practice, especially compared to other 
forms of legislative oversight. She develops her argument by examining case studies of 
policy areas before and after Chadha to show how, in her view, Congress actually 
performed its oversight functions better without the veto. 
This critique certainly has merit in some issue contexts. Take, for example, the 
War Powers Resolution of 1973, an example that Korn, ironically, does not use. At the 
height of discontent over presidential war powers during the Vietnam Era, Congress 
passed the War Powers Resolution in order to “fulfill the intent of the framers of the 
Constitution,” and to restore the constitutional balance between the branches with regard 
to the exercise of war authority by requiring that the United States only commit troops in 
the case of a “declaration of war,” “statutory authorization,” or in the case of “a national 
emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its 
armed forces.” In the absence of a formal declaration of war or statutory authorization, 
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the president was required to submit a formal report notifying Congress within 48 hours 
of committing troops abroad. This formal notification would open a 60-day window, after 
which the president was required to remove troops from hostilities unless Congress 
formally declared war or passed statutory authorization (or if Congress had not given the 
president a 30-day extension). Moreover, the Resolution provided a legislative veto 
mechanism which stipulated that Congress could force the president to end hostilities by 
passing a concurrent resolution.  
As Gordon Silverstein notes, however, the War Powers Resolution has been an 
abject failure, freeing the president from constitutional constraints.160 Before the War 
Powers Resolution the president’s ability to constitutionally commit troops abroad in the 
absence of congressional approval was on shakier constitutional ground, and this had a 
constraining effect on presidential action. By allowing the president to commit troops up 
to ninety days without prior congressional sanction, on the other hand, the War Powers 
Resolution “removed any claim that the president lacked constitutional authority to use 
force without prior congressional authorization.”161 Presidents have taken great advantage 
of this newfound clarity where there was once constitutional ambiguity. Once troops are 
committed Congress has a difficult time ending the hostilities. Silverstein concludes, 
therefore, that Congress “undercut its own constitutional position without gaining 
anything in terms of practical control on the use of force.”162 In this regard, then, the War 
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Powers Resolution (with its attached legislative veto) made Congress appear powerful 
vis-à-vis the executive branch when it comes to the exercise of war powers. But this 
appearance has not been reality as the president’s position has only been strengthened. 
This example demonstrates that Korn’s critique of the legislative veto has a great deal of 
merit when applied to the right cases. 
But just because the legislative veto might be inconsequential in some policy 
areas (such as war powers), this does not mean that the legislative veto is inconsequential 
across the board. In fact, although Korn contends that the legislative veto merely 
symbolized Congressional power rather than impacting policy outcomes in any 
meaningful sense, her case studies do not bear this out. In fact, her case studies, at times, 
demonstrate the importance of the veto. For example, Korn examines the congressional 
oversight of educational policy.163 Congress inserted a legislative veto into the Education 
Amendments of 1972 (which established the Pell Grant financial aid program) as well as 
the General Education Provisions Act of 1974. The legislative veto proved 
inconsequential in the education context, however, because Congress used other kinds of 
oversight mechanisms. Indeed, even before Chadha Congress often chose to legislate the 
annual-based formulas for Pell Grants when it disagreed with the proposals coming from 
the executive branch rather than to exercise its veto power.164 This makes intuitive sense 
given the particular disagreement with the Reagan administration at the time. The Reagan 
administration wanted to dramatically cut Pell Grant spending, and no funds would be 
 
163 Korn, The Power of Separation, 69–90. 
164 Korn, 77–78. 
 97 
spent until a plan was finalized. Pell Grant dispersal would therefore be delayed greatly if 
Congress had to keep vetoing plans with which it disagreed if the administration would 
not come into agreement with Congress’s own policy preferences on the matter. Hence, 
Congress chose to legislate its preferences rather than to continually veto administration 
plans.  
After Chadha, however, Congress rescinded its delegation to propose the needs-
analysis formulas for Pell Grants, because it viewed the legislative veto as an essential 
mechanism by which administration proposals reflected congressional preferences. 
Without the veto, Congress began to legislate the needs-analysis formulas every year. 
Thus, Korn concludes that the Court’s invalidation of the legislative veto forced Congress 
to do a better job by encouraging “members to enact their policy convictions about the 
Pell Grant program into law.” The Supreme Court, therefore, “made it easier for members 
to fulfill that aspect of their representative function that requires them to make Congress 
explicitly responsible for broadly supported public policies.”165  
While Korn effectively shows that the legislative veto was not always a decisive 
tool in this particular policy context, her case study is ultimately not convincing when 
considered against the full backdrop of delegation and the vast amount of federal 
regulations issued each year (3,853 final rules in 2016 alone). Indeed, even if Congress 
was able to micromanage the needs-analysis formula for Pell Grants, it certainly could 
not similarly micromanage every policy area it deemed important unless it was to do 
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substantially less. Of course, many vocal opponents of the legislative veto, such as 
Antonin Scalia before he joined the Supreme Court, advocated just this type of return to a 
limited role for the national government with more specific legislation and more 
traditional oversight through hearings and the appropriations process.166  
However, other scholars have demonstrated that the legislative veto was a more 
effective tool of congressional oversight than traditional methods. After reviewing five 
agency programs during the 1970s, Harold Bruff and Ernest Gellhorn concluded that the 
legislative veto significantly altered “the working relationship” between Congress and 
bureaucratic agencies, making those agencies far more responsive to congressional views 
than they would be absent a legislative veto provision.167 Traditional forms of legislative 
oversight, such as authorization renewal and appropriations hearings, provided ad hoc 
and sporadic opportunities for oversight, whereas the legislative veto ensured “regular 
and systematic examination of the substantive details of an agency’s program.”168 The 
legislative veto, by contrast, gave congressional committees negotiating power with 
agencies that helped bring final rules and regulations into alignment with congressional 
preferences.  
Finally, it is worth noting that Korn’s definition of legislative veto is limited 
solely to formal expressions of that power. Korn, however, argues that report-and-wait 
provisions — wherein federal administrators are required to publish proposed final rules 
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in the Federal Register for a specified period of time before such rules can go into effect 
— were highly effective at bringing the Department of Education to heel.169 Such report-
and-wait provisions, however, work almost exactly like formal legislative vetoes — as I 
will address in greater depth in the final section of this chapter — and, indeed, are subject 
to the same kind of critiques as formal legislative vetoes even as they are untouchable by 
the legal argument against legislative vetoes, as articulated by the Court in Chadha.170 
Such report-and-wait provisions, as Korn acknowledges, can be quite successful at 
ensuring that federal regulations reflect congressional intent because agencies and 
administrators are incentivized to keep good relations with their oversight committees, 
lest they lose funding or policy flexibility. Even so, they are generally not as effective as 
formal vetoes because Congress has no formal mechanism outside of enacting a statute 
— which would require congressional supermajorities to overcome a presidential veto — 
should the executive branch persist in issuing regulations with which Congress disagrees. 
Hence, Korn’s praise of report-and-wait provisions hardly makes the case that legislative 
vetoes are an ineffective policy tool; rather, it suggests the opposite. 
The Legislative Veto and the Politics of Negotiation and Compromise 
Korn’s case study with regard to foreign policy is similarly illuminating even as it 
also fails to convince that the legislative veto was merely a tool that allowed Congress to 
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symbolize congressional power while, in reality, abdicating its political prerogatives vis-
à-vis the executive branch. Korn examines how Congress attached the legislative veto to 
the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974, tying human rights to trade 
policy, specifically to the extension of Most Favored Nation (MFN) trade status. 
However, Congress only once attempted, and lost by a wide margin, to exercise the veto 
regarding the extension of MFN to Romania in 1979.171 After Chadha, however, 
Congress had a great deal of success in confronting the executive branch over its 
extension of MFN by passing conditions bills (passed by both houses and signed by the 
president) which required that nations meet certain human rights benchmarks before the 
United States extended MFN. For example, Congress successfully passed a conditions 
bill in 1990 that tied the extension of MFN to China to certain human rights benchmarks 
after public outcry regarding the Tiananmen Square incident.172 Korn concludes that 
these conditions bills were better than the legislative veto because it was a way to prod 
foreign nations to make human rights advances to receive MFN rather than for Congress 
to deny them MFN by exercising its veto. 
This analysis also overstates the case against the legislative veto, in that it 
assumes that legislative vetoes were only effective if and when they were deployed by 
Congress. However, legislative vetoes, rather than merely serving as an outward 
expression of congressional power, might actually serve as a tool that fosters interbranch 
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cooperation and compromise that precludes publicly-visible interbranch conflict.173 For 
example, when it came to foreign arms sales, Congress used the threat of the veto to force 
negotiation and accommodation of its views. After U.S. arms sales hit an all-time high in 
1974, Congress included the Nelson-Bingham Amendment in the Foreign Aid 
Authorization for fiscal year 1975, requiring the president to give Congress advance 
notice of arms sales exceeding $25 million (reduced in 1981 to $7 million) and subjecting 
the proposed arms sale to a concurrent resolution of disapproval. Congress was 
particularly concerned that arms sales to the Middle East (both to Israel and its hostile 
neighbors) were creating an arms race in the region, and there was significant public 
concern about the issue. Congress only once threatened a veto regarding arms sales 
(pertaining to Hawk missiles to Jordan), but intense negotiation in the face of a legislative 
veto threat forced the administration to back down from its proposed arms sale and to 
compromise in light of congressional concerns.174 As Martha L. Gibson notes, after this 
incident the viable threat of the legislative veto forced negotiation between the executive 
branch and Congress long before arms sale agreements were finalized and reported to 
Congress, thus ensuring that such deals accommodated congressional concerns during 
their formation. This cooperative spirit was undermined, however, by the legislative 
veto’s invalidation. Without the legislative veto, Congress was left to engage in repeated 
high-profile conflicts regarding arms sales, including the introduction of joint resolutions 
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of disapproval. In some instances, the president was forced to rescind arms agreements in 
ways that embarrassed both the United States and the recipients of arms sales.175 
Similarly, the legislative veto protected the institutional concerns of Congress 
with regard to MFN trade policy and attendant human rights concerns. Unlike arms sales, 
MFN, generally speaking, was not an issue of high public concern. Hence, Congress 
could use the legislative veto to ensure interbranch compromise and negotiation, but, 
unlike with arms sales, Congress lacked the electoral incentives to engage in high-profile 
conflict with the executive branch after it lost the legislative veto. The Tiananmen Square 
incident, however, sparked widespread outrage in the American public and made MFN 
trade status a politically salient issue, providing Congress the opportunity to engage in 
more high-profile conflict with the executive branch by holding public hearings and 
passing conditions bills.176 The point here is the legislative veto ensured compromise and 
accommodation with the executive branch before Chadha, while the high-profile 
interbranch conflict Korn documents with regard to China and MFN was, in many ways, 
due to external factors that empowered Congress vis-à-vis the executive branch in this 
particular context. It does not follow, therefore, that the legislative veto was wholly 
inconsequential to MFN trade status or that conditions bills were always the best solution. 
In short, Korn’s case studies overstate the case that the legislative veto was 
merely symbolic of congressional power. By disregarding the extent of delegation (by 
asserting that Congress could just legislate more specifically and micromanage policy as 
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it did with education policy) as well as by ignoring how the legislative veto fostered 
different types of interbranch conflict (negotiation and compromise versus high-profile 
conflict) across issues that varied in terms of public salience, Korn fails to account for the 
ways in which the legislative veto aids healthy interbranch politics. Anecdotal evidence, 
in other words, cannot speak to the full benefits or imperfections of the legislative veto. 
Moreover, it should perhaps go without saying that just because the legislative veto was 
not always the answer to a particular interbranch conflict does not mean that the 
legislative veto was wholly inconsequential in the ways that Korn suggests. However, it 
is valid to worry about using the legislative veto as an excuse not to do the hard work of 
actual interbranch politics, as demonstrated by the war powers example discussed above. 
Indeed, such concerns could potentially counsel against the pre-Chadha push to have a 
generic veto applied to all agency regulations rather than to use the veto where Congress 
most wanted the leverage. In sum, Korn’s worries are ultimately worth taking seriously 
because she operates within the political framework of separation of powers, attempting 
to evaluate how well Congress performs oversight of its delegated legislative powers. 
The concern about inserting legislative vetoes merely to appear powerful is certainly a 
line of inquiry worth pursuing — and could certainly be the case at times — even if the 
evidence presented by Korn is ultimately unpersuasive. 
The Legislative Veto and the Problem of Interest Groups Politics 
The second line of critique against the legislative veto primarily concerns its 
application to bureaucratic rulemaking. Critics of the veto charged that it undermined the 
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separation of powers values applied to bureaucratic rulemaking by the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA).177 The APA is a good example of Congress attempting to ensure 
that its delegated powers are exercised according to separation of powers principles by 
requiring agency rulemaking to be made in accordance with legislative values. As David 
Rosenbloom notes, the legislative history of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 
reveals that Congress views agencies as extensions of itself — a much closer relationship 
than a principle-agent relationship — when they engage in legislative functions delegated 
to them by Congress.178 Hence, Congress went to great lengths to shape the ways that 
those agencies engaged in the legislative process by requiring those agencies to hold 
public hearings and open-comment proceedings in addition to taking congressional views 
into account in the formulation of final rules.  
Critics of the legislative veto argue that the veto undermines these open and 
democratic processes by allowing powerful interest groups to lobby congressional 
committees behind the scenes and get those committees to use the threat of a legislative 
veto to move regulations closer to their preferences.179 A few points can be made in 
response to these criticisms. First, the kind of interest group pressure that critics of the 
legislative veto point to exists even for mechanisms that are perfectly constitutional. In 
fact, one of Barbara Hinkson Craig’s examples of this type of interest group subversion 
of democratic politics concerned a joint resolution, a type of legislative veto that meets 
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all of the Constitution’s procedural requirements for lawmaking (bicameralism and 
presentment).180 Hence, if interest group lobbying disqualifies the legislative veto, then it 
also calls into question perfectly constitutional methods of congressional oversight, 
including the regular legislative process.  
Secondly, such critiques over-emphasize the democratic quality of decision-
making in bureaucratic agencies (even when they operate according to congressionally-
prescribed APA procedures) while overly denigrating congressional oversight, 
characterizing congressional procedures as dominated by special interests at odds with 
the public good. In fact, there is no reason to conclude that bureaucratic agencies, on the 
whole, do a better job of making rules in accordance with the deliberative public will.181 
For example, open comment proceedings are often dominated by those most impacted by 
forthcoming regulations. Indeed, as William West and Joseph Cooper note, given the 
massive bureaucratic apparatus it can be difficult for less financed interest groups — or, 
for that matter, ordinary citizens — to find out basic information about when and where 
such proceedings take place.182 Moreover, given the fact that the rulemaking process can 
take years, well-financed interest groups are better positioned to utilize the administrative 
process to their advantage. 
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In a democratic society, there is no substitute for a generalized and electorally 
accountable legislature tasked with weighing and balancing competing interests across 
policy areas. This is a job that only Congress can perform. While agencies bring expertise 
and single-minded focus to bear to complex problems — the reason for delegating to 
such agencies in the first place — agencies can also exist in a policy vacuum with 
attendant biases that do not reflect the general concerns of the public. This does not mean 
Congress will always do this job well, or that there will never be occasions where special 
interests rule the day. But none of these arguments prove that the legislative veto’s 
problems outweighed its benefits, even as it points to an area of concern. 
In short, while critics of the legislative veto argued that it undermined rather than 
served fundamental separation of powers values, closer examination points to the 
opposite conclusion. Given the vast number of issues of national concern, delegation 
empowers the executive branch and the bureaucracy to engage in Congress’s legislative 
functions while the legislative veto ensures that the deliberative will of the people is still 
expressed through their representatives in Congress. Even if some evidence points to 
problems with the legislative veto in practice, such examples, on the whole, cannot form 
a principled basis for rejecting the legislative veto entirely, even as such concerns are 
important to note and point to ways to evaluate interbranch politics in practice. 
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INVALIDATED. NEVERTHELESS, IT PERSISTED183 
The Court’s decision in Chadha effectively invalidated any legislative veto that 
did not meet the legislative requirements of bicameralism and presentment.184 This had 
dramatic effects on Congress’s ability to formally oversee its delegated powers. Since 
1983, Congress has not enacted veto statutes that give it the power to overturn rules and 
regulations by concurrent or simple resolutions of approval or disapproval. Consequently, 
if Congress disagrees with a particular executive action, or a rule or regulation issued 
from an agency, it has to mobilize and go through the full legislative process to overturn 
by law the specific rule or action at issue. In this situation, the interbranch dynamics 
greatly favor the executive branch. Given that Congress is seeking to overturn exercises 
of its delegated legislative power wielded by executive officials, such congressional 
action is far more susceptible to a presidential veto. Hence, supermajorities in both 
chambers are often necessary for Congress to substantively engage the executive branch 
to oversee its delegated legislative powers.  
The cumbersome nature of the full legislative process to correct bureaucratic 
regulations has been on full display since Congress passed the Congressional Review Act 
(CRA) in 1996 as an attempt to provide oversight after the invalidation of the legislative 
veto. The CRA required that all final rules be presented to Congress 60 days before going 
into effect, thus providing Congress time to review and then possibly overturn agency 
regulations by passing a joint resolution of disapproval (subject to the president’s veto, 
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meaning that supermajorities in both chambers are generally necessary to disapprove). 
Between its enactment in 1996 and 2016, however, only one regulation was overturned, 
and only 5 percent of regulations promulgated by the executive branch have ever resulted 
in resolutions introduced on a chamber floor.185 In recent years, the CRA has been used 
more vigorously. This use, however, has been contained to what might be termed 
“midnight rulemaking.” Congressional Republicans and Republican President Donald 
Trump were able to use the CRA to subsequently overturn a number of last-minute rules 
promulgated during the last months of the Obama administration.186 The CRA, however, 
is largely ineffective when the political branches disagree. 
Due to the apparent failure of the CRA to give teeth to Congress’s oversight of 
the bureaucratic rules and regulations issued in its name, Congress tried (and failed) to 
pass a new mechanism that, while still following the Constitution’s lawmaking 
procedures, would greatly favor Congress rather than the president. The REINS Act 
(Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny) would require that any major rule 
with a significant effect on the national economy would be subject to a joint resolution of 
approval.187 This would have the effect of turning bureaucratic rulemaking into mere 
legislative proposals — and agencies into study commissions — since such legislative 
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proposals that would only go into effect if Congress subsequently went through the full 
legislative process to enact them into law. While the REINS Act received the support of 
many commentators who hoped to see Congress regain its constitutional role in the 
legislative process, the legislation never passed the Senate.188 Some constitutional 
scholars argued that the REINS Act would violate the Constitution by effectively giving 
Congress a one-house veto over proposed rules and regulations (should one house refuse 
to pass the proposal).189 Given the intellectual incoherence of the Chadha decision, it is 
possible the Court would extend that logic to the joint resolution of approval mechanism 
by pointing to the repackaged one-house veto.  
The REINs Act, however, did not pass, and so the constitutional question is moot. 
If it had passed, the blanket rule it established to subject all economically significant 
major rules to congressional approval would undoubtedly create logistical problems for 
Congress by forcing it to deal legislatively with every issue at a certain threshold of 
economic significance, thus undercutting one of the rationales for delegating in the first 
place.190 One of the practical benefits of the legislative veto before Chadha, as discussed 
previously, was its relative adaptability, giving Congress the flexibility to employ it in 
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issue areas that most concerned it and in ways appropriate to the political dynamics of 
specific issues (concurrent resolutions of disapproval vs. concurrent resolutions of 
approval, for example). With the invalidation of the legislative veto, Congress’s options 
were severely limited. The failure of the CRA and the potential logistical nightmare of 
approving all major rules and regulations through the REINS Act (assuming, as I do, that 
it would not pose any constitutional problems) points to the difficulties with which 
Congress used the joint resolution mechanisms to oversee its delegated lawmaking 
powers. 
The effects of the Chadha ruling, however, have not only been detrimental to 
effective congressional oversight powers. Stripped of the legislative veto, Congress has at 
times chosen to rescind or change the mechanisms by which it oversees its delegated 
powers, at times in ways that greatly disadvantage the executive branch. For example, 
after Chadha Congress still granted the president the power to re-organize the executive 
branch, but rather than subject his proposals to a simple resolution of disapproval 
(meaning that the plan went into effect after a certain period of time unless one house 
mobilized to veto the plan) Congress subjected the re-organization plan to a joint 
resolution of approval (meaning that the plan did not go into effect unless both houses of 
Congress legislated it into law within a specified period of time). This is a far more 
onerous process, and one that made it far more difficult for the president to get his plans 
approved. Given this, presidents stopped requesting re-organization authority soon after 
Chadha, and Congress has rarely taken on re-organization efforts itself. When it does act, 
as discussed previously, it does so generally only as a response to major crises rather than 
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with the kind of proactiveness that came with executive leadership on the issue.191 
Similarly, when the judiciary applied Chadha and severed the legislative veto from the 
Budget and Impoundment Control Act (1974), Congress rescinded the president’s 
authority to impound or issue rescissions, prohibiting the delay of spending when the 
president disagreed with Congress’s appropriations (even for politically justifiable 
reasons).192 Invalidation of the legislative veto, therefore, disrupted robust interbranch 
politics over appropriations and spending wherein the branches evaluated and responded 
to arguments in the realm of politics rather than through legalization of their disputes.   
However, it can be easy to overstate the impacts of the Chadha decision on the 
practice of interbranch politics by looking at formal exercises of the legislative veto. 
While the concurrent and simple resolutions have all but disappeared from the 
congressional arsenal, Congress has continued to attach legislative veto provisions to 
bills. Most often such legislative vetoes are included in appropriations bills, requiring, in 
fairly standard language, that specified actions may not be executed without the “prior 
approval of the Committees on Appropriations of both Houses,” or that the 
appropriations committees for both houses must be notified (generally 15 days) in 
advance.193 The White House has often objected to the presence of such vetoes — 
claiming that they violate the Court’s Chadha decision because such congressional action 
is non-legislative — and, consequently, informed administration officials to ignore such 
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legislative veto provisions. As Louis Fisher wrote about this phenomenon in 1993, 
however, it is one thing for the president to condemn such legislative veto provisions as 
unconstitutional, but “agencies have a different attitude. They have to live with their 
review committees, year after year, and have a much greater incentive to make 
accommodations and stick by them …. Agencies cannot risk …. collisions with the 
committees that authorize their programs and provide funds.”194  
When executive officials tried to disregard such legislative vetoes, they quickly 
learned the error of their way. For example, when President Reagan objected to several 
legislative vetoes requiring approval from the appropriations committees, he issued a 
signing statement declaring the provisions that required committee approval outside of 
the legislative process were unconstitutional and would therefore be implemented “in a 
manner consistent with the Chadha decision.195 Prior to this signing statement, Congress 
had allowed NASA to exceed spending caps with approval from the appropriations 
committee. Since the administration threatened to ignore these caps, Congress threatened 
to remove both the veto and the administration’s ability to exceed the spending caps. 
Consequently, if NASA needed extra funds, it would have to lobby Congress to pass a 
statute. NASA administrator James E. Beggs, however, departed from the 
administration’s position and asked Congress to keep the accommodation in place. Both 
Congress and the executive branch, therefore, had good reason to compromise. 
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Similarly, in 1988 the Director of the OMB, James C. Miller III, protested the 
inclusion of a legislative veto included in the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act that 
required “written prior approval” from the Appropriations Committee before transferring 
foreign assistance funds from one account to another. Congress again threatened to 
remove both the veto and the State Department’s ability to transfer funds under any 
circumstances.196 The two sides eventually reached a compromise in 1990. That bill did 
not include an explicit legislative veto requiring approval, but merely inserted a report-
and-wait provision into the law requiring that the Appropriations Committees receive 
advance notification and a written justification for any transfers. Louis Fisher described 
the compromise this way:  
While not articulated in the public law, those procedures require the 
administration to notify the Committees of each transfer. If no objection is raised 
during a fifteen-day review period, the administration may exercise the authority. 
If the Committees object, the administration could proceed only at great peril. By 
ignoring committee objections, the executive branch would most likely lose 
transfer authority the next year.197 
 
Such report-and-wait provisions — which constitute the vast amount of post-
Chadha legislative vetoes — perform similar functions to formal vetoes, and Congress 
has implemented them across issue areas. While report-and-wait provisions do not have 
any formal mechanism to veto specific executive action or rulemaking, they are highly 
effective at ensuring compliance with congressional views. Such provisions keep 
Congress informed of executive branch activity.  If executive officials diverge too far 
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from congressional preferences, they imperil important relationships with their oversight 
committees. Congress can subsequently rein in an out-of-line agency by slashing its 
budget, or by subjecting administrators to embarrassing public hearings. Administrators 
would rather avoid such scenarios.  
Critics of report-and-wait provisions hoped to see them invalidated because they 
perform the same function as formal legislative vetoes invalidated by the Court.198 At 
first, the U.S. Court of Claims did just this, striking down the report-and-wait provisions 
as a violation of separation of powers. While it found report-and-wait provisions to be 
“facially inoffensive,” it was evident “from congressional and agency practice” that such 
provisions operated as “a de facto… congressional veto.”199 On appeal, however, the 
Appeals Court upheld the distinction between formal and informal vetoes, even though 
informal legislative vetoes work just like formal ones. The Court noted that “committee 
chairmen and members naturally develop interest and expertise in the subjects entrusted 
to their continuing surveillance. Officials in the executive branch have to take these 
committees into account and keep them informed, respond to their inquiries, and if may 
be, flatter and please them when necessary.” Even so, “there is nothing unconstitutional 
about this: indeed, our separation of powers makes such informal cooperation much more 
necessary than it would be in a pure system of parliamentary government.”200 
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The difference between these informal legislative vetoes and the formal ones 
invalidated by Chadha is that the latter mechanism, according to the Court, violates the 
Constitution’s procedural requirements for lawmaking. In most other respects, however, 
they largely foster the same kind of interbranch politics that opponents of the legislative 
veto found so objectionable in the first place. Indeed, the logic of the Chadha decision is 
that Congress can only act legislatively. The Court went to great lengths to explain why 
the framers were so concerned with the powers of Congress that its powers were the most 
circumscribed. Therefore, Congress could not act to even oversee its delegated legislative 
functions unless it went through the entire legislative process. After Congress legislates, 
the executive branch administers the government.  
This artificial, and static, notion of separation of powers imposed by the Court in 
Chadha has ultimately proven undesirable and unworkable for both branches. The 
framers constructed a separation of powers system in which the branches would negotiate 
the limits of their respective powers in ordinary political disputes rather than according to 
static legal rules. The legislative veto is a prime example of interbranch politics wherein 
both branches negotiated the limits of their powers and came up with a working 
relationship that, while changing the order of interbranch action when it comes to 
lawmaking, maintained the substantive involvement of the branches.  
Hence, the executive branch was granted vast discretionary power to engage in 
the lawmaking function typically reserved to Congress, allowing the government to 
overcome legislative inertia by harnessing the expertise and efficiency that comes with 
executive government. The legislative veto, on the other hand, ensured that executive 
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branch exercises of legislative power accorded with the deliberative public will by 
requiring that exercises of delegated power only occurred with the consent of Congress. 
If the executive branch objected to the presence of legislative vetoes, Congress could 
refuse to delegate power in the first place, choosing instead to legislate with more 
specificity, and thus denying the executive branch the flexibility and discretion it wanted, 
and that good government often requires.  
The Court’s formalistic focus missed these larger political dynamics that, far from 
being contrary to the Constitution, are, rather, the product of it. Given this, it is hardly 
surprising that such interbranch negotiation has continued despite the Court’s 
intervention. The Court’s notion of separation of powers articulated in Chadha can thus 
best be seen as layered on top of a working political order, disrupting the practice of 
healthy politics, but not entirely displacing it. The fact that interbranch politics has 
persisted in much the same way points to the vitality of the Constitution’s political 
architecture in spite of the negative, and very real, effects of bad judicial reasoning.  
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Executive Agreements, Treaties, and the Constitution’s Political 
Architecture 
The Constitution specifies only one mechanism for entering into international 
agreements: the treaty. Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 provides that “[the President] shall 
have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, 
provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur.” Today, however, the vast majority 
of international agreements entered into by the United States are concluded as executive 
agreements, not treaties. The president enters most of these agreements without 
subsequent congressional ratification. Such agreements have been used in limited 
contexts since the founding.201 However, the economic challenges of the Great 
Depression and the national government’s unprecedented actions to deal with them — 
including the transnational dimensions of those issues — resulted in a significant increase 
in the use of executive agreements. In addition, the United States’ move away from 
isolationism to embrace its role as a superpower in an increasingly globalized world 
following the Second World War meant that the foreign affairs agenda of the United 
States dramatically increased.202 The volume of the United States’ global interactions 
following the New Deal and World War II, therefore, meant that it would be literally 
impossible to conduct international agreements through the cumbersome treaty 
ratification process. As Louis Fisher has argued, executive agreements are an essential 
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feature of modern government due to the “sheer increase in volume of the amount of 
business and contacts between the United States and other countries.”203 Today, treaties 
comprise approximately only 5 percent of international agreements entered into by the 
United States, while the United States enters into approximately 300-400 executive 
agreements per year.204 There is widespread consensus, moreover, that such executive 
agreements are legally interchangeable with treaties.205  
The purpose of this chapter is to consider the use of executive agreements from a 
political understanding of the Constitution’s separation of powers. Executive agreements, 
in this way, can be understood and evaluated by looking to the larger frame of American 
constitutionalism, to the specific institutional competencies of the branches based on their 
differing institutional designs, and, more fundamentally, to the purposes underlying those 
particular design choices. In other words, even as the United States departs from the 
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literal strictures of the Treaty Clause in the vast majority of international agreements that 
it enters into, the values underlying the Treaty Clause and the reasons undergirding its 
specific allocations of power provide constitutional criteria for evaluating interbranch 
behavior as they negotiate their boundaries concerning the ways the United States binds 
itself internationally. 
Through attentiveness to the goods that differently designed institutions bring to 
foreign affairs, it is no surprise that the vast majority of international agreements entered 
into by the United States are executive agreements, given the executive branch’s 
institutional advantages in the foreign affairs arena. These advantages, as I will indicate, 
are based on a principled commitment to effectiveness in foreign affairs, a commitment 
made all the more obvious by contrast with the ineffectiveness of the Articles of 
Confederation in the absence of a unitary and independent executive.206 An 
understanding of the political purposes underlying the Treaty Clause, therefore, can 
assuage some of the concerns of political scientists who see the rise of executive 
agreements as indicative of an imperial presidency circumventing Congress.207 Attention 
to the deeper political commitments of the constitutional order, moreover, reveals that the 
rise of executive agreements is not merely the result of “rational actors” updating their 
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institutions to meet the needs of foreign affairs.208 This characterization is true as far as it 
goes, but it suggests that modern constructs are the result of adaptation disconnected from 
principled constitutional commitments. Rather, as I will argue, the rise of executive 
agreements is not an example of “updating” the constitution, but their use, within certain 
limits, is the working out of the Constitution’s political logic. 
But, of course, the use of executive agreements cannot be endlessly malleable if 
the Constitution is to maintain its basic character. Even when the branches depart from 
the literal strictures of the Treaty Clause, the Clause — by how it allocates power 
between the branches — points to political criteria that should guide the branches in their 
deliberations about when an agreement is acceptably an executive agreement versus one 
requiring a stronger form of congressional authorization. As I will argue, the choice of 
the Senate — and the reasons underlying that choice — points to a concern that the 
House of Representatives is constructed to be too reflective of momentary, and at times 
fleeting, changes in public opinion. The framers thus signaled the need for significant 
international agreements to have sufficient buy-in from Congress to ensure a stable 
foreign policy, thus safeguarding the credibility of the nation in the foreign arena. The 
point here is not to dwell too legalistically on the choice of the Senate — or to suggest 
that the Senate still retains these advantages vis-a-vis the House — but, rather, to 
underscore the kind of political criteria undergirding the specific choice, criteria that can, 
and should, guide congressional claims to authority over international agreements.  
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To think constitutionally about executive agreements, in short, requires 
attentiveness to the reasons underlying specific design choices and the ways in which the 
framers constructed a system to harness the institutional advantages of the executive 
branch in foreign affairs while ensuring that major commitments enjoy widespread public 
support and, consequently, establish the conditions for a stable and effective foreign 
policy that wins the trust of foreign nations. From an architectonic perspective, then, the 
rise of executive agreements is more properly viewed as the outworking of a deeper 
political logic wholly consistent with the original design understood, as articulated in The 
Federalist, as fully adaptable to meet the needs and exigencies of unforeseen 
circumstances while maintaining its basic character through the interior structure of the 
government. The use of executive agreements, in other words, is not structured or 
constrained by legal limits, but through political negotiation (or conflict) between the 
branches (whether effective or otherwise), that negotiation tethered to legitimate 
constitutional claims deduced from the basic principles undergirding their offices and 
shared powers.209 
This chapter will begin with a discussion of the positive purposes of a vigorous 
executive branch in foreign affairs, and how executive agreements can be understood in 
light of this commitment to vigorous executive power in the foreign arena. This section 
will detail the ways in which Congress can use its institutional capacities to oversee 
executive agreements. It is difficult to imagine the President breaking completely free 
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from separation of powers constraints given Congress’s political controls, such as its 
power over appropriations, should Congress exercise its powers effectively. The major 
problem with executive agreements today, I argue, is not executive pre-predominance per 
se, but a lack of effective oversight by Congress through its failure to ensure 
transparency.210 While Congress requires that the executive branch transmit the text of 
executive agreements to Congress within 60 days of entering into force, the executive 
branch has not often complied and many agreements are either never transmitted to 
Congress or are substantially late. Moreover, while the State Department posts the texts 
of international agreements on its website, reporting is rarely up-to-date and agreements 
are posted without any reference to their legal authorization, thus making it very difficult 
— if not impossible — for citizens to monitor the use (or abuse) of executive agreements. 
The reporting system for executive agreements stands in marked contrast to reporting 
requirements under the Administrative Procedure Act, which lists all the rules and 
regulations in the Federal Register, thus allowing for Congress and concerned citizens to 
oversee rulemaking in the administrative state. Transparency, I argue, is necessary if 
Congress is to mobilize its other political capacities in response to executive agreements 
because information is a necessary predicate for interbranch negotiation and contestation.   
The second part of this chapter will consider the criteria, previewed above, that 
should guide the branches (especially Congress) as they negotiate when an agreement is 
appropriately an executive agreement versus one requiring more congressional input. 
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There is a great deal of evidence to suggest that Congress has often guarded its 
prerogatives over treaty-making, demanding that important agreements be submitted to 
the Senate as treaties (regardless of the partisan dynamics between the institutions) and 
that presidents have complied with congressional demands even when doing so has 
ensured defeat for particular treaties.211 While these interbranch negotiations often have 
exhibited a great deal of constitutional health, Congress has at times failed to show 
sufficient political ambition, deferring to legal arguments about executive power rather 
than asserting its political prerogatives. This chapter will consider the interbranch 
negotiations concerning the Iran Agreement, arguing that although the President had the 
legal authority to enter into the agreement, Congress was insufficiently motivated by its 
own political prerogatives to ensure that important changes to American foreign policy 
— regardless of the President’s legal authority — receive sufficient support in Congress 
to be durable commitments. The lack of congressional buy-in, moreover, left the 
agreement politically vulnerable to the whims of the next president.  
The allocations of power in the Treaty Clause point to an evaluative framework 
for constitutional politics. This chapter will consider the use and scope of executive 
agreements in light of that framework. While the proliferation of such agreements, at 
least at first glance, appears to be yet another instance of presidential aggrandizement, 
this conclusion is tempered by understanding the basic frame of the constitutional order 
and the ways success in foreign affairs requires the political capacities and strengths of 
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the executive branch. What appears to be presidential overreach, however, is magnified 
by the ways that Congress has at times abdicated its own responsibilities or failed to be 
properly motivated by its constitutional duties. 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE LIMITS OF CONSTITUTIONALISM 
A discussion of treaties and executive agreements in the context of the 
Constitution’s political architecture is illuminating because international agreements pose 
particular, and complicated, problems for the practice of constitutional government. 
Alexander Hamilton acknowledged as much when he answered the objections of those 
who argued that the treaty-making power ought to be lodged either exclusively with 
Congress or with the President. Indeed, when Hamilton took up the Treaty Clause in 
Federalist 75 he argued that treaty-making, in its essence, “does not seem strictly to fall 
within the definition of either one of them.” In the ordinary practice of constitutional 
government, the purpose of the legislative branch, Hamilton asserts, is to “prescribe rules 
for the regulation of the society,” while the purpose of the executive branch is to employ 
the common strength, “either for this purpose or for the common defense.” Treaties, 
however, strain the constitutional enterprise because they do not fit neatly into either 
category. Rather, Hamilton argues,   
Its objects are CONTRACTS with foreign nations, which have the force of law, 
but derive it from the obligations of good faith. They are not rules prescribed by 
the sovereign to the subject, but agreements between sovereign and sovereign. 
The power in question seems therefore to form a distinct department, and to 
belong, properly, neither to the legislative nor to the executive.212 
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In other words, the framers recognized, following classical separation of powers 
theorists such as John Locke and the Baron de Montesquieu, that the foreign arena is a 
realm that poses unique problems for constitutional government because law cannot bind 
foreign nations in the same way that it can bind citizens within a regime.213 Indeed, in the 
context of a specific regime, people leave the state of nature, forming a social contract by 
which individuals collectively transfer the power to enforce the law and protect natural 
rights to the community as a whole, setting up a government to serve as an impartial 
judge and enforcer of their own natural rights against the claims of others. Government 
thus serves a kind of settlement function, and law brings order and stability where there 
was once chaos.   
Such stability, however, is impossible to maintain — at least to the same degree 
— in the international arena where no such overarching, and impartial, government 
regulates the constituent parts of the international order. The international arena, in other 
words, always exists in a state of nature, and potentially a state of war. Locke makes this 
clear in his discussion of the federative power. While it is typical to think of separation of 
powers as the division between three types of power — legislative, executive, and 
judicial — the federative power, according to Locke, is the power of a constitutional 
regime “to respond to actions of foreigners” rather than to direct the actions of those who 
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live within the regime.214 This power, moreover, is far more difficult for governments to 
exercise than the mere enforcement of their laws because the “plans and interests of 
foreigners vary so greatly that they cannot be anticipated by a set of standing laws for 
each eventuality.”215 Hence, it is particularly important that the power over foreign affairs 
“be left in great part to the prudence of those who have it, trusting them to do their best 
for the advantage of the commonwealth.”216  It is this unique nature of foreign affairs — 
its unpredictability and chaos, and the impossibility of providing the kind of internal 
stability that inheres within a regime governed by law — that led Hamilton to assert that 
treaties form a unique department for constitutional government, stretching the very 
limits of constitutional government itself as it seeks to preserve itself in its dealings with 
foreign nations.  
The question thus becomes, how did the framers design an institutional 
framework to achieve the aims of the constitutional order in foreign affairs, and what 
does the nature of that design tell us about what we ought to expect with regard to a 
phenomenon such as executive agreements? Returning to Federalist 75, Hamilton 
supplies an answer by noting that it is important to consider the qualities the two 
branches bring to bear on foreign affairs: 
The qualities elsewhere detailed as indispensable in the management of foreign 
negotiations, point out the Executive as the most fit agent in those transactions; 
while the vast importance of the trust, and the operation of treaties as laws, plead 
 
214 John Locke, Second Treatise of Government. Early Modern Texts, 47. Retrieved at: 
https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/locke1689a.pdf 
215 Locke, 47. 
216 Locke, 47. 
 127 
strongly for the participation of the whole or a portion of the legislative body in 
the office of making them.217 
 
It must be stressed that Hamilton emphasizes the positive contributions of 
differently structured institutions for the practice of foreign affairs. The branches do not 
share power in treaty-making merely to check each other. Rather, they share power 
because the nation’s effectiveness in foreign affairs, and the purposes of republican 
government, require the involvement of these differently structured institutions. It makes 
sense, therefore, to take each of the two institutions — and their role in foreign affairs — 
in turn. The purpose of doing so is not to highlight the specific constitutional line-
drawing encapsulated by the Treaty Clause so much as it is to underscore the animating 
values of the Treaty Clause and how those values provide constitutional criteria for 
evaluating interbranch politics as it relates to international agreements. In other words, 
what positive attributes do the branches bring — based on the type of institutions that 
they are — to the forming of international agreements and how, then, can we evaluate 
interbranch politics when the vast majority of international agreements are not conducted 
as treaties?  
EXECUTIVE POWER IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
It is important to note at the outset the extent to which the Constitution makes 
provision for the effective use of executive power, and how this was seen as essential, 
especially in the context of foreign affairs. The executive branch is structured to meet the 
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needs of the nation, both domestically and in foreign affairs, through its independent and 
unitary structure. In other words, the executive branch is structured to summon the 
nation’s strength in foreign affairs because its powers are derived directly from the 
Constitution and are not dependent upon the powers of the other branches to implement 
them.  
This conception of executive power — power derived from the Constitution itself 
and not formally dependent, at least in an legal sense, upon the will of Congress — 
differs substantially, however, from constitutional orthodoxy today wherein the powers of 
the executive branch are seen, to a large extent, to be legally dependent, at least to some 
degree, upon congressional approval or sanction. Justice Jackson supplied this general 
maxim when he famously wrote in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952) that 
“[p]residential powers are not fixed but fluctuate depending upon their disjunction or 
conjunction with those of Congress.”218 Indeed, Jackson asserted that the president’s 
power is at the maximum when he acts “pursuant to express or implied authorization of 
Congress,” that the president’s power is at its “lowest ebb” when he acts contrary to 
congressional authority,” and that, finally, there is a “zone of twilight” when it is 
impossible to determine whether Congress supports particular actions. This tri-part 
schema has provided a paradigm for legal assessment and enforcement of interbranch 
boundaries by the judiciary.219 Moreover, this framework has often been used to assess 
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whether executive agreements are constitutionally legitimate, at least in a legal sense.220 
This legalistic notion of the president’s powers vis-a-vis Congress, however, makes the 
president subordinate to Congress. As Joseph Bessette argues, according to the Court’s 
notion of separation of powers when the powers between the two branches conflict, 
“Congress retains all its authority, while the president loses all overlapping powers to 
Congress.”221  
The framers, however, recognized that a vigorous executive branch — wholly 
independent from Congress for the exercise of its own powers — is essential to success 
in foreign affairs. Writing about the importance of executive power to the effectiveness of 
government more generally in Federalist 70, Hamilton argued that executive vigor is 
essential to the maintenance of constitutional government because it supplies energy to 
the constitutional order. Indeed, Hamilton asserted that, “[e]nergy in the executive is a 
leading character in the definition of good government.”222 A feeble executive, on the 
other hand “implies a feeble execution of the government. A feeble execution is but 
another phrase for a bad execution; and a government ill executed, whatever it may be in 
theory, must be, in practice, a bad government.”223 
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Hamilton goes on to list the “ingredients” of executive energy: “unity; duration; 
and adequate provision for its support; and competent powers.”224 Unity is particularly 
important for the present discussion, especially as it pertains to the government’s 
effectiveness in foreign affairs. Unity can be undermined in one of two ways. First, it can 
be destroyed by vesting the executive power in more than one individual. Secondly, and 
crucially, unity can be destroyed by vesting the executive power “ostensibly” in one 
person, but subjecting that person “in whole or in part to the control and cooperation of 
others, in the capacity of counselors to him.”225 The quality of energy so essential for 
effective governance is thus secured and induced by designing an executive branch that is 
wholly independent of Congress — with powers derived from the Constitution itself — 
and headed by a single individual. In the ordinary practice of governance, deliberation on 
the merits of public policy is essential, but it is no less essential to have an institution 
designed to implement and enforce the laws with vigor and efficiency, and to act quickly 
and decisively when the laws do not speak to certain contingencies or, perhaps more 
importantly, when emergencies require particularly decisive action to preserve the regime 
from both internal and external threats. 
 Such qualities are particularly important in the arena of foreign affairs, where 
deliberation, perhaps even more than in a domestic context, is more often a liability than 
an asset. Experience under the Articles of Confederation confirmed the necessity of 
executive vigor for the effective practice of government generally, but especially for 
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effectiveness in the foreign arena. Under the Articles, there was no independent executive 
branch.226 Rather, Congress retained for itself the executive tasks associated with foreign 
affairs by either dealing with such tasks as an entire body or by delegating certain 
executive tasks to committees or boards responsible to the whole.227 This often proved to 
be a disaster, as deliberation often hampered the government’s ability to act as quickly 
and effectively as circumstances required. Writing about the difficulties of legislature-
centered government, Hamilton asserted: 
Another defect in our system is want of method and energy in the administration. 
This had partly resulted from the other defect [the weakness of Congress]; but in a 
great degree from the prejudice and the want of a proper executive. Congress have 
kept the power too much in their own hands and have meddled too much with 
details of every sort. Congress is, properly, a deliberative corps, and it forgets 
itself when it attempts to play the executive. It is impossible such a body, 
numerous as it is, and constantly fluctuating, can ever act with sufficient decision 
or with system.228 
 
 John Jay, as Minister to Spain and Secretary of Foreign Affairs, also dealt with the 
inadequacies of legislature-centered governance, writing to George Washington that the 
committee system that Congress had established to oversee foreign affairs lacked 
“system, attention and knowledge.”229 When Jay became Ambassador to Spain in 1780 he 
was forced to rely on credit while waiting for Congress to issue appropriations, and he 
rarely — in fact, only once — received communications from the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, which he wrote was “not worth a farthing.”230 Separation of powers — more 
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specifically, the creation of an independent executive branch — was essential, according 
to Jay, if the United States was to conduct itself successfully in the arena of foreign 
affairs. Writing to Thomas Jefferson about the need to divide the government into three 
distinct departments — executive, legislative, and judicial — Jay asserted that: 
Congress is unequal to the first, very fit for the second, and but ill calculated for 
the third; and so much time is spent in deliberation, that the season for action 
often passes by before they decide on what should be done; nor is there much 
more secrecy than expedition in their measures. These inconveniences arise, not 
from personal disqualifications, but from the nature and construction of the 
government.231 
 
 By the time of the Constitutional Convention, Charles Thach notes, the 
Continental Congress “was a thoroughly discredited body,” because it was so unable to 
perform executive and administrative tasks efficiently and effectively.232 Indeed, Thach 
continues, 
[Congress] exercised the great nonlegislative powers of appointment, of 
determining financial policy, and of control of foreign affairs as well. Its 
incapacity in all three lines of endeavor is too well known to require 
demonstration. Factional differences kept important offices unfilled for long 
periods. Time and again purely personal considerations proved the governing 
factor in determination of foreign policy. The laborious efforts to draft 
instructions for the negotiations of the treaty of peace with the accompanying 
intrigues of the French faction against the English faction served to prove 
Congress as incompetent in this capacity as in its strictly administrative 
character.233 
 
 Hence, the qualities of an independent and unitary executive branch are meant to 
make the government more effective in foreign affairs in ways that a legislature is 
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unlikely to be able to achieve given that its plural structure. Given these structural 
advantages in foreign affairs, the framers placed the power to make treaties with the 
executive branch. As Gary Schmitt notes, the framers did not give the power to make 
treaties to the president (or, for that matter, make the president commander-in-chief) until 
the executive branch had been structured to be a safe repository of those powers by 
securing its independence from Congress and by vesting the power in a single head: “If 
institutional independence was a critical requirement for both the effective and safe use of 
such a power, then the framers were sound in their determination to withhold those 
powers until a proper repository could be built.”234 
 The advantages of the executive branch in foreign affairs in general and in the 
formation of international agreements are fairly obvious. The formation of treaties, “of 
whatever nature,” according to Jay in Federalist 64, requires the virtues of the executive 
branch because their negotiation almost always requires “perfect secrecy and immediate 
dispatch.”235 A legislature is often not able to provide this, which, as evidenced by 
practice under the Articles of Confederation, hinders the ability of the national 
government to negotiate treaties effectively.236 Foreign adversaries, motivated by either 
“mercenary or friendly motives,” are doubtless more likely to rely on the secrecy of the 
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President than they are to confide in the Senate, “and still less in that of a large popular 
assembly.”237 Moreover, the tides and fortunes are constantly shifting in foreign affairs, 
and the government needs the ability to respond quickly to events that are seldom 
predictable and often defy the most carefully laid out plans. According to Jay in The 
Federalist: 
The loss of a battle, the death of a prince, the removal of a minister, or other 
circumstances intervening to change the present posture and aspect of affairs may 
turn the most favorable tide into a course opposite to our wishes. As in the field, 
so in the cabinet, there are moments to be seized as they pass, and they who 
preside in either should be left in a capacity to improve them.238  
 
Lodging the power to negotiate and make treaties with foreign nations in the 
executive branch thus ensures that secrecy and dispatch appropriate to the needs and 
contingencies of quickly changing circumstances in foreign affairs are met. Indeed, it is 
for these functional reasons — the ability to act with vigor, decisiveness, and secrecy as 
the circumstances require — that led classical separation of powers theorists Locke and 
Montesquieu to place the federative power (which included the power to make treaties 
and to conduct war) solely with the executive branch, citing the inability of a deliberative 
body to adequately meet the exigencies of foreign affairs. As Montesquieu, for example, 
wrote, discussing the importance of giving the executive full control over the military, 
"[w]hen once an army is established, it ought not to depend immediately on the 
legislature, but on the executive power; and this from the very nature of the thing, its 
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business consisting more in action than in deliberation."239 Rather than involving the 
legislature in a formal sense in the negotiation and ratification of treaties, the legislature 
was to be given other powers, such as power over appropriations, meant to influence, 
though not directly control, the actions of the executive branch. The legislature can limit 
executive discretion by exercising its own political prerogatives over appropriations and 
its determinations about the size of the army and even the types of weapons that the 
legislature will fund. As Josh Chafetz notes, Congress’s power over the purse gives it 
substantial power to limit presidential discretion with regard to the exercise of its foreign 
affairs powers by, for example, choosing to eliminate funding for new aircraft carriers or 
long-range bombers, thus making it more difficult for the president to “project American 
power overseas.”240  
The essential point for Locke and Montesquieu — and, indeed, for the framers 
who experienced first-hand the problems associated with government absent an 
appropriately-designed executive branch — was that foreign affairs requires the vigor and 
efficiency that comes from a unitary and independent executive branch, and that provision 
must be made to ensure the effective use of executive power. In short, as Gary Schmitt 
has argued, “[b]y separating executive power from legislative power the Constitution 
frees the executive to meet the exigencies of foreign affairs, thereby increasing the overall 
capacity of the government.”241 The Constitution vests the executive power in the 
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president, providing the president all powers necessary to act to preserve the nation in its 
dealings with foreign nations. Given that the needs and exigencies of the nation in the 
foreign sphere are, by their nature, illimitable, the executive is granted power to meet 
these needs. The executive’s power expands as the needs of the nation in the foreign 
sphere expand given the executive’s distinct institutional advantages in foreign affairs. As 
Madison argued in Federalist 41, to place legal limitations on the government’s ability to 
meet the needs of foreign affairs would shackle the government, preventing it from 
attaining legitimate constitutional ends, including, potentially, the very survival of the 
constitutional order:  
The means of security can only be regulated by the means and the danger of 
attack. The will, in fact, be ever determined by these rules and by no others. It is 
in vain to oppose constitutional barriers to the impulse of self-preservation. It is 
worse than in vain; because it plants in the Constitution itself necessary 
usurpations of power, every precedent of which is a germ of unnecessary and 
multiplied repetitions.242 
 
There is thus an inherent tension between the aims of republican government and 
the ability for the government to preserve itself in its dealings with foreign nations. In 
Federalist 70, Hamilton did not, perhaps, assuage the concerns of those who feared a 
“vigorous Executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican government.” Rather, he 
argued, the “enlightened well-wishers to this species of government must at least hope 
that the supposition is destitute of foundation” given that vigorous executive power is an 
essential ingredient to good government, and, indeed, a necessary ingredient for the very 
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survival of the constitutional order itself.243 In other words, republican government can 
only be maintained with a vigorous executive branch with the capacity to act to meet the 
needs of the nation, and this capacity can only be ensured by a grant of power directly 
from the Constitution to the president rather than by shackling the executive branch to the 
legislature.  
This is not to say that the president’s power over foreign affairs is illimitable and 
that any action the president takes to preserve the nation in foreign affairs is 
constitutionally legitimate. To return to Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown, there is an 
element of truth to the notion that the president’s power fluctuates according to the views 
of Congress, but, contrary to Jackson, this power is constrained not by legal limitations 
(presumably enforceable by the judiciary) but by the exercise of Congress’s own political 
prerogatives over and against the executive branch should Congress disapprove of 
exercises of executive discretion. 
In short, if separation of powers is ultimately a principled division of labor meant 
to promote the efficient and effective use of power, then the executive’s predominance in 
foreign affairs should come as no surprise, and neither should executive agreements. In 
other words, the rise of and use of executive agreements does not, at least in principle, 
mean that the executive branch has exceeded separation of powers constraints because 
Congress has political capacities (often retrospective) that it can mobilize to oversee, and 
constrain, the use of executive agreements. 
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THE USE AND CONTROL OF EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS 
Before turning to the Senate’s shared powers over treaty-making and how the 
reasons underlying that shared power ought to inform how Congress seeks to advance its 
own prerogatives over international agreements (asserting its prerogatives especially 
when certain international agreements, because of their importance to American foreign 
policy, require more stringent legislative scrutiny and involvement), it is worth pausing to 
examine the use of executive agreements in general and the reasons why they are used. 
As should be clear from the previous section, the rise of executive agreements is, in many 
respects, the outworking of a principled division of labor. The executive branch has 
gained pre-dominance in the field not as the result of historical accident or the rational 
updating of institutions, but because an independent and unitary executive branch is 
structured to be pre-eminent in foreign affairs because the nation’s vitality in the foreign 
sphere requires it. This section will thus consider how executive agreements are used and 
how they are reconciled with the constitutional structure (i.e. how does Congress maintain 
oversight of executive agreements, effectively or otherwise?). Executive agreements are 
not uniformly controversial. Indeed, how controversial an executive agreement is 
ultimately depends on whether an executive agreement is entered into pursuant to a 
statutory grant of power by Congress or whether it is based solely on the president’s 
Article II powers.  
Ex Ante Congressional-Executive Agreements 
The vast majority of executive agreements are concluded based on delegated 
power from Congress in what are known as ex ante congressional-executive agreements. 
 139 
Given transparency issues — which will be discussed at length later on — it is impossible 
to know the precise number or percentage of executive agreements entered into based on 
delegated statutory authority, although most scholars estimate that such agreements 
constitute roughly 80-85 percent of all executive agreements.244  
Congress makes these delegations, as it often does in a domestic context, because 
it cannot conceivably respond quickly to rapidly changing situations on the ground. The 
reasons for congressional delegation to the executive branch in the foreign sphere, 
however, are magnified compared to the reasons in the domestic context given the 
volatility of foreign affairs. The precedent for future ex ante congressional-executive 
agreements based on delegated statutory power was set when — at the height of the New 
Deal — President Roosevelt requested power to act quickly in negotiating reciprocal 
trade agreements without returning to Congress for approval.245 Faced with an 
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unprecedented economic collapse and the need to deal with the global implications of the 
Great Depression, President Roosevelt asked Congress to grant the executive branch the 
power to negotiate reciprocal trade agreements that could change tariffs up to 50 percent 
of what Congress had established by law. As Roosevelt argued to Congress: 
Other governments are to an ever increasing extent winning their share of 
international trade by negotiated, reciprocal trade agreements. If American 
agricultural and industrial interests are to retain their deserved place in this trade, 
the American government must be in a position to bargain for that place with 
other governments…. 
If the American government is not in a position to make fair offers for fair 
opportunities, its trade will be superseded. If it is not in a position at a given 
moment rapidly to alter the terms on which it is willing to deal with other 
countries, it cannot adequately protect its trade against discriminations and against 
bargains injurious to its interests. Furthermore, a promise to which prompt effect 
cannot be given is not an inducement which can pass current at par in commercial 
negotiations. 
For this reason, any smaller degree of authority in the hands of the Executive 
would be ineffective. The executive branches of virtually all other important 
trading countries already possess some such power.246  
 
In response, Congress voted overwhelmingly to grant President Roosevelt the 
authority he requested. In doing so, Congress acknowledged the President’s concern that 
the United States would not be able to achieve its international objectives if the Senate 
were to convene to approve every such agreement. When Congress reauthorized the 
delegation to enter into executive agreements in 1937 the Senate Report asserted that 
“[t]rade agreements should not be subjected to the cumbrous treaty-making procedure.”247 
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The House or Representatives Report further underscored the need for executive vigor if 
the United States was to accomplish its trade objectives, acknowledging that 
congressional procedures were not adequate to the needs of the moment:  
The Senate and the House of Representatives are in session for only part of the 
year and in recent years the demands upon their time when in session have been 
enormous. Were either senatorial or congressional ratification to be required, the 
inevitable delay and the further uncertainty as to ratification would go far toward 
destroying the incentive of foreign government to enter into any trade 
negotiations at all.248   
 
 Congress and the President, therefore, negotiated their boundaries with respect to 
international trade, determining, through their deliberations, that the institutional 
advantages of the executive branch needed to be harnessed to ensure effectiveness in 
international commerce, especially at a moment of great crisis. Such discretion in this 
case, moreover, was not unlimited as Congress’s delegations were limited and 
periodically renegotiated. In this way, Congress delegated power to the executive branch 
to perform an essential function that could not conceivably be accomplished through the 
treaty ratification process, but it also ensured that this executive discretion would be 
evaluated and subject to congressional oversight. 
 Ex ante Congressional-executive agreements expanded dramatically over the 
course of the 20th Century, driven in large part by an expansive foreign aid program 
(foreign aid agreements constitute a significant percentage of ex ante congressional-
executive agreements).249 Executive agreements based on delegated statutory power are, 
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at least in theory, hardly controversial insofar as Congress has the political tools 
necessary to influence executive discretion. Some scholars, however, worry that the 
president has too much power in foreign affairs given the widespread and, at times, 
overly broad delegations to the executive branch. As Oona Hathaway contends, such 
delegations essentially grant the executive branch unfettered discretion in foreign affairs, 
satisfying the form of interbranch cooperation without the substance.250 Indeed, some 
delegations, often authorized decades ago, are so broad so as to provide very little 
meaningful guidance to the executive branch (though other provisions, discussed below, 
can restrict the scope of these delegations). For example, the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1973 states that the President is “authorized to furnish… assistance, on such terms and 
conditions as he may determine.”251 Similarly, the Mutual Education and Cultural 
Exchange Act of 1961 granted the executive broad power to conclude “agreements with 
foreign governments and international organizations, in furtherance of the purposes of 
this Act.”252 These two examples are typical of the broad and vague delegations that 
serve as the basis for most executive agreements today.253  
Of course, the broadness of such delegations is arguably appropriate given that 
such delegations are meant to be flexible enough to enable the president to respond to 
events on the ground rather than to tie the president’s hands through overly specific 
legislation (the reason for delegating in the first place). Moreover, open-ended 
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delegations are at times essential for long-term planning and investment. For example, 
prior to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Congress included sunset provisions in its 
foreign assistance legislation, and, therefore, had to reauthorize foreign aid every few 
years.254 In requesting that Congress overhaul the foreign assistance program, President 
Kennedy argued that “uneven and undependable” short-term delegations undermined 
efficient long-term planning.255 Congress thus overhauled the program with longer-term 
grants of power.  
At the end of the day, Congress has substantial power to influence executive 
discretion through its control over appropriations. It is, of course, difficult for Congress 
to defund an executive agreement with which it disapproves in order to undercut the 
agreement. Moreover, to do so could undercut the United States’ credibility in foreign 
affairs because the withholding of funds to implement a particular agreement could mean 
that the United States is non-compliant with its international obligations.256 Even so, 
Congress can scrutinize executive use of delegated authority and alter its funding 
priorities — or perhaps end the delegation altogether — should the executive branch 
exercise its authority in ways that defy congressional priorities. This gives Congress 
substantial power to both harness the benefits of executive energy and discretion in 
foreign affairs while influencing (though not directly controlling) how that discretion is 
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used in the long-term, and Congress has, at times, been fairly adept at using the 
appropriations process to constrain executive discretion with regard to executive 
agreements. 
For example, Congress has often, to great effect, attached appropriation riders to 
its delegations for foreign aid. As Josh Chafetz notes, since 1986 Congress has attached 
appropriations riders prohibiting the payment of direct assistance to nations’ whose 
elected head of state was deposed in a military coup.257 A recent study, moreover, 
demonstrates that administrations have generally complied, albeit begrudgingly, with this 
congressional demand.258 The existence of the appropriations rider, Chafetz contends, 
has created problems for administrations who do not want to comply. For example, when 
the Obama administration wanted to avoid cutting off aid to Egypt after the 2013 
Egyptian coup, the administration simply refused to characterize the coup as such. 
Extensive, and negative, media coverage of the issue, however, eventually forced the 
administration to comply with congressional demands.259 In addition to this, Congress 
(through the so-called Leahy Amendment) has used appropriations riders barring foreign 
aid from groups known to commit human rights violations, generating substantial 
conflict between the executive branch and Congress.260 In 2011, 1,766 individuals and 
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units from 46 countries were denied assistance on humans rights grounds.261 Beyond 
appropriations riders, moreover, Congress can alter its funding priorities, providing more 
strict guidance for the executive branch. Lisa L. Martin, for example, demonstrates how 
in the 1980s Congress substantially altered the Food Aid Program in response to 
disagreements with the executive branch. Broad delegations, Martin argues, signaled 
general interbranch agreement on the issue. When the executive branch used that 
discretion in ways that diverged from congressional expectations Congress responded by 
narrowing the delegations.262 
In short, Congress wields substantial powers to oversee the use of executive 
agreements — especially those executive agreements entered into based on its delegated 
power — should it choose to use its political capacities in response to the need to 
delegate. As Gary Schmitt observed in a study of military agreements from 1946-1973, 
presidential reporting requirements and annual appropriation hearings in each house 
indicated substantial congressional control of agreements entered into based on statutory 
delegation. Schmitt concluded that it was perhaps a “misnomer to refer to these accords 
as executive agreements” given the extent to which such agreements ultimately relied 
upon Congress for their substance.263 The point here is that this type of executive 
agreements are not in principle problematic because Congress has all the tools necessary 
(at least in theory) to ensure that the substance of executive agreements reflects its own 
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political priorities and to contest presidential use of its delegated power when the 
president acts in ways that are inconsistent with those priorities. There are, however, 
reasons to believe that Congress has not sufficiently used these political capacities. These 
shortcomings are separate, although not entirely distinct, from the question of whether 
such agreements are themselves constitutionally appropriate, and will be addressed in a 
later section. 
It should be mentioned that Congress’s ability to oversee its delegated powers in 
foreign affairs has been substantially curtailed by the Court’s invalidation of the 
legislative veto. Given that the legislative veto is the subject of another chapter, there is 
no reason to dwell on this issue at length here. However, the rise of executive agreements 
and the legislative veto occurred in tandem (one of the original applications of the 
legislative veto, in fact, was in the Lend-Lease Act of 1941), with the legislative veto 
often serving as the price for broad and wide-ranging delegated powers in foreign affairs. 
While the legislative veto was never successfully used in the foreign sphere, the viable 
threat of the veto, as I argued in the other chapter, ensured that the executive branch 
consulted with Congress during the negotiation and formation of international 
agreements. For example, arms sales under the Arms Export Control Act of 1974 were 
subject to a legislative veto. Congress only once threatened to use the veto (regarding the 
sale of Hawk missiles to Jordan). The administration, under intense pressure from 
Congress, backed down from that particular agreement. In later years, the viable threat of 
the veto in that incident, however, resulted in much closer consultation with Congress 
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long before such agreements were finalized.264 Legislative veto provisions thus ensured 
that congressional delegations in the foreign affairs context — delegations that, to be 
successful, were often long-term and broad grants of power to enable sufficient 
flexibility and long-term planning — did not result in congressional abdication, 
providing Congress opportunities to assert its political perspective in particular 
circumstances. As Hathaway argues, many of Congress’s long-term delegations in 
foreign affairs were made precisely because the legislative veto provided Congress with 
a viable mechanism for continued political influence. The long-term delegations made 
(often without sunset provisions) are hard to repeal by statute (often facing an executive 
veto). The invalidation of the veto, in this way, has significantly undercut congressional 
control of its delegated powers in foreign affairs, and the United States’ expanded role in 
the global arena makes it difficult to walk back such delegations.265 A strict reading of 
the branches’ powers vis-a-vis each other in terms of lawmaking (in the case of the 
invalidation of the legislative veto) has thus undermined the political capacities of the 
branches in an area (international agreement making) where a more expansive notion of 
constitutional purposes has taken hold. 
Sole Executive Agreements 
 Agreements entered into based solely on the president’s constitutional powers are 
the most controversial international agreements because they are neither mentioned by 
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the Constitution nor authorized in advance by Congress. Such agreements, however, 
have been upheld by the Supreme Court and retain a legal status on par with treaties.266 
Scholars estimate that sole executive agreements constitute around 5-10 percent of 
executive agreements (though, again, this is simply an estimate given data limitations 
and transparency issues discussed below).267   
While sole executive agreements are potentially the most controversial because 
Congress is not formally involved in making them, such agreements fit within the 
general constitutional framework specified in the previous section. A fundamental reason 
for constructing a vigorous executive branch with powers derived directly from the 
Constitution — and thus independent of Congress — was to ensure that the 
constitutional order would be able to meet the needs of the nation in foreign affairs. 
Hence, the president at times enters into sole executive agreements related to national 
security and defense. Sole executive agreements in this area deal with issues such as 
intelligence sharing, cross-servicing agreements, joint military missions, and training 
exercises, and, as such, fall squarely within the president’s powers as commander-in-
chief. All status of forces agreements (SOFAs), which deal with issues pertaining to the 
legal rights of U.S. personnel stationed abroad, are entered into as sole executive 
agreements (with the sole exception of the treaty which established NATO, which is 
perhaps not a surprise given the significance of the commitment). Such agreements, 
while at times merely routine, can be highly consequential, such as the SOFA and the 
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“Strategic Framework” for friendship and cooperation that President George W. Bush 
concluded with Iraq at the very end of his presidency, entering into force on January 1, 
2009.268  The agreement was particularly controversial because it was concluded after the 
2008 election but before President Obama entered into office. The executive agreements 
included a withdrawal timeline that would significantly affect U.S. and Iraqi relations 
related to the war effort well into the Obama administration.269  The substantive nature of 
the two sole executive agreements concluded with Iraq at the end of the Bush 
administration led some members of Congress (for example, Senator Obama on the 
campaign trail) and some legal scholars to demand that the agreements be submitted to 
the Senate for ratification as a treaty.270 The agreements were implemented without any 
congressional authorization. 
While at times highly significant and controversial, it can be easy to overstate the 
problems associated with sole executive agreements. While such agreements are entered 
into based solely on the president’s power with no prior authorization or subsequent 
approval by Congress, sole executive agreements, like agreements based on delegated 
statutory power, are unlikely to evade separation of powers constraints entirely should 
Congress exercise its own political prerogatives over foreign affairs. Military and basing 
agreements, for example, might be concluded as sole executive agreements, but at the 
end of the day Congress controls the purse strings and can choose to fund or not to fund 
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bases overseas. By keeping itself apprised of executive action, Congress can place itself 
in a position to contest presidential use of sole executive agreements. Indeed, all 
exercises of presidential power related to foreign affairs are ultimately subject to 
Congress’s independent constitutional powers should Congress use its political capacities 
effectively. As Josh Chafetz notes, Congress’s power over the purse give it substantial 
power even to end wars when troops are already committed on the ground, a feat which 
Congress accomplished when it passed the Case-Church Amendment in 1973, effectively 
cutting off all funding, direct and indirect, to the war effort in Vietnam.271 Sole executive 
agreements are but a subset of this larger constitutional picture and, as such, they are 
constrained, at least theoretically, by the larger separation of powers system. 
TRANSPARENCY PROBLEMS: A FAILURE OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 
 Much of what has been written about the use of executive agreements so far has 
been speculative and theoretical in many respects. The argument has been fairly 
straightforward: executive agreements do not, in principle, pose major constitutional 
concerns in light of the principled division of labor embodied by the Constitution’s 
political architecture. Moreover, such agreements do not necessarily mean that the 
executive branch has exceeded separation of powers constraints because Congress has 
political capacities that enable it to exercise substantial control of executive agreements 
regardless of whether those agreements are entered into based on delegated power or 
solely on the president’s own constitutional powers. 
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Exercising those political prerogatives effectively, however, requires that 
Congress have accurate and up-to-date information about executive agreements. In other 
words, while it is certainly true that the president is the dominant actor in the negotiation 
and conclusion of the vast majority of international agreements (without subsequent 
approval by Congress), Congress has a great deal of power to influence the direction of 
American foreign policy through the exercise of its political prerogatives vis-a-vis the 
executive branch. Congress can alter statutory delegations, influence executive discretion 
through the appropriations process, and even use other political tools up to and including 
impeachment should the executive branch persist in actions that violate the deliberative 
will of Congress. Acquiring the relevant information regarding executive exercises of 
authority, however, is a necessary prerequisite to using these political capacities when the 
branches disagree. Indeed, it is impossible to have an argument about political differences 
between the branches if Congress does not know how the executive branch is using its 
power.   
Transparency was the goal of the Case-Zablocki Act of 1972 (also known as the 
Case Act) which required that the Secretary of State report all international agreements 
entered into by the United States through mechanisms other than treaties to Congress 
within 60 days after agreements entered into force.272 Congress was rightly concerned 
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that the massive uptick in executive agreements had left it in the dark on major 
international commitments. Of particular concern were secret agreements that committed 
the United States to serious international obligations without congressional knowledge or 
approval. Perhaps the most notable, and controversial, of such agreements was a secret 
annex to a basing agreement with Spain. In the context of the basing agreement, the 
United States and Spain noted their mutual security interests and pledged to work within 
their constitutional processes to take action to preserve their common security interests.273 
While basing agreements were generally concluded as executive agreements — and 
considered within the purview of the president’s power as commander-in-chief — this 
agreement clearly committed the United States to a more substantive pact. Given this 
agreement, and others like it, Congress was concerned that the executive branch was 
essentially acting unfettered in the foreign arena. As the Senate Committee Report for the 
Case Act stated:   
As the committee has discovered, there have been numerous agreements 
contracted with foreign governments in recent years, particularly agreements of a 
military nature, which remain wholly unknown to Congress and the people. A 
number of agreements have been uncovered by the Symington subcommittee... 
including, for example, an agreement with Ethiopia in 1960, agreements with 
Laos in 1963, with Thailand in 1964 and again in 1967, with Korea in 1966 and 
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Given that such agreements could constitute significant commitments on the part 
of the United States, Congress asserted its need to know what those commitments could 
entail: “...these agreements, which can in an instant commit or involve this country in 
possible hostilities, must be formally and systematically examined by the Congress before 
they are triggered by events.”275 Even so, Congress acknowledged that the executive 
branch had good reasons, at times, for keeping certain agreements secret, especially from 
the public, and, therefore, created mechanisms for specialized committees to review such 
agreements rather than the whole of Congress. Under the provisions of the Case Act, the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee receive 
the agreements and can then follow up with questions or criticisms, or hold closed-door 
hearings.276 The need for secrecy, however important, could not be a pretext for keeping 
Congress — or portions of Congress — completely in the dark about U.S. commitments. 
As Senator Case (for whom the Act is named) argued:   
The most important purpose of this legislation is to make the American people 
aware of what our international relationships are on a continuing basis, for two 
reasons. First, so that the public, where those arrangements are sound and the 
direction of policy is wise, can support it . . . . Second, so that the administration 
from time to time is checked in its efforts to do things that are unwise by the force 
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 Unfortunately, the accountability regime embodied by the Case Act has hardly 
lived up to its aspirations.278 First, there are major problems regarding executive branch 
compliance with the terms of the Case Act. While agreements are supposed to be reported 
to Congress within 60 days after they enter into force, reporting is “often late and 
perpetually incomplete.”279 For example, in 2004 the House Committee on International 
Relations learned that more than 600 classified and unclassified agreements dating back 
to 1997 had not been reported to Congress due to organizational failures at the State 
Department.280 Many of the reporting failures are due to a lack of centralized planning 
resulting from, at least in part, the fact that the Federal Register Act has excluded the 
reporting for international agreements since its inception in 1934 (a point to which I will 
return). The State Department maintains that the backlog in the organization and reporting 
of agreements is due in part to a lack of funding and resources.281 Perhaps even more 
problematic is the fact that the State Department is not itself always aware of all of the 
agreements concluded by other departments and agencies (especially since the reporting 
to the State Department is often late) and a great deal of confusion at times exists within 
the executive branch about the nature of American commitments. For example, in 1999 
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the General Accounting Office reported that “[t]he number of trade agreements to which 
the United States is currently a party is uncertain” and that “key agencies were unable to 
provide a definitive count of all U.S. trade agreements that are currently in force.”282 
Moreover, a report from the International Security Advisory Board maintained as recently 
as 2015 that because there is no “comprehensive and readily accessible archival database 
of all existing agreements… there is a surprising degree of uncertainty about what status 
agreements are in force and their terms.”283 The report further asserted that “[i]n some 
cases, different parts of the U.S. government disagree about whether agreements exist 
with a particular nation, whether agreements are still in force, and what their terms 
are.”284 While Congress amended the Case Act in 2004 to bring about greater executive 
branch compliance, major compliance issues persist, as Curtis Bradley and Jack 
Goldsmith recently noted, “and the result in practice is that Congress lacks a full picture 
of U.S. agreements, and the public (including those in the public who have the incentive 
and ability to monitor the government) has highly selective access to these agreements 
and little ability to perceive the overall agreement practices of the executive branch.”285 
Beyond the issues with executive branch reporting under the Case Act, Congress 
has not acted to ensure that information about executive agreements is made available to 
the public in easily accessible ways. Pursuant to the Case Act, a list of all non-classified 
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international agreements are supposed to be posted to the State Department website no 
later than 180 days after entering into force (although, as mentioned above, the reporting 
of these agreements is never up-to-date or complete).286 Even when agreements are posted 
online, the State Department only posts the texts of agreements and does not cite the legal 
authority by which agreements were made. While the State Department, through its 
Circular-175 procedure, makes a determination about the legal basis for agreements when 
deciding whether an agreement is authorized by statute or needs to be concluded as a 
treaty (or with some form of congressional ratification), these determinations are never 
released to the public even though they are rarely classified.287 Different types of 
executive agreements (ex ante congressional-executive agreements and sole executive 
agreements) are thus posted without distinction. Hence, it is nearly impossible for 
researchers — and, for that matter, average citizens — to determine whether the executive 
branch has exceeded its legal authority in the conclusion of executive agreements, or even 
whether executive agreements have any legal basis at all.288  
It should be noted that this lack of governmental transparency has not always been 
the norm. For example, when Gary Schmitt conducted his research into executive 
agreements in the early 1980s he relied upon a government source that listed all executive 
agreements with their legal citations through the 1960s (excluding classified 
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agreements).289 Determining the legal basis for executive agreements today (if one can 
find agreements in the first place), however, requires considerable guesswork. While 
scholars estimate, for example, that executive agreements based on statutory delegations 
comprise 80-85 percent of executive agreements, this estimate involves connecting 
executive agreements to statutes by conducting keyword searches in the statutes-at-
large.290 Obviously, this is a fraught and painstaking process. In one of the more recent 
comprehensive studies of executive agreements, Oona Hathaway and her research 
assistants searched the statutes-at-large database and connected executive agreements to 
statutes in nearly every issue area conceivable.291 For example, by searching the statutes-
at-large for “agriculture” or “agricultural commodities” in the same sentence as 
“agreements”  Hathaway was able to find 167 agreements, most of which were pursuant 
to the Agricultural Trade and Development and Assistance Act of 1954.292 Much of the 
work here, however, is speculative, and is prone to error.  
Moreover, the Case Act only requires the executive branch to report legally 
binding international commitments.293 The United States, however, increasingly enters 
into “political” agreements, whereby both nations disclaim any intention to form a legally 
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binding instrument, even as they commit to do certain things.294 Such agreements are 
neither reported to Congress nor publicized, though such agreements can have significant 
consequences for the public. As Bradley and Goldsmith maintain, such political 
commitments have been used especially prominently in regulatory contexts in order to 
facilitate greater cooperation between U.S. bureaucratic agencies and their foreign 
counterparts, and these agreements, although not legally binding, “can have an enormous 
impact on the everyday activities of U.S. firms and persons.”295 Moreover, such 
agreements are being used increasingly for important international commitments. Indeed, 
two of the most prominent international commitments concluded during the Obama 
Administration — the nuclear deal with Iran and the Paris Climate agreement — were 
“political” agreements, and thus did not impose legally-binding commitments under 
international law. These types of “political” commitments, as Harold Koh argues, are 
increasingly becoming the norm in international lawmaking as international affairs 
becomes less about drafting static texts and more of “a process of building relationships to 
foster normative principles in new issue areas.”296 As such “political” agreements 
proliferate and have significant impacts on U.S. foreign policy and the regulatory regimes 
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that impact the daily lives of Americans, Congress has not acted to ensure that such 
commitments are publicly recorded and made known in any systematic way.  
This transparency regime for executive agreements (to the extent that it exists) 
contrasts significantly with the administrative state where both proposed and final rules 
and regulations — pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) of 1946 — are 
catalogued and listed in the Federal Register, allowing time for agencies to hold open 
proceedings where members of the public can comment on proposed rules and regulations 
prior to the finalization of rules. As David Rosenbloom argues, Congress, when debating 
the APA, recognized that bureaucratic departments and agencies operate as mere 
extensions of Congress when they issue rules and regulations based on delegated 
legislative power.297 To address the constitutional and accountability problems associated 
with delegation of legislative power to the executive branch, Congress developed 
mechanisms meant to bring legislative values to the rule-making process by requiring that 
information about rules and regulations — including their legal basis and general 
applicability — is public.298 By requiring the publication of this information, Congress 
thus provides opportunities to take public views into account in the formation of rules and 
regulations. The Federal Register Act similarly requires that various executive actions, 
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such as presidential proclamations and executive orders be published in the Federal 
Register.  
Perhaps most importantly, this record enables citizen and media watchdog groups 
to raise awareness when the executive branch acts in ways that are potentially 
problematic, giving Congress the opportunity to respond to executive actions with which 
it disagrees. Indeed, given the volume of administrative action today it is impossible for 
Congress to oversee every executive or administrative action. Neither would such 
micromanagement necessarily lead to better oversight given that this would require 
Congress to spend a great deal of time addressing potential executive non-compliance that 
is not publicly salient, and, moreover, given the scale of the national agenda, would likely 
miss many instances of executive discretion with which it disagrees. By providing a 
record of executive branch action, on the other hand, Congress can engage in what 
Matthew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz refer to as “fire-alarm” oversight.299 An 
informational record available to the public, in short, enables concerned citizens and 
watchdog groups to bring potential abuses of executive discretion to the attention of 
Congress, giving it opportunities to respond.  
International agreements have been excluded from publication in the Federal 
Register since publishing began in 1934. This is perhaps not surprising given that such 
agreements were used sparingly at the time. While Congress has enacted informational 
reforms with the Case Act since that time, these reforms, as demonstrated, have never 
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been in any way comparable to the vast informational resources created by the APA and 
the Federal Register Act in the domestic sphere. The Federal Register, published daily, is 
voluminous. In 2016, it included 3,853 final rules constituting 38,652 pages.300 This, of 
course, does not include the lists of proposed rules. By contrast, the United States enters 
approximately 300-400 international agreements per year, and yet the information 
regarding these commitments is difficult to find (given major reporting problems), and, 
when reported, is reported without relevant — and, indeed, essential — information (such 
as the legal authorization).  
In the absence of a publicly available, and easily accessible, informational record, 
Congress and the public are left uninformed about the nature of U.S. commitments 
entered into by the executive branch. The lack of such information, moreover, makes it 
difficult for citizens to raise controversial issues to the attention of Congress, thus making 
oversight of executive agreements all the more difficult. While executive agreements, as I 
have argued, are theoretically justifiable given the institutional advantages of the 
executive branch in foreign affairs, executive predominance in foreign affairs (and the 
concomitant rise in executive agreements) is ultimately reconciled to the aims of 
republican governance by the exercise of Congress’s distinctive political capacities vis-a-
vis the executive branch, political capacities, moreover, that can only be exercised 
effectively if Congress has sufficient information about executive actions to respond.  In 
other words, if Congress is to effectively wield its powers of the purse, for example, in 
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response to executive actions it deems inappropriate (inappropriate either for legal or 
political reasons), information about those executive actions is a prerequisite for 
exercising those prerogatives.  
Events during the Obama administration highlighted why the current transparency 
regime for international agreements is inadequate. The Obama administration frequently 
employed a legal theory justifying executive agreements that were not directly authorized 
by a specific statute, but, nevertheless, were consistent with the tapestry of existing law 
and, moreover, could be implemented, according to the administration, without 
subsequent legislation.301 Some legal scholars have characterized such executive 
agreements as “executive agreements plus.”302 Perhaps most controversially, the Obama 
administration announced that it intended to ratify the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (ACTA) without seeking ratification by Congress. The administration, 
however, only provided vague explanations for why it had the authority to enter the 
ACTA as a sole executive agreement.303 While the administration argued that the 
agreement would not require any changes to existing law, many members of Congress 
and large swaths of the legal community objected to the administration’s decision to ratify 
the ACTA without congressional approval, arguing that the administration did not have 
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legal authority to conclude the agreement without Congress.304 The administration 
ultimately argued that it had the authority to conclude the agreement based on the Trade 
Act of 1974, although this law did not delegate to the administration the power to 
conclude agreements without congressional approval.305 While the administration never 
renounced its legal position, it never ratified the agreement in the face of political 
pressures.306 
This example highlights the extent to which the executive branch has at times 
seemed to stretch the limits of its authority in defense of the legal basis for certain 
agreements. The ACTA was a particularly controversial agreement and, as such, attracted 
the attention of Congress and the legal community. It is certainly possible that there are 
other examples of agreements made with tenuous legal authority. Absent a better 
transparency regime, however, it is difficult to know whether the executive branch is 
routinely exceeding its legal authority or entering agreements in ways that defy the 
political preferences of Congress. By building a more robust accountability regime that 
requires the executive branch to list all international agreements and to make legal 
justifications for them — akin to reporting requirements under the APA — Congress 
could lay the foundations for effective oversight by ensuring that the public is aware of 
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executive action. Ensuring that the public has access to relevant information, moreover, 
provides Congress with opportunities to assess and respond to executive exercises of 
discretion in foreign affairs.  
Finally, such informational reforms are more appropriate to the foreign affairs 
context than more stringent administrative requirements. Oona Hathaway, for example, 
has advocated for all proposed international agreements (especially ex ante congressional-
executive agreements) to be reported to Congress prior to entering into effect and subject 
to APA procedures, such as open comment proceedings.307 Such administrative 
requirements, however, would be particularly onerous, and, moreover, they elide the 
differences between domestic and foreign affairs. While Congress has subjected 
rulemaking in the administrative context to stringent controls meant to ensure that the 
binding rules and regulations are made pursuant to the public good, such controls make 
sense where the rulemaking being controlled is Congress’s delegated legislative power. 
To apply such requirements in the international context, however, would risk 
undermining the executive branch’s particular institutional advantages for secrecy and 
dispatch, especially for sensitive agreements. Moreover, such requirements would be far 
more onerous in foreign affairs than in domestic policy-making because it would mean 
that the president would have to negotiate with both Congress and foreign counterparts, 
making the conclusion of agreements far more difficult.  
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In short, ensuring transparency by requiring that agreements be posted with legal 
justifications would better enable Congress to perform its oversight function while 
preserving the benefits of executive vigor and energy in foreign affairs. Given that the 
executive branch is designed to summon the nation’s strength and effectiveness in foreign 
affairs, the rise of executive agreements does not in principle signal constitutional 
subversion. Rather, executive dominance is the outworking of a principled constitutional 
commitment. The major problem with executive agreements, as this section has 
demonstrated, is not executive dominance, but, rather, the failure of Congress to 
effectively mobilize its political capacities in response to the natural evolution of the 
executive branch’s power in foreign affairs as the international arena has taken a larger 
role in the national government’s agenda. It is true that the absence of information about 
executive agreements today makes it impossible to claim that the executive branch is 
routinely entering into illegal or otherwise bad agreements in ways that contravene the 
deliberative will of Congress. However, the lack of available information about executive 
agreements itself demonstrates a congressional failure to adequately supervise executive 
branch actions. This abdication makes such executive subversion of constitutional 
principles more likely by undermining the effective exercise of Congress’s political 
prerogatives. 
CONGRESSIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 
While executive agreements, as I have argued, are to be expected given the 
structural advantages of the executive branch in foreign affairs, the use of executive 
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agreements cannot be endlessly malleable if the constitutional order is to maintain its 
basic character. Under the Constitution the Senate retains significant oversight of treaties 
with its power to ratify them by the consent of two-thirds of the Senators present. 
Returning to Federalist 75, Hamilton notes the logic of this arrangement by pointing out 
the fact that treaties, while requiring the institutional capacities of the executive branch to 
ensure effectiveness in foreign affairs, also “plead strongly for the participation of the 
whole or a portion of the legislative body in the office of making them” because treaties 
operate as laws and are thus binding on citizens.308 In other words, while the need for 
vigor and dispatch would seem to require placing the power to make treaties solely with 
the executive branch as Locke and Montesquieu had urged, the framers departed from 
these separation of powers theorists, recognizing the importance of enhanced 
congressional involvement in treaty-making to ensure that treaties, because of their status 
as law, reflect the deliberative will of the people expressed by their representatives in 
Congress. The Treaty Clause, in this regard, ultimately brings the branches into a 
productive conflict over the nation’s involvement in foreign affairs. Shared powers over 
treaty-making, in short, is both about creating an institutional framework that is effective 
in foreign affairs by harnessing the institutional advantages of the executive branch while 
also ensuring that the government’s success in foreign affairs is made consistent with the 
aims and purposes of republican government.  
 
308 Hamilton et al., The Federalist Papers, 499. 
 167 
Of course, given the scale of the nation’s involvement in foreign affairs, it would 
be impossible for the Senate to ratify all international agreements as treaties. “Processing 
such a workload through the Article II process,” as Glen Krutz and Jeffrey Peake argue, 
“would grind the presidential-congressional system to a halt, at least in regard to foreign 
policy, at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue.”309 Much of this chapter, therefore, has 
considered how the rise of executive agreements was anticipated by the Constitution’s 
principled division of labor and how Congress can use its political capacities to constrain 
agreements. This section is concerned with a separate, albeit closely connected, question: 
what political criteria, deduced from the animating purposes of the Treaty Clause, should 
guide the branches’ political negotiations about the level of congressional authorization 
certain agreements ought to take? In other words, how should Congress understand its 
role in the formation of international agreements, asserting its institutional prerogatives in 
ways that realize underlying constitutional values? This question, moreover, is more 
fundamental than whether a particular agreement is legal. Indeed, Congress can assert its 
political prerogatives in ways that fail to achieve its constitutional purposes even as, 
legally speaking, it provides authorization for a particular agreement (as in the Iran 
Agreement, which will be discussed below). Understanding the Treaty Clause politically, 
in short, does not mean that any political resolution the branches come up with is rightly 
characterized as a healthy instance of constitutional politics. 
 
309 Glen S. Krutz and Jeffrey S. Peake, Treaty Politics and the Rise of Executive Agreements: International 
Commitments in a System of Shared Powers (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009). 
 168 
In order to elucidate the underlying purposes of the Constitution’s treaty-making 
architecture, it is necessary to examine the best reasons for placing the power to ratify 
treaties in the Senate rather than in the Congress as a whole. Highlighting this choice, and 
the framers’ overarching purposes in making it, helps to clarify the kind of politics it was 
intended to inspire. In other words, the primary task is to understand what is signified by 
the logic of placing the power to ratify treaties in the Senate and how the purposes 
underlying this decision should inform how the branches negotiate their boundaries in a 
world where it would be impossible to conduct all agreements as treaties.  
Although there was considerable disagreement about whether both houses should 
have a role in ratifying treaties — with notable members of the Convention such as James 
Madison and James Wilson, for example, both repeatedly arguing in favor of the 
involvement of the House — the Convention ultimately chose to place the power to ratify 
treaties solely in the Senate. The Senate, as a smaller chamber of older, wiser statesmen 
elected by state legislatures, would serve longer terms than members of the House, giving 
senators, according to Jay in The Federalist, “sufficient time to become perfectly 
acquainted with our national concerns, and to form and introduce a system for the 
management of them.”310 Given that treaties can potentially take a long time to negotiate, 
and given the complexity of national affairs more generally, placing the power to ratify 
treaties in a more stable legislative body would thus enable members to take the long 
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view in foreign affairs and, consequently, make it more likely that the good of the nation 
was met in foreign affairs. As Hamilton further explained in Federalist 75: 
The fluctuating and, taking its future increase into the account, the multitudinous 
composition of that body [the House of Representatives], forbid us to expect in it 
the qualities which are essential to the proper execution of such a trust. Accurate 
and comprehensive knowledge of foreign politics; a steady and systematic 
adherence to the same views; a nice and uniform sensibility to national character, 
decision, secrecy, and dispatch, are incompatible with the genius of a body so 
variable and so numerous.311 
  
The framers’ choice to place the power to ratify treaties in the Senate, therefore, points to 
an underlying concern that the United States enters into international agreements credibly 
because they enjoy widespread and stable public backing.  
As is made clear in The Federalist, one of the great dangers of republican 
government, generally speaking, is mutability of the laws, and while it is good for 
government to be responsive to public opinion, “a continual change even of good 
measures is inconsistent with every rule of prudence and every prospect of success.”312 
The Senate, therefore, was intended, in general, to guard against mutability of the laws, 
ensuring that adequate provision is made for the long-term good of the nation, not just the 
short-term and elusive notions of the people more likely to be expressed by the House of 
Representatives given its proximity to the people because of its larger size and more 
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frequent elections. While it is true that the House of Representatives is a far more stable 
body today, with members serving in office, on average, as long as members of the 
Senate,313 it bears repeating that the reasons underlying the choice for including the 
Senate as opposed to the House are more important than the specific institutional 
instantiation of the larger constitutional commitment and the kind of politics signified by 
the choice. 
The dangers of mutability of the laws, while problematic for republican 
government in general, are especially pronounced in the foreign arena where a lack of 
constancy undermines the trust of foreign nations. As Madison argued in Federalist 62, 
commenting on the ways in which a Senate would buttress the credibility of the United 
States among foreign nations: 
An individual who is observed to be inconstant to his plans, or perhaps to carry on 
his affairs without any plan at all, is marked at once by all prudent people as a 
speedy victim to his own unsteadiness and folly. His more friendly neighbors may 
pity him, but all will decline to connect their fortunes with his; and not a few will 
seize the opportunity of making their fortunes out of his. One nation is to another 
what one individual is to another; with this melancholy distinction, perhaps, that 
the former, with fewer of the benevolent emotions than the latter, are under fewer 
restraints also from taking undue advantage of the indiscretions of each other. 
Every nation, consequently, whose affairs betray a want of wisdom and stability, 
may calculate on every loss which can be sustained from the more systematic 
policy of its wiser neighbors. But the best instruction on this subject is unhappily 
conveyed to America by the example of her own situation. She finds that she is 
held in no respect by her friends; that she is the derision of her enemies; and that 
she is a prey to every nation which has an interest in speculating on her 
fluctuating councils and embarrassed affairs.314 
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The ultimate choice to place the power to ratify treaties in the Senate, therefore, 
points to the importance that major foreign policy commitments enjoy widespread support 
of the public at large. Such widespread support among the public is necessary, moreover, 
to ensure that important international agreements can be entered into credibly and that the 
nation will not abandon such agreements based on momentary, and at times fleeting, 
changes in public opinion. At least in theory, therefore, the high threshold required for 
Senate ratification is not primarily intended to make agreements more difficult to enter — 
a mere instance of checks and balances — but, rather, to ensure that the agreements 
entered into by the United States are done so in ways that have the backing of the public, 
and, consequently, are durable enough to win the respect of foreign nations.  
This, moreover, as alluded to by Madison in the above quotation, was a central 
concern of the Constitutional Convention. Indeed, one of the major problems of 
governmental practice under the Articles of Confederation was the inability of the United 
States to keep its treaty obligations because the national government could not enforce 
state compliance.315 The trust of foreign nations was thus undermined, making it more 
likely that other nations would, in turn, fail to uphold their own obligations towards the 
United States. Part of the problem under the Articles was that treaties were not considered 
supreme law of the land and, perhaps more centrally, the national government did not 
have adequate enforcement mechanisms to ensure state compliance. The task for the 
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constitutional framers, therefore, was to create the conditions for effectiveness in foreign 
affairs by unleashing the vigor of an adequately structured executive branch while also 
ensuring that there was sufficient public support for international agreements to make 
those commitments credible. Such public support, moreover, is especially important in a 
republican government where the president, while originally perpetually eligible for re-
election, would ultimately serve at the pleasure of the people. Because the Senate is better 
constituted to channel the long-term, deliberative will of the people, its support is thus 
particularly important to ensure the credibility of the nation without a hereditary monarch. 
The choice to have the backing of a supermajority of the Senate, therefore, was meant to 
ensure that the United States’ important foreign policy commitments are not quickly, and 
imprudently, jettisoned when, for example, a president from a different political party 
takes office, or after a wave-election in the House of Representatives. The Senate’s 
distance from the people thus allows, at least in theory, for more reflection — time for 
“cooler heads to prevail” — leading to more stable support for major international 
commitments.  
While in modern practice lower forms of authorization are, at least legally-
speaking, considered to be constitutionally legitimate (such as ex post congressional-
executive agreements that require authorization by a majority vote in both chambers 
rather than the supermajoritarian requirement in the Senate),316 presidents, following this 
logic, have routinely brought important international agreements to the Senate for 
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ratification to signal the credibility of the agreement even though — or, rather, because — 
the Senate process is far more cumbersome than other post hoc approval mechanisms. As 
Lisa L. Martin argues, presidents have to consider how the form an international 
agreement takes signals the durability of the agreement.317 Foreign nations are going to be 
suspicious of the durability of an agreement if it appears that it is conducted with a lower 
form of authorization because it does not have sufficient support in Congress. This, of 
course, has been borne out in practice as foreign nations have at times publicly urged that 
agreements be concluded as treaties for the very reason that treaties, because they are 
concluded with a stronger form of authorization, are considered to represent a more 
durable commitment on the part of the United States.318 For example, when the United 
States and Russia negotiated what became the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty 
(SORT) in 2002, there was some question about what form the new arms control 
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agreement would take. President George W. Bush favored a more flexible “gentlemen’s 
agreement” rather than a full-blown treaty. Russian President Vladimir Putin, on the other 
hand, wanted to ensure that any agreement reached would bind subsequent 
administrations and that, therefore, the accord needed to be concluded as a treaty. The 
Senate, moreover, concurred, asserting its prerogatives to ratify arms control agreements 
as treaties given the importance of such commitments for American foreign policy.319 
The point here is that the logic undergirding the Senate’s inclusion in the Treaty 
Clause points to a constitutional good that a stable and deliberative body brings to the 
practice of foreign affairs, ensuring both that the international commitments entered into 
by the United States — which attain the status of laws — enjoy the widespread support of 
the public, and, consequently, enable the United States to form credible commitments 
internationally. If such stability is a constitutional good, moreover, then executive 
agreements cannot be used for any agreement if the constitutional order is to maintain its 
basic character. In other words, there should be a qualitative difference between what is 
acceptably concluded as some form of executive agreement compared to those 
agreements which require more stringent congressional scrutiny and a higher form of 
congressional authorization based on the significance of the international commitment. 
There is, however, no way to deduce a specific line, in a legalistic sense, demarcating 
when an agreement should be concluded as one form or another, and the judiciary has 
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been highly reticent to enter the fray, asserting lack of judicial competence to issue such a 
bright-line rule.320 Such decisions, rather, are appropriately left to political negotiation 
between the branches. For that negotiation to be appropriately characterized as 
constitutional politics, however, it must be tethered to legitimate constitutional claims 
deduced from the animating purposes of the Treaty Clause. Hence, it is possible to 
evaluate the ways the branches engage each other politically, assessing the types of 
arguments the branches make as well as how well those branches use their distinctive 
governance capacities vis-a-vis each other in service of their larger constitutional 
arguments and purposes. 
There are many examples of Congress — and especially the Senate — protecting 
its institutional prerogatives, demanding that the president submit international 
agreements to the Senate to be ratified as treaties. The Senate has exercised its 
prerogatives, moreover, regardless of the partisan dynamics between the branches. 
Indeed, the Senate considers some issue areas — such as arms control and human rights 
— to be sufficiently important and, consequently, demands that such agreements be 
concluded as treaties rather than agreements with a lower threshold of authorization. For 
example, since World War II presidents have submitted nearly every arms control treaty 
to the Senate for ratification. Such agreements are highly consequential because they have 
established the United States nuclear deterrence strategy of “mutually assured 
destruction,” sought to restrict the spread of nuclear weapons, and led to the 
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demilitarization of Europe.321 The one major exception to this general practice was the 
1972 SALT I agreement, which was concluded as a congressional-executive agreement. 
This agreement, however was considered a temporary agreement (only lasting for five 
years), and both sides understood that the agreement was a placeholder until a more 
substantive treaty could be concluded at a later date.322 When SALT II faced considerable 
political opposition from Congress, President Carter considered submitting the agreement 
to both houses to be approved by majority vote rather than as a treaty, but was forced to 
submit the agreement as a treaty after sustained Senate pressure.323 Similarly, as 
previously mentioned, President George W. Bush attempted to conclude the Strategic 
Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT) as a congressional-executive agreement, but 
submitted the agreement as a treaty after considerable pressure from both Russian 
President Vladimir Putin and members of the Senate.324 Finally, while the United States 
signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) during the Clinton 
administration, the treaty has not been ratified by the Senate. Although the treaty (which 
had majority support in Congress) stalled out in the Senate, neither Presidents Clinton nor 
Obama considered submitting the agreement to Congress as anything other than a treaty 
given congressional sentiment on the matter. Indeed, the Senate has consistently asserted 
its political prerogatives over arms control agreements, attaching a declaration to arms 
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control treaties in several instances stating that agreements “that would obligate the 
United States to reduce or limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the United States in a 
militarily significant manner [should be concluded] only pursuant to the Treaty Power as 
set forth in Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution.”325 The Senate has insisted 
that treaties be used in other areas as well, including human rights accords, 
political/military agreements, environmental agreements, and extradition. Such 
agreements, in other words, are concluded as treaties because the Senate demands it. The 
Senate’s demands, moreover, are political demands, especially given that many contend 
that such agreements can and should be appropriately concluded as congressional-
executive agreements given the difficulty of securing Senate ratification.326 Moreover, the 
consensus of the legal community is that congressional-executive agreements are legally 
interchangeable with treaties.327 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to wade into the 
interchangeability debate other than to note that the Senate’s repeated demands that 
important agreements be submitted to the Senate for ratification, in practice, contradicts 
this general scholarly consensus. As Bradley and Morrison conclude, “historical practice 
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suggests a constitutionally salient distinction between ‘major’ and ‘minor’ 
agreements.”328  
It should be noted, moreover, that when the United States uses ex post 
congressional-executive agreements instead of treaties for major international 
commitments, it does so in limited contexts that, with few exceptions, lie within 
Congress’s plenary powers pursuant to Article I, Section 8 to regulate trade and foreign 
commerce. For all the constitutional controversy surrounding ex post congressional-
executive agreements,329 they are, in practice, used sparingly (one per year on average).330 
Of course, such agreements can be highly consequential. Indeed, ex post congressional-
executive agreements have been used for major economic agreements such as the World 
Trade Organization and the Bretton Woods Convention, which “did nothing less than 
create the foundations of the new world economic order.”331 Moreover, today all major 
trade agreements, such as NAFTA, are concluded by congressional-executive agreement 
rather than as treaties. Even so, in areas, such as trade, Congress could just as easily 
legislate the United States into compliance with the international obligations imposed by 
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such agreements irrespective of whether the United States actually ratifies the agreements. 
As John Yoo argues, “[i]f, for example, Congress were to adopt unilaterally the changes 
in tariffs, customs laws, or national treatment required by NAFTA or the WTO, in the 
absence of an international agreement, it would have ample authority to do so pursuant to 
Article I, Section 8.”332 In this way, such agreements, while not concluded as treaties, still 
retain significant congressional buy-in and do not represent, arguably, any subversion of 
constitutional principles.  
In fact, when Congress has used congressional-executive agreements in the area of 
trade, for example, it has developed mechanisms (fast-track authority) that give it 
substantial input during the negotiation and formation of agreements in exchange for fast-
track approval post hoc. By requiring the executive branch to keep relevant congressional 
committees informed throughout negotiations (and even to have members of Congress on 
the negotiation delegation), Congress ensures that the final deal submitted to Congress for 
approval closely aligns with congressional views.333 By, then, fast-tracking approval (with 
strict time limits on a final vote and no floor amendments), Congress buttresses the 
United States’ negotiating credibility by ensuring that the agreement will not languish in 
Congress or be subsequently amended in ways that substantially alter the carefully 
negotiated agreement, a perennial problem with treaties. Unlike the vast majority of 
treaties, moreover, such agreements involve Congress at the “advice” stage, leading some 
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commentators like Ackerman and Golove to assert that the ex post congressional-
executive agreement, as used with fast-track trade authority, has better realized the virtues 
of the Treaty Clause than does the specific textual instantiation of the Treaty Clause.334 
The fundamental point here is that when Congress has used ex post congressional-
executive agreements instead of treaties, it has used them in areas where it has the plenary 
constitutional authority to legislate on the matter and it has often used the agreements in 
ways that enhance, rather than diminish, its political control over the issues concerned.  
CONSTITUTIONAL VERSUS LEGAL CLAIMS 
 Finally, the claims of Congress vis-a-vis the president regarding its prerogatives 
over international agreements are ultimately political claims. Congress’s role in foreign 
affairs, as argued above, is not merely about checking and balancing. Rather, Congress’s 
shared powers over foreign affairs in general, and treaty-making in particular, is 
ultimately about bringing positive political goods to the practice of foreign affairs, 
making it more likely that the United States’ foreign policy will be stable and its 
agreements credible. Congress, as demonstrated above, has often asserted its political 
prerogatives to ratify important agreements as treaties rather than to allow those 
agreements to be entered into at a lower level of authorization. Interbranch contestation 
surrounding the nuclear deal with Iran, however, reveals the ways that an overly legalistic 
focus on the powers of the branches can miss — and, consequently, undermine — the 
larger political purposes of the branches shared powers over international agreements. 
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Legal analysis provides an inadequate framework for evaluating interbranch behavior 
with regard to foreign affairs. 
 The Iran Nuclear Deal (known formally as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action or “JCPOA”) was a political agreement signed by the P5+1 (the UN Security 
Council’s five permanent members plus Germany) and Iran. According to the terms of the 
deal, Iran agreed to end key components of its nuclear development program. In 
exchange, the United States agreed to suspend its unilateral sanctions against Iran, and the 
UN agreed to lift the international sanctions it had imposed. The agreement, to say the 
least, was controversial. When Congress learned that President Obama was attempting to 
broker a deal that would lift congressionally-imposed sanctions on Iran, there was 
widespread, and bipartisan, opposition. Particularly controversial was the administration’s 
decision to conclude the agreement without subsequent approval from Congress, with the 
President claiming that he had sufficient authority to conclude the agreement without 
congressional authorization.335 The administration's position on the issue resulted in 
Republican members of Congress writing a controversial open letter addressed to the 
“leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” informing them that any agreement entered into 
without legislative approval could be abandoned by the next president “with the stroke of 
a pen.”336 
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 The administration argued that the sanctions regime implemented by Congress 
delegated to the president the power to suspend sanctions against Iran if the president 
determined that to do so would be in the national interest.337 The president, moreover, 
intended to complete the agreement as a “political” agreement, meaning that it would 
impose no legal obligations on the United States under international law. The 
administration believed that a legally non-binding agreement would give it sufficient 
flexibility to reimpose sanctions should Iran fail to comply with its terms.338 Harold Koh 
argues that political agreements, like the one brokered with Iran, are particularly 
important in contexts where regimes fundamentally distrust each other. As Koh argues, 
“[t]he Iran Nuclear Deal” was “a confidence-building device designed to shift from a 
pattern of confrontation toward a pattern of cooperation with Iran.”339 The agreement 
would thus be successful if both nations, step by step, abided by the terms of the 
agreement, leading to greater compliance over time and, perhaps, paving the way to a 
legally-binding arrangement. Given the “political” nature of the proposed accord — that it 
would not legally bind the United States or the next president — the President argued that 
he had sufficient legal authority to bring the nation into compliance with the terms of the 
agreement by waiving sanctions pursuant to his waiver authority. 
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 Congress, however, rightly asserted its institutional prerogatives to review any 
agreement concluded with Iran before the agreement took effect, given the significance of 
the agreement for American foreign policy. Congress overwhelmingly passed the Iran 
Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, requiring the President to submit the final 
negotiated agreement to Congress, and, moreover, prohibiting the President from waiving 
sanctions pursuant to the agreement during a 60-day review period. According to the 
terms of the legislation, the agreement could go into effect if Congress voted to approve 
the deal during that window. Congress, however, reserved the right to disapprove the 
agreement by passing a joint resolution of disapproval. If Congress did not act, the 
agreement would go into effect at the end of the 60-day period. Moreover, the legislation 
included significant oversight mechanisms meant to keep Congress informed of Iranian 
compliance with the agreement (should it go into effect), requiring the president to certify 
that Iran was in compliance with the terms of the agreement every 90 days. Congress 
could fast-track legislation to reimpose sanctions if Iran violated the terms of the 
agreement. Arguing about the merits of the legislation, Senator Jeff Flake (R-AZ) argued 
that 
Since this agreement is slated to last well beyond the President’s term and even 
the next President’s term, any effective, enduring agreement has to have 
congressional buy-in. Let me repeat. If this legislation fails, the President will be 
able to sign a final agreement and have a nice signing ceremony, but an effective, 
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 Congress was able to mobilize veto-proof majorities in both chambers to enact the 
legislation subjecting any proposed agreement to congressional review, a feat that took 
considerable negotiating skill by top congressional leaders.341 Ultimately, President 
Obama acquiesced to congressional pressure and announced that he would sign the 
legislation. This was hardly a concession by President Obama, however, given that under 
the terms of the legislation it would take supermajorities in Congress to disapprove any 
agreement made with Iran, a near impossibility given partisan dynamics in Congress. 
Congress, in other words, asserted itself such that it did not have to put any skin in the 
game, so to speak. President Obama essentially convinced Congress that since he already 
possessed the legal authority to undertake the actions necessary to implement any 
agreement with Iran (given that the agreement was legally non-binding and that Congress 
had already delegated the legal authority to waive sanctions based on presidential 
discretion) that Congress did not need to affirmatively approve the deal.  
While Congress was able to muster enough political will to ensure that it could 
review and possibly disapprove the agreement — and the benefits of Congress’s political 
efforts here, especially in terms of bringing the salient issues of the agreement into public 
view, should not be understated — it was not able to muster its political prerogatives in 
ways that realized the positive institutional goods of having Congress involved in the 
formation of international agreements in the first place. Members of Congress agreed that 
the Iran Deal ultimately constituted a major change in U.S. foreign relations towards Iran 
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— hence Congress’s determination to review the terms of the agreement — but 
Congress’s rhetoric about the importance of congressional “buy-in” to ensure an 
“effective and enduring” agreement was not matched in the terms of the actual bill as 
passed. Congress purported to assert its political prerogatives, but did so by inverting the 
normal constitutional procedure for ratifying treaties. The Iran Nuclear Agreement 
Review Act required supermajorities in both houses to disapprove the agreement, rather 
than the Senate supermajority required to approve treaties. In other words, once the deal 
was negotiated, the president needed only to convince just over a third of one house to 
support the deal for it to go into effect. Doing so undermined the ability of Congress to 
deliberate effectively about the actual merits of the deal. At the end of the day, members 
of Congress could enjoy the political benefits of voting against the agreement while 
knowing that a “no” vote would have no effect on the final outcome. Congressional 
deliberations were inconsequential insofar as members of Congress ultimately did not 
have to bear the political burdens of the ultimate outcome and thus did not have to 
actually consider the merits of the proposed deal versus no deal at all. It is hard to know, 
in other words, how members of Congress would have voted had their choices mattered. 
The deal thus went into effect even though majorities in both houses of Congress opposed 
the bill.342 While the deal was legal — and, as David Golove argues, there is no doubt 
about its legality after Congress passed the review act — it was left politically vulnerable 
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because it was a major foreign policy commitment made not only without the imprimatur 
of Congress, but against its expressed will.343 
This is not to say that the Iran Deal should have been concluded as a treaty. There 
are perhaps good arguments — along the lines of Harold Koh’s arguments above — for 
“political” agreements that help move states towards better relations with each other 
through more flexible arrangements. It is to say, however, that the Treaty Clause points to 
criteria that should guide how Congress asserts its political prerogatives against the 
President’s claims, legal or otherwise. Whether the president has legal authority to take a 
certain action is beside the point. A Congress that is motivated by the overarching 
purposes of the Treaty Clause would demand to deliberate and vote on an agreement in a 
way that matters given the importance of such an agreement for American foreign policy, 
and, moreover, would wield its other political capacities, up and to impeachment, should 
the president persist in acting against the deliberative and majoritarian will of Congress. 
As argued in the previous section, one of the overarching goals of the Treaty Clause was 
to safeguard the stability of American foreign policy by ensuring that international 
commitments entered into by the United States had sufficient public support, thus 
buttressing the United States’ credibility in the international arena. A constitutionally-
motivated Congress, irrespective of the president’s legal claims, would advance and 
defend its prerogatives, asserting the need to ensure the credibility of the nation in foreign 
affairs by ensuring that any major agreement — especially one that dramatically changed 
 
343 David Golove, “Congress Just Gave the President Power to Adopt a Binding Legal Agreement with 
Iran,” Just Security, May 14, 2015, https://www.justsecurity.org/23018/congress-gave-president-power-
adopt-binding-legal-agreement-iran/. 
 187 
U.S. foreign policy with regard to Iran — retained sufficient public support to be a 
durable commitment. Moreover, Congress’s substantive deliberations about a 
controversial and consequential foreign policy choice, could help move public support 
towards the agreement. Faced with an actual choice — and the responsibility for the 
ultimate outcome — congressional deliberations could underscore the wisdom (or futility) 
of the agreement. 
 Of course, some, like Harold Koh and Jack Goldsmith, argue that such 
agreements, like the Iran Deal, entered into by the executive branch without robust 
congressional support are, in fact, durable because they are difficult for future presidents 
to unwind.344 As Koh argued prior to the Trump administration’s decision to “exit” the 
Iran Agreement, “[i]f the Iranians continue to keep their part of the bargain, legal or 
political, the new Administration will be hard-pressed to replace a working multilateral 
deal with nothing.”345 Indeed, according to Koh, “deals are sticky, regimes are path-
dependent, and in complex political equations, the locus of domestic legal authority often 
plays a subsidiary role.”346 As the deal gained traction, moreover, all involved (national 
and business interests) started to rely on the new legal framework, as they began to invest 
their resources in Iran’s increasingly globally-connected economy.347 
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Koh and Goldsmith might be correct that most presidents would not exit the 
agreement absent Iranian non-compliance with its terms. Even so, this does not mean that 
the agreement was not left politically vulnerable should a president decide, even against 
what many perceive to be in the best interest of the nation, to exit the agreement, as 
President Trump ultimately decided.348 It would have been far more difficult for President 
Trump to have exited the agreement had the agreement had the deliberative and 
affirmative consent of Congress at the outset. No doubt the United States’ credibility on 
the international stage — and especially with Iran — has been seriously compromised, 
and, moreover, it is highly unlikely that the United States will be able to broker a better 
deal with Iran in the near future given that it cannot be trusted to keep the commitments 
that it makes.349  As Wendy Sherman, the chief negotiator for the United States during the 
Iran Deal negotiations, wrote, the United States’ exit from the deal “has given U.S. allies 
less reason to trust Washington on future deals or to take U.S. interests into account.”350  
It is perhaps no surprise that President Obama stretched the limits of his 
constitutional authority (given the absence of robust political support in Congress) to 
conclude an important multilateral agreement with Iran that the administration believed 
would be the best option for preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons, taking a 
major risk in the hope that the next president would have every incentive to stick with the 
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agreement to the extent that Iran continued to comply with its terms. It is also possible, 
perhaps even likely, that over time such a deal, if Iran complied, would gain the support 
of Congress and the American people. The problem, however, is that this was a high-
stakes gamble. Given that the agreement was made in opposition to the expressed will of 
Congress — even though Congress buttressed its legality by passing the review act — it 
did not have the support necessary to survive if a president was determined to exit. And, 
moreover, both the fact that public sentiment was clearly against the agreement when it 
entered into effect and that nearly every Republican presidential candidate vowed in the 
primaries to exit the deal points to the fact that the agreement was built firmly on sand.351 
In short, Congress’s failure to be motivated by its own constitutional purposes — 
those purposes deduced from the animating principles of the Treaty Clause’s institutional 
allocation of power — meant that the agreement was ultimately entered into without 
sufficient congressional buy-in or public support, leaving the agreement vulnerable to the 
political considerations of an unwise president. The interbranch negotiation surrounding 
the Iran Agreement is instructive because it demonstrates how the law — whether the 
president has the legal authority to do something or not — does not provide sufficient 
criteria for evaluating how the branches engage each other in politics to achieve the aims 
of the constitutional order in foreign affairs. Without Congressional buy-in, the Iran deal 
lacked the broad-based support needed for a durable commitment. And when President 
Trump withdrew from the deal, it undermined American credibility with important allies.  
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While the Iran Agreement might appear, at first glance, as an instance of 
presidential overreach, the real constitutional failure was Congress’s inability (or 
unwillingness) to exercise its political capacities in a way that matched its rhetoric. 
Indeed, Congress expressed the importance of exercising its prerogatives over the 
agreement given the major change the deal represented for American foreign policy 
towards Iran. But, ultimately, it exercised its prerogatives in a way that was of no 
consequence (and, in fact, only further buttressed the president’s legal position). The 
ultimate interbranch resolution, as far as the durability of the agreement was concerned, 
left the United States in the same position it would have been in had Congress decided to 
abandon the field entirely. The point of this illustration is not to overstate the case about 
congressional abdication over international agreements. As demonstrated in the previous 
section, Congress has at times exercised its prerogatives over treaty-making even when to 
do so meant the failure of agreements that had majority support in both houses of 
Congress but could not reach the supermajority requirement of the Senate. In this case, 
President Obama was able to convince Congress — or at least enough members of his 
own party — that his legal position trumped Congress’s political claims. This case, 
therefore, illustrates both the promise of the political approach to separation of powers 
insofar as Congress demanded to play a role in the agreement’s conclusion, and the 
residue of a legalistic notion of separation of powers to the extent that the political 
contestation was motivated more by narrowly legal reasoning than deep constitutional 
principles. 
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CONCLUSION: INSTANCES OF CONSTITUTIONAL HEALTH AND CONGRESSIONAL 
ABDICATION 
While the Treaty is the only mechanism prescribed by the Constitution for 
entering into executive agreements, this chapter has demonstrated that the Constitution’s 
political architecture provides a framework that both accounts for the rise of executive 
agreements and limits their use. Indeed, the overarching purposes of the Treaty Clause 
can be gleaned from the reasons underlying the specific institutional commitments of the 
Clause. Those overarching purposes, moreover, provide constitutional criteria by which 
the branches can negotiate their boundaries with regard to such agreements in particular 
moments of conflict. Such agreements, therefore, do not, in principle, point to an imperial 
presidency overstepping constitutional boundaries. Indeed, while some political scientists 
have viewed the rise of executive agreements as a unilateral tool of the presidency and as 
indicative of an imperial presidency,352 the rise of executive agreements, as argued in this 
chapter, is to be expected given the president’s structural advantages in the foreign arena. 
These structural advantages were intended, moreover, to ensure the effectiveness of the 
nation in foreign affairs. In this way, then, the rise of executive agreements are the natural 
outworking of the Constitution’s political program. In other words, the best justification 
for such agreements is deduced from how such agreements are used to achieve the aims 
of the constitutional order, and how governmental objectives would be thwarted if the 
Constitution was to be so strictly interpreted as to prohibit their use entirely. That the aims 
of the constitutional order would be impossible to attain without executive agreements is 
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a widely accepted claim. As Edward Corwin wrote in his book The President’s Control 
Over Foreign Relations, “as between the organs of government sharing these powers, that 
organ which possesses unity and is capable of acting with greatest unity, expedition, 
secrecy, and fullest knowledge — in short, with greatest efficiency — has obtained the 
major participation.”353  
Understanding the Constitution’s political architecture — and the ways in which 
power over treaty-making is distributed between differently constituted institutions — 
demonstrates that insofar as there are separation of powers failings these failures are not 
the result of executive dominance. Rather, the major problems with regard to international 
agreements are failures by Congress to effectively mobilize its political capacities in 
response to the need for executive agreements by ensuring that Congress and the public 
are adequately informed of presidential action in the foreign sphere — a necessary 
prerequisite for using its other political capacities to rein in a wayward executive branch. 
Moreover, while Congress has often asserted its political prerogatives over international 
agreements, demanding that important agreements be concluded with a higher form of 
congressional authorization, recent practice during the Obama administration suggests 
that Congress has at times failed to assert its political prerogatives effectively over and 
against the president’s legal claims to authority. Its failure to assert its political 
prerogatives against the president’s legal claims led to a major foreign policy failure with 
regard to Iran. 
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In short, understanding the purposes underlying the Treaty Clause — those 
purposes deduced from though distinct from the literal textual instantiation of those 
commitments — provides a way to understand both the rise and scope of executive 
agreements. Understanding this framework helps to clarify, moreover, that the problem of 
executive agreements is not so much one of executive overreach (though there are 
certainly instances of such overreach) as much as it is a failure of Congress to advance its 
own constitutional prerogatives in ways that restrain such overreach.  
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Perverse Politics: Recess Appointments, Noel Canning, and the Limits 
of Law354 
On the surface, there is nothing particularly interesting or even controversial 
about the U.S. Constitution’s Recess Appointments Clause, which states that “[t]he 
President shall have Power to fill all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the 
Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.” In 
fact, the Clause was approved by the Constitutional Convention with little discussion and 
without any debate, signaling that the framers understood the Clause merely as a 
necessary exception to the normal appointments procedures, which requires the advice 
and consent of the Senate for presidential appointments.355 
         “Uncontroversial,” however, is not a term that describes the use of recess 
appointments in recent practice. On the contrary, recess appointments were one of the 
central points of contention between the Congress and the Obama administration, 
culminating in a showdown at the Supreme Court. At issue were several intra-session 
recess appointments made to the National Labor Relations Board and to the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) in January 2012 even as Congress maintained pro 
forma sessions — in which a single senator came in to gavel the Senate into session once 
every three days, but in which no business took place — precisely to prevent President 
Obama from making recess appointments. The Court intervened in NLRB v. Noel 
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Canning, declaring that the Senate, not the President, determines when it is in session, so 
long as it, at least technically, retains the capacity to conduct business. 
         Much of the current literature on recess appointments among legal scholars is an 
attempt to determine the specific meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause and, 
consequently, to legally settle in some way the boundary between the branches when it 
comes to the appointments process.356 This, moreover, is hardly surprising given that the 
legal meaning of the clause was the central question before the Supreme Court when it 
decided the case in Noel Canning. Political scientists, on the other hand, have largely 
been concerned with checks and balances and how recess appointments fit within the 
President’s unilateral toolkit, and, therefore, how the ruling in Noel Canning affects those 
interbranch dynamics.357 The Court’s ruling is thus seen as an example of “powering 
down the presidency” by legally enforcing interbranch boundaries and buttressing Senate 
prerogatives vis-à-vis the President.358 
The purpose of this chapter is to reframe the recent interbranch dispute 
surrounding recess appointments by considering how the modern use of recess 
appointments can be better understood and evaluated as part of the dynamic political 
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order established by the Constitution. The Constitution, in this understanding, is more 
than a legal framework intended to settle disputes between the branches or to maintain 
legal balance through judicial oversight. Rather, the legal provisions of the Constitution 
rest on a set of normative commitments and substantive goals.359 From this larger 
constitutional perspective, the substantive goal of the Recess Appointments Clause is that 
the government should continue running, absent democratic choice to the contrary. While 
the literal function of the Clause was to ensure the proper functioning of government 
when the technological difficulties of travel and communication made long congressional 
recesses necessary, this literal function is better understood in terms of this higher order 
constitutional principle. From this perspective, then, there might be other occasions 
wherein recess appointments are justifiable, even beyond the original intentions and 
expectations of the constitutional framers: in this case, the breakdown of governmental 
processes due to the sheer problem of unfettered partisanship. 
Evaluating recess appointments from this larger constitutional perspective reveals 
judicial resolution of the issue actually subverted the Constitution’s political processes, 
preventing the President from staffing the national government even as he faced 
unprecedented partisan obstruction from a minority faction in the Senate. The Court’s 
policing of constitutional boundaries based on a literal reading of the purposes of the 
Recess Appointments Clause thus made it appear that the President had acted lawlessly 
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even as he pressed legitimate constitutional claims to keep the government functioning 
absent the deliberative will of Congress to the contrary. Conversely, the legal resolution 
of the issue sanctioned constitutionally-suspect congressional behavior, making 
unprecedented partisan obstruction of the institution appear high-minded compared to the 
President’s purported “lawlessness.” The recess appointments, therefore, were a response 
to the breakdown of interbranch politics, a problem that judicial resolution disguised 
rather than resolved. 
Political contestation between the branches, unencumbered by the legal arguments 
about the literal purposes of the Recess Appointments Clause, would have provided 
opportunities for institutional actors in each of the branches to make arguments about 
their respective behavior that could then be judged and evaluated by the other branches 
and the public at large. The Court’s intervention in Noel Canning, however, precluded 
this interbranch deliberation. In other words, the Recess Appointments Clause became a 
site for interbranch contestation but the conflict itself was based on larger political 
dynamics between the branches that were then obscured by the focus on the literal 
meaning of the Clause. The recess appointments controversy and its subsequent 
resolution by the Court, therefore, illuminates the problems with an overly legalized 
conception of the Constitution’s separation of powers. 
STANDARD LEGAL ACCOUNT OF RECESS APPOINTMENTS 
   Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution provides the President with 
the power to appoint with the “advice and consent” of the Senate “ambassadors, other 
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public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the 
United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall 
be established by law.” The Recess Appointments Clause — which states in Article II, 
Section 2, Clause 3 that “The president shall have power to fill up all vacancies that may 
happen during the recess of the Senate, by granting commissions which shall expire at the 
end of their next session” — is an ancillary clause, meant to ensure the functioning of 
government in the Senate’s absence. Indeed, Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist 67 
that 
[t]he relation in which [the Recess Appointments Clause] stands to the 
[Appointments Clause], which declares the general mode of appointing officers of 
the United States, denotes it to be nothing more than a supplement to the other, 
for the purpose of establishing an auxiliary method of appointment, in cases to 
which the general method was inadequate.360 
    
For most of American history recess appointments were hardly controversial. In 
fact, recess appointments served a valuable function in an age where limited 
communication and long-distance travel meant that Congress met continuously for 
several months before recessing so that members could travel back to their states and 
districts. The practical necessities of the Recess Appointments Clause in a time where 
significant portions of the year were marked by congressional absence help explain why 
the Constitutional Convention did not view the Clause as controversial, and saw no need 
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to even debate its meaning.361 The purpose of the clause was simple: the President needs 
the power to ensure the functioning of the federal government in the face of 
congressional absence. This power, moreover, was necessarily circumscribed by the 
temporary nature of such appointments, recess appointed officials merely serving until 
the end of the next Senate session. Recess appointments, in this way, cannot serve as a 
method by which the Senate is continually circumvented given that such appointments 
are merely temporary.  
   Moreover, recess appointments, as a supplement to the general appointment 
procedures, were considered better than the alternatives: an extended vacancy until the 
next session, recalling the Senate out of recess to consider a nomination, or keeping the 
Congress in perpetual session, which would conflict with the prevailing understanding of 
republican government — and would be expensive and logistically challenging.362 In 
fact, Justice Joseph Story, commenting on the clear logic of the Recess Appointments 
Clause in his Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, wrote that the 
decision to allow for recess appointments was “so obvious that it can require no 
elucidation,” because without recess appointments “the Senate should be perpetually in 
session, in order to provide for the appointment of officers.”363 The absence of such a 
clause, Justice Story asserted, “would have been at once burdensome to the Senate and 
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expensive to the public,” and so the insertion of such a clause represented the need for 
“convenience, promptitude of action, and general security.”364 
 Given the fundamental purpose of the Recess Appointments Clause, it was 
interpreted narrowly at the outset of American government. President Washington had 
the first opportunity to construe the Recess Appointments Clause however broadly would 
fit his purposes. When presented with the opportunity to make a recess appointment for 
an office that had become vacant while the Senate had been in session, Washington 
deferred judgment to Attorney General Edmund Randolph who wrote to President 
Washington that: 
The Spirit of the Constitution favors the participation of the Senate in all 
appointments. But as it may be necessary oftentimes to fill up vacancies, when it 
may be inconvenient to summon the senate a temporary commission may be 
granted by the President. This power then is to be considered as an exception to 
the general participation of the Senate. It ought too to be interpreted strictly.365 
       
Alexander Hamilton, perhaps one of the strongest defenders of executive power among 
the framers, also concluded that recess appointments were limited to vacancies that arise 
during a recess, not any vacancy that happens to exist: “It is clear, that independent of the 
authority of a special law, the President cannot fill a vacancy which happens during a 
session of the Senate.”366 
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   Even so, the prevailing historical understanding of how widely the Clause should 
be interpreted recognized that to construe it too strictly could undermine the purpose for 
which it was adopted in the first place. Attorney General William Wirt asserted in an 
1823 opinion that while the text clearly demonstrates that recess appointments can only 
be made when a vacancy arises during a recess, such a construction could hinder the 
president’s ability to make an appointment to a federal office far from the nation’s capital 
should he not receive word that such a vacancy exists in time for him to make an 
appointment before the ensuing recess: 
The substantial purpose of the Constitution was to keep these offices filled and 
powers adequate to this purpose were intended to be conveyed. But if the 
President shall not have the power to fill a vacancy thus circumstanced, the 
powers are inadequate to the purpose, and the substance of the Constitution will 
be sacrificed to a dubious construction of its letter.367 
 
Even so, Wirt maintained that such a construction would not give license to the 
president to circumvent Senate confirmation. While he asserted that the Clause should be 
construed broadly enough to ensure “the substantial meaning of the instrument” and to 
avoid the “most embarrassing inconveniences,” such a construction “cannot possibly 
produce mischief, without imputing to the president a degree of turpitude entirely 
inconsistent with the character which his office implies.”368 In short, what is clear from 
early practice is that recess appointments were understood as a serving a practical and 
necessary purpose in the constitutional order. Insofar as the Clause was construed beyond 
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its specific textual instantiation it was done so not to undermine the letter of the law but 
in service to the broader commitment of the Clause.  
In the 20th Century, however, recess appointments became increasingly 
controversial as presidents used them more frequently, even as Congress stayed in 
session far more regularly. Moreover, recess appointments, including within shorter 
intrasession recesses, became a mechanism by which presidents attempted to staff the 
executive branch in the face of Senate obstruction.369 The chart below shows the number 
of recess appointments made by each president starting with Ronald Reagan up until the 
Court’s ruling in Noel Canning in 2014. 






Ronald Reagan I 134 33.5  
Ronald Reagan II 98 24.5 232 
George H. W. Bush 78 19.5 78 
William Clinton I 35 8.75  
William Clinton II 104 26 139 
George W. Bush I 106 26.5  
George W. Bush II 65 16.25 171 
Barack Obama I 32 8  
Barack Obama I 0 0 32 
Table 4: Number of Recess Appointments per President 370 
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Given the proliferation of recess appointments at the expense of Congress’s 
constitutional power to advise and consent to executive nominations, it is perhaps not 
surprising that this use of recess appointments ultimately resulted in a showdown before 
the Supreme Court in 2013 in National Labor Relations Board v. Noel Canning. The 
recent controversy surrounding Noel Canning was caused by the Senate’s use of pro 
forma sessions to prevent recess appointments. Because recess appointments have 
increasingly been used by presidents to appoint controversial nominees, pro forma 
sessions of the Senate were supposed to serve as a buffer to keep the President from 
making such nominations by keeping the Senate in perpetual session by having one 
Senator gavel the chamber into session once every three days so that the Senate would 
not be in recess for longer than three days. This strategy was considered in the 1980s and 
1990s, but never used.371 
   When the Senate finally implemented pro forma sessions in 2007 to prevent 
President George W. Bush from making recess appointments, the President abided by the 
will of the Senate. President Bush was thus prevented from making recess appointments 
for the last 14 months of his presidency because Congress, at least technically, did not 
recess.372 Such pro forma sessions, according to some estimates, prevented President 
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Bush from making dozens of appointments, diminishing presidential influence in a 
variety of policy areas.373  
After Republicans regained the House in the 2010 midterm elections, the Senate 
once again began holding pro forma sessions to prevent President Obama from making 
recess appointments even though Democrats held a majority in the Senate. The Senate 
maintained pro forma sessions because the Republican-controlled House of 
Representatives would not agree to adjourn. The Adjournments Clause in the 
Constitution (Article I, Sec. 5, Cl. 4) requires that both chambers agree to any 
adjournment longer than three days. Hence, the Republican-controlled House was able to 
force the Senate to maintain pro forma sessions to prevent recess appointments, while, at 
the same time, the Republican minority in the Senate obstructed appointments through 
the use of the filibuster. 
         Because of this minority obstruction in the Senate, President Obama made three 
recess appointments to the National Labor Relations Board, and also recess appointed 
Richard Cordray to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau during a short three-day 
break between pro forma sessions. The recess appointments to the NLRB came after 
months of Senate delay and as NLRB vacancies kept it from reaching a quorum, thus 
preventing it from functioning. Appointments to the NLRB had become increasingly 
partisan over the years, and so recess appointments became a prime way in which the 
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President ensured that the NLRB could maintain a quorum so that labor groups and 
organizations could air grievances against employers and so that business interests could 
face the threat of sanctions for unfair business practices.374 Richard Cordray’s 
appointment to the CFPB was similarly thwarted by a partisan filibuster by Senate 
Republicans, the minority party in the Senate, and this after the Republicans had blocked 
Elizabeth Warren’s nomination to the post. 
Given these circumstances, President Obama, under advice from the Office of 
Legal Counsel, declared “the President may determine that pro forma sessions at which 
no business is to be conducted do not interrupt a Senate recess for the purposes of the 
Recess Appointments Clause.”375 By not counting the pro forma sessions as legitimate 
interruptions to the Senate’s recess, President Obama determined that the Senate had 
recessed from December 20, 2011 and would not reconvene until January 23, 2012, a 
recess of longer than a month. These appointments set off a partisan fire-storm, with 
nearly 40 Republican Senators condemning the appointments and voicing their intention 
to file a “friend of the Court” brief, expressing their support for legal action in a letter to 
the President.376 Senator John Cornyn (R-Texas) went so far as to say that “American 
democracy was born out of a rejection of the monarchies of Western Europe, anchored by 
limited government and separation of powers,” and that “[w]e refuse to stand by as this 
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President arrogantly casts aside our Constitution and defies the will of the American 
people under the election-year guise of defending them.”377   
In its determination of the scope of the Recess Appointments Clause in NLRB v. 
Noel Canning (2014),378 the Court largely considered the original meaning of the text, 
and looked to historical practice to fill in textual gaps. Hence, most of the debates 
focused on whether the President can make appointments for any vacancy in any recess 
or only those in which the particular vacancy arose. Moreover, the Court considered the 
definition of recess, and whether the Clause applied to both inter-session and intrasession 
recesses. The court ruled unanimously that President Obama’s recess appointments 
exceeded constitutional limits, though it split 5-4 on how widely the Clause should be 
construed. While a minority on the Court would restrict the use of recess appointments 
solely to intersession recesses and only for vacancies that arose in the particular recess, 
the majority construed the Clause far more broadly. 
Writing for the Court, Justice Breyer argued that an examination of founding era 
dictionaries, common usage of the term “recess” during the founding era, and historical 
practice could not definitively answer the question of what types of recesses are 
appropriate.379 Because presidents had made recess appointments for both types of 
recesses and because the distinction between the two types of recesses is largely 
inconsequential today, the Court held that either type of recess is appropriate for recess 
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appointments. Drawing upon historical precedent, however, the Court drew a bright line 
rule, declaring that recesses of less than ten days — regardless of what type of recess — 
would be constitutionally inappropriate. The Court made this determination by looking to 
the Adjournments Clause,380 concluding that a recess of shorter than three days was 
constitutionally inappropriate. According to the Court’s reasoning, a recess that is not 
long enough to require the consent of the other chamber is presumptively too short for 
recess appointments. The Court also held that historical practice revealed that presidents 
had never, minus a few exceptions, made recess appointments during recesses lasting less 
than 10 days.  
Moreover, the majority declared that reading the Clause to only reach vacancies 
that arise during a recess could prevent the President from making necessary 
appointments. Given that the very purpose of the Recess Appointments Clause is to 
ensure that the President can “obtain the assistance of subordinate officers when the 
Senate, due to its recess, cannot confirm them,”381 construing the Clause too narrowly 
“would prevent the President from making any recess appointment that arose before a 
recess, no matter who the official, no matter how dire the need, no matter how 
uncontroversial the appointment, and no matter how late in the last session the office fell 
vacant.”382  
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The crucial part of the ruling, however, concerned the legitimacy of pro forma 
sessions. Indeed, Justice Breyer asserted that “the Senate is in session when it says it is, 
provided that, under its own rules, it retains the capacity to transact Senate business.”383 
The Court, thus, placed great emphasis on the ability of each House to “determine the 
Rules of its Proceedings.”384 Perhaps ironically, the majority’s broad interpretation of 
what would constitute an acceptable recess appointment, despite Justice Scalia’s 
trenchant critique of the majority’s decision as granting the President too much power 
vis-à-vis Congress, made it easier for the Senate to block recess appointments than the 
minority’s strict construal of the clause in Justice Scalia’s concurrence. The decision, 
therefore, was widely characterized as a “rebuke” of the President by the Supreme 
Court.385 
The implications for the President have already been clearly exhibited in practice. 
President Obama was prevented from making any recess appointments during his second 
term in office.386 After Senate Republicans refused to even conduct hearings for President 
Obama’s Supreme Court nominee Merrick Garland, there was some speculation that the 
President could recess appoint him to the Court.387 Senate Majority Leader Mitch 
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McConnell, however, moved to keep the Senate in pro forma sessions, thus preventing 
any such recess appointment. Hence, as Ian Ostrander aptly noted, the Court’s ruling in 
Noel Canning, even in its broad interpretation of the Clause, is an example of “powering 
down the presidency,” especially during periods of divided government.388 
THE APPOINTMENTS PROCESS AND THE CONSTITUTION’S POLITICAL ARCHITECTURE 
The Court’s decision in Noel Canning clearly had the effect of diminishing the 
President’s ability to make recess appointments. The main question of this chapter is 
whether the legal resolution of the issue missed key elements of the dispute and, 
therefore, subverted and ended a political struggle between the branches that would have 
been better left to the political process. Answering this question requires understanding 
the Constitution in light of its purposes and ends. If the Constitution is primarily 
understood as a legal document — in which the branches’ powers are understood 
primarily in terms of the literal meaning of the constitutional text — then it makes sense 
that the Court would enforce constitutional boundaries as it did in Noel Canning. The 
Court’s determination of the limits of the Clause and its legal buttressing of Senate 
prerogatives — “The Senate is in session when it says it is” — is thus a logical outgrowth 
of the type of project established by the Constitution. Constitutional fidelity, in this view, 
is best understood in terms of adherence to the legal text as interpreted and enforced by 
the judiciary. The Constitution, therefore, serves a settlement function in the 
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constitutional order, and separation of powers is primarily understood in terms of 
constraint. 
         An alternative way to understand the recess appointments phenomenon, however, 
is to view it as situated within the dynamic political order created by the Constitution. 
From this perspective, the Constitution does more than assign powers to the branches in a 
strictly legal sense. Rather, the Constitution establishes congeries of structures, powers, 
and duties. The recess appointments controversy can best be evaluated, therefore, by 
attention to the larger substantive ends of the appointments process in general and why 
the framers included both branches in that process. The choice to include the political 
branches in the process of staffing the executive branch and the judiciary was not an 
arbitrary choice, as made clear by the constitutional debates over the issue. Rather, both 
political branches bring specific capacities and perspectives that are important to the 
process. 
Indeed, Hamilton illustrates in Federalist 76 how the different structures of the 
two elected branches of the government are both important to the selection and 
confirmation of nominees. For example, the unitary nature of the executive better enables 
the choice of a nominee because it avoids the “display of all the private and party likings 
and dislikes, partialities and antipathies, attachments and animosities, which are felt by 
those who compose the assembly.”389 Hamilton continued: “I proceed to lay it down as a 
rule that one man of discernment is better fitted to analyze and estimate the peculiar 
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qualities adapted to particular offices than a body of men of equal or perhaps even of 
superior discernment.”390 Indeed, the “sole and undivided responsibility of one man will 
naturally beget a livelier sense of duty and a more exact regard to reputation. He will, on 
this account, feel himself under stronger obligations, and more interested to investigate 
with care the qualities requisite to the stations to be filled, and to prefer with impartiality 
the persons who may have the fairest pretensions to them.”391 Placing the power to 
appoint in the hands of the President, therefore, makes it more likely that a choice will be 
selected in a timely manner, avoiding the delay that would be caused by placing the 
choice in a deliberative assembly. Furthermore, by placing the power to appoint in the 
hands of one person, it increases the chances that the person will nominate good 
candidates for the post because blame for bad choices will reflect solely upon the 
president. In a legislature, however, blame could be diffused across the body. 
Beyond the particular structural qualities that presumably foster better selection, 
the President is certainly motivated by political concerns as well. At least in theory, the 
president makes selections with an eye towards a nominee’s character, competence, but 
also a nominee’s particular views on the subject matter for which that nominee will 
exercise responsibility. The administration of the laws is not merely technical, but 
involves discretion and political judgments. Hence, a nominee’s particular policy views 





the executive branch and administering the laws passed by Congress. The President thus 
has a vested role in nominating subordinates based on his own political preferences. 
The deliberative capacities of the Senate, on the other hand, ensure that an 
appointment is only concluded after a public process. This deliberation, while extending 
to the character and competence of a nominee, certainly also pertains to larger questions 
of politics as well. This is especially true when it comes to staffing the judiciary. The 
President obviously makes his or her selection of jurists with regard to the particular 
constitutional views — not just the professionalism or legal competence — of a nominee. 
These questions, therefore, are certainly fair game for the Senate to consider given the 
contestability of the criteria involved in the selection process. Indeed, questions 
concerning what constitutes a qualified jurist or a good interpretation of the Constitution 
are ultimately political questions. The Constitution does not itself specify how it ought to 
be interpreted. Neither does it provide criteria as to what kind of person should 
appropriately serve. The political circumstances surrounding a particular vacancy, 
moreover, perhaps raise further considerations regarding what would constitute an 
appropriate choice. Should there by an ideological balance on the Court and, 
consequently, should the Senate demand that the replacement for a swing vote have 
similarly moderate ideological leanings? Does the Senate believe that a recent case was 
wrongly decided (for example, cases dealing with abortion or campaign finance), and that 
the constitutional questions surrounding the case should be reconsidered — and, 
moreover, that any potential jurist should answer questions about how they would rule if 
the constitutional question was to be revisited in a similar case? Senate confirmation 
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hearings and floor debate, therefore, are essential mechanisms for both advancing 
congressional preferences on the choice as well as engaging the wide range of issues that 
would constitute a valid choice, especially given the political contestability of such 
criteria in the first place. 
This is perhaps an important point to dwell on, especially given the ways in which 
Senate confirmation hearings have largely been marked by the absence of substantive 
deliberation in recent years, perhaps most strikingly in the Congress’s refusal to hold 
hearings at all for Merrick Garland — or to even meet with him. The Senate Republicans 
declared that they would not hold confirmation hearings and would not consider the 
nomination because it was an election year and, consequently, the American people 
should rightly decide who the next Supreme Court Justice should be by choosing the next 
president who would then make the nomination.392 This, of course, presumes that the 
American people can be trusted to make such an important choice in an election — an 
election, moreover, in which who the next Supreme Court jurist should be is but one 
issue among many — absent substantive Senate deliberations on the matter. As Joseph 
Bessette argues, “we should not be surprised if instantaneous opinion bears little 
resemblance to what would result from serious reasoning on the merits.”393 Indeed, if a 
polling company were to conducted a poll at the outset of the nomination, it would likely 
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find public opinion to be shallow and uninformed as most citizens can hardly be expected 
to have thought much about it or to know the relevant criteria for making an informed 
judgment on the matter. And yet, the poll results are generally seen as indicative of the 
People’s preferences.  Therefore, the People’s voice in an election can hardly be viewed 
as a referendum on a Supreme Court nomination if there is no deliberation fostered by the 
political institutions that are meant to channel and refine public opinion through their 
deliberations. Why have a Congress at all if technological advancements have made it 
possible to make decisions based on public opinion surveys that presidents can consult? 
While the blocking of Merrick Garland’s appointment was perhaps one of the 
most extreme examples of Congressional failure to substantively deliberate on the merits 
of particular jurists, such confirmation hearings have long been marked by the absence of 
robust deliberation — especially as potential jurists refuse to answer substantive 
questions about their relevant constitutional views on a number of publicly salient issues 
— even as the political issues animating support or disapproval of a nominee are evident 
to anyone who watches the events unfold. The one exception in the modern era, of 
course, is the infamous Robert Bork confirmation hearing, which is today generally 
viewed as the type of political event to be avoided. While the Senate deliberations 
regarding Bork certainly had their fair share of nastiness — indeed, the verb “to bork,” 
meaning to systematically defame or vilify, was added to the lexicon — the Senate asked 
substantive questions of Bork and Bork answered the questions with a high degree of 
candor. As Nina Totenberg commented at the time,  
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The Committee's hearings on the nomination of Judge Robert Bork were, in my 
view, the first time the process worked properly. Leaving aside for the moment 
the question of outside influences, the Senate, for a change, gave itself enough 
time, and the senators prepared themselves. They asked probing but, for the most 
part, respectful and proper questions, and they knew enough to follow up and find 
out what the nominee really meant in his answers.394 
 
Given the substantive nature of the Senate deliberations, the public was greatly informed, 
moreover, about the specific nature of Bork’s views on a number of highly consequential 
issues, especially as senators pressed him to clarify his views during their questioning:  
The Senator’s questioning was effective not because Bork's position was right or 
wrong, but because the nominee was not permitted simply to make a broad 
motherhood-and-apple-pie statement embracing free speech. His restricted view 
of what speech is protected by the Constitution became clear. In other areas - 
privacy, gender discrimination, race discrimination - Bork was similarly pressed 
so that his views emerged with some clarity, not in broad generalizations, but 
tested against what he had said in the past.395 
 
As the public became more informed over the course of the confirmation process, 
public opinion changed dramatically, as shown in a series of Washington Post-ABC 
News Polls.396 A month after Bork was nominated, but before the hearings, a poll found 
that only about 45 percent of respondents had heard of Bork, and of these 45 percent 
supported while 40 percent opposed the nomination.397 Public support began to change 
during the hearings, however, as revealed by a poll taken directly before and after the 
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hearings in which 70 percent of respondents had heard of Bork, and of those 44 supported 
his nomination while 48 percent opposed.398 Ten days after the Senate rejected Bork’s 
nomination, public opinion had decisively moved against Bork. Indeed, 78 percent of 
respondents had heard of Bork, and of those only 38 percent supported his nomination 
while 52 percent opposed.399 What should be clear from this evidence is that the 
substantive nature of the confirmation hearings greatly impacted public opinion, thus 
demonstrating the ways in which the Senate’s deliberations are essential to constructing 
public opinion by bringing the publicly salient issues to the fore in robust debate.  
While some deference might be accorded to the President for the appointment of 
executive branch nominees, this does not mean that Congress should fully defer to the 
President in the staffing of departments and agencies. Indeed, the executive branch is 
largely tasked with implementing laws passed by Congress, laws over which Congress 
has a legitimate stake in maintaining oversight. Insofar as the administration of 
government requires discretion and political and policy judgments, Congress certainly 
has a role in deliberating on whether a particular nominee is appropriate. Given the move 
towards administrative governance dominated by the executive branch, the appointments 
process is a crucial way in which Congress maintains a role in the programs and offices it 
creates. Moreover, Congress can affect the administration of the laws by changing laws, 
eliminating or diminishing the power of particular departments or agencies. These, 
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however, are all affirmative actions determined by deliberative will of a majority in 
Congress. 
 From this perspective, then, the branches do not share power over appointments 
primarily in terms of a checking function, or merely to maintain a legal balance of power. 
Rather, the legal assignments of power point to affirmative duties, the exercise of which 
is meant to ensure the selection of good nominees through interbranch deliberation — 
and even conflict — about the direction of the government and the administration of the 
laws, areas in which both branches have a legitimate stake. The branches both bring a 
variety of concerns to that process, and the political engagement between the branches is 
thus meant to foster deliberation about the ends of government, structured by the different 
perspectives and concerns of differently constituted institutions.  
LEGAL RESOLUTION AND THE SUBVERSION OF POLITICS 
With this account of the purposes of the branches’ shared power over 
appointments in view, it becomes possible to see how the judicial resolution of the recess 
appointments controversy undermined a dynamic political process between the branches 
because it missed, or at least obscured, the underlying nature of the dispute in the first 
place. While President Obama made recess appointments during a three-day weekend 
between two pro forma sessions of the Senate, these appointments were not made to 
bypass the majoritarian will of the Senate. On the contrary, President Obama made the 
recess appointments because the deliberative process itself had broken down due to 
hyper-partisan obstruction of the Senate by a minority faction. The President’s actions, 
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therefore, were a response to congressional abdication in the appointments process rather 
than a willful attempt to ignore the affirmative decisions of the Senate majority. 
By the time President Obama made the recess appointments at issue in Noel 
Canning, Senate Republicans, as the minority party in the Senate, had held up nearly 200 
agency nominations, nearly half (43 percent) of all of President Obama’s civilian 
nominees.400 For a striking contrast, during the last two years of President George W. 
Bush’s term – when he faced a unified Democratic Congress – 75 percent of his civilian 
nominees were still confirmed. Moreover, by mid-to-late 2009 during the midst of the 
financial crisis — and as crucial decisions needed to be made regarding the 
implementation of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) — the Senate had failed to 
confirm key Treasury Department officials, as well as key officials in other economic and 
banking-related departments and agencies.401 The result was that the President and his 
administration were hampered in their ability to implement the very laws that Congress 
had passed and tasked him to implement, and this during the midst of an economic crisis 
that called for decisive action. 
However, the obstruction of executive nominees extended beyond mere delay. 
The Republican minority obstructed some nominees through the filibuster because they 
disagreed with the laws to be implemented, or disliked the departments or agencies that 
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needed to be staffed. In fact, in some instances Republicans vowed to block any 
nomination, no matter how distinguished or qualified the individual. One striking 
example of such obstruction by Senate Republicans — especially as it relates to the 
recess appointments at issue in Noel Canning — was the filibuster of Richard Cordray to 
head the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). The CFPB was established by 
Congress in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Financial Protection Act, 
passed by Congress and signed by President Obama in 2010. The Republicans, who 
opposed key provisions of the law — including the structure of the CFPB —vowed not to 
confirm a director until aspects of the law were changed. Hence, Republicans, even while 
praising Cordray’s background, qualifications, and character, refused to consider his 
nomination, and blocked it by filibuster.402 In other words, while Congress had only 
recently passed the law, Republicans, from their minority position in the Senate, made the 
law impossible to implement. 
Such tactics extended to other offices as well, including a filibuster of Donald 
Berwick, whom President Obama later recess appointed, to run the Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services, because Republicans opposed, and sought to obstruct, the 
implementation of the health care law.403 President Obama’s invalidated recess 
appointments to the National Labor Relations Board, moreover, were meant to give the 
board a quorum — after months of filibusters and delays — so that it could actually 
adjudicate pending claims. Criticizing Republican obstruction, Senator Chuck E. 
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Schumer (D-NY) said, “The Republicans goal here is not simply to object to people who 
have views they think are out of the mainstream, but to shut down parts of the 
government they don’t like.”404 Hence, having lost the debate on the laws they opposed, 
Senate Republicans, from their minority position in the Senate, attempted to keep those 
laws from being implemented by obstructing nominations. 
The President, therefore, was not prevented from making appointments because 
the nominees were opposed by the deliberative will of Congress. Rather, the President 
was prevented from making appointments because of partisan obstruction at an 
unprecedented level, using delay tactics such as holds and filibusters, tools whose 
constitutional status are highly questionable themselves.405 Of course, delay in the service 
of enhanced deliberation can be a good thing. Indeed, The Federalist makes clear that one 
of the benefits of having a Senate constituted as a smaller body than the House of 
Representatives, and with significantly longer terms of office, was to add a more stable 
and deliberative perspective on politics than the House, given the House’s close 
proximity to the people. A legislative chamber so constituted would thus be less likely to 
give into the passions of the people through quick and short-sighted decision-making.406  
While the filibuster is often celebrated with regard to the Senate’s tradition of 
unlimited debate, and thus characterized as a tool that enhances the deliberative qualities 
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of the Senate,407 the problem with the filibuster, as Josh Chafetz has argued, is that in 
actual practice the “filibuster is not about unlimited debate — indeed, it is not about 
debate at all. It is simply about permanent minority obstruction.”408 Moreover, the 
historical record on the filibuster does not provide support for the way the filibuster is 
used today. Indeed, in early constitutional practice, delay in Senate voting was in the 
service of majoritarianism, not in opposition to that principle. For example, in 1790 the 
House of Representatives voted to move Congress to Philadelphia, but the Senate voted 
down the measure. Samuel Johnston was so sick he had to be brought in his bed to 
participate in the vote.409 Taking advantage of bad weather, the House of Representatives 
took up the issue again. Given that Johnston was not able to be brought to the Senate 
chamber due to the rain, other Senators who opposed the motion spoke until the Senate 
adjourned for the day, thus ensuring that the minority could not win by taking advantage 
of bad circumstances.410 While filibusters were used frequently throughout the 19th 
Century — championed especially by John C. Calhoun — such filibusters did not prevent 
the majority from enacting its agenda. Indeed, given the smaller legislative agenda at the 
time, the majority could simply wait out the minority. In fact, every bill filibustered 
before 1880 eventually passed.411 As the congressional agenda increased, the Senate 
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introduced cloture rules in 1917 so that filibusters would not derail the entire Senate 
agenda. During the 20th Century filibusters were most prominently (and infamously) 
used against civil rights legislation. 
Today filibusters are not deliberative at all because they merely force supporters 
to muster 60 votes to pass a piece of legislation — or to confirm a nominee. Moreover, 
given the two-track system the Senate has developed, once the intention to filibuster is 
announced, the issue is moved off the calendar until the majority can muster 60 votes, 
thus ensuring that such filibusters do not prevent the Senate from moving onto other 
issues. As Chafetz argues, this “significantly decreases the costs of filibustering — no 
longer must a filibusterer justify his tying up the entire business of the Senate to his 
constituents or colleagues, and no longer must the filibusterer summon the physical 
endurance to hold the Senate floor.”412 In practice, therefore, the increased use of the 
filibuster now means that almost any controversial legislation or nomination requires a 60 
vote supermajority to pass, and that a minority can continually prevent the majority’s 
preferences from being enacted into law without having to make substantive justifications 
for the obstruction.413  
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Article I, Section 5, Clause 2 of the Constitution — as noted by the Court in Noel 
Canning — grants each chamber of Congress the power “to Determine the Rules of its 
Proceedings.” From a purely legal perspective, then, there is nothing unconstitutional 
about the filibuster. However, the widespread use of filibusters, especially for 
nominations to staff the government undermines the governmental efficiency for which 
the Articles of Confederation were abandoned in the first place.414 Criticizing super-
majoritarian rule under the Articles, Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist 22 that the 
result of such rules, rather than being beneficial to good government, is to “destroy the 
energy of the government, and to substitute the pleasure, caprice, or artifices of an 
intransigent, turbulent, or corrupt junto to the regular deliberations and decisions of a 
respectable majority.”415 The filibuster, as practiced today, solidifies the power of the 
minority, basically changing the Constitution such that those provisions that merely 
require majority votes in Congress now require supermajority votes in the Senate. As 
Chafetz argues, the problematic nature of the filibuster, in its current form, is perhaps 
made most clear by analogy. Indeed, the Constitution also gives both chambers the power 
to “Judge ... the Elections ... of its own members.”416 There would thus seemingly be no 
constitutional problem with the Senate thus adopting a rule stating that any member of 
the Senate seeking re-election would be deemed the winner of the election unless the 
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challenger received at least 60 percent of the vote.417 Indeed, the 17th Amendment only 
provides that “the Senate . . . shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected 
by the people thereof,” and that “[t]he electors in each State shall have the qualifications 
requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures,” but does not 
state that the candidate with the most votes wins. But, as Chafetz notes, such a rule could 
not be constitutional because it would entrench officeholders and make it harder for the 
people to hold their government accountable: “Any use of the Senate’s power under the 
Rules of Proceedings Clause that frustrates this principle must be unconstitutional.”418 No 
doubt, such a rule would be widely viewed as constitutionally inappropriate if a chamber 
of Congress were to adopt it, and this is true regardless of whether such a rule could be 
found unconstitutional by the judiciary. The way the filibuster works today, in practice, 
entrenches the preferences of past majorities in the same manner as did the hypothetical 
presented above for legislators, making it difficult for new majorities to change 
governmental policy.419  
Of course, the Senate is not meant to be a rubber stamp for the President’s 
agenda, and, as noted earlier, there might be legitimate ways in which Congress opposes 
the President and his agenda. For example, the Senate can vote down individual 
nominees and force the President to submit a new nominee more favorable to the Senate. 
The Senate can also get rid of departments or agencies, or diminish their influence within 
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the federal government. The problem, however, with the appointments process as it has 
played out in recent years, though especially during the Obama administration, is the 
wholesale obstruction of the administration by a minority faction within the Senate rather 
than affirmative actions on behalf of the Senate majority after a deliberative process. 
Without affirmative choices made by the Congress, the President, therefore, is left to 
administer a government without key subordinates. Congressional use of the filibuster to 
engage in wholesale obstruction of the will of the majority poses major constitutional 
problems even though there is no legal or judicial solution that could be used to solve the 
problem. The fact that constitutional norms are underenforced, however, does not mean 
that there is not a way to evaluate or to think constitutionally about such norms. Indeed, 
as Paul Brest argues, the fact that the judiciary is deferential in such contexts does not 
“suggest that the legislature should exercise restraint in assessing the constitutionality of 
its own product.”420 Indeed, what should be clear from the present discussion is the extent 
to which the filibuster as practiced today in no way advances constitutional aims, merely 
grinding the government to a halt without substantive engagement with the issues at 
stake. 
In light of this breakdown of the appointments process due to partisan obstruction 
in the Senate, the President had a legitimate constitutional claim to make recess 
appointments in his attempt to fulfill his constitutional task to take care that the laws be 
faithfully executed. While the framers imagined instances wherein the Senate would be 
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out of session due to the technological difficulties of travel and communication during 
the 18th and 19th centuries, the larger purpose of the clause — its animating principle — is 
the continuation of government absent congressional choice to the contrary. In other 
words, the President’s job is to faithfully execute laws passed by Congress, and he 
requires subordinates to help him in this administrative function. Given this larger 
purpose, the President had a legitimate claim that his recess appointments were 
appropriate given that the deliberative process in the Senate had broken down due to the 
obstructionist tactics of a Senate minority, those tactics made possible by recourse to a 
Senate procedural rule that is constitutionally suspect. The President, therefore, was using 
his recess appointments power in order to keep the government functioning based on the 
choices a majority in Congress had already made, and in light of what the majority in the 
Senate would likely have approved absent such obstruction. While it is true that this is 
not a use of recess appointments imagined by the framers, neither did the framers intend a 
Senate so thoroughly enervated by hyper-partisanship and thus unable to function. The 
President was simply making temporary appointments to achieve the overarching purpose 
of the Clause. 
Ultimately, only political contestation between the branches could have settled 
these competing claims. Political contestation wherein the branches could justify their 
behavior to each other in front of the electorate — rather than legal determinacy — 
would perhaps structure a more robust deliberative space in which the political branches 
could have worked out the merits of differing constitutional and policy positions, a 
process that was abruptly ended by the Court’s intervention into the process. Leaving 
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such a dispute to politics, moreover, would not necessarily give the President a free hand. 
Rather, the President ultimately has to make legitimate constitutional claims about the 
need for recess appointments given the relevant circumstances. Congress, of course, has 
political tools to combat the President’s use of recess appointments should those 
appointments actually undermine the will of the deliberative majority of the Senate. 
Congress can censure the President, cut off funding for the offices in question, and even 
impeach a President who continues to defy the will of Congress. 
In fact, it is not difficult to imagine different scenarios in which the Congress 
would strongly oppose and resist recess appointments. For example, there was some 
speculation that President Trump wanted to fire Attorney General Jeff Sessions so that he 
could appoint a new attorney general who could then fire Independent Counsel Robert 
Mueller, who was investigating potential collusion between Russia and the Trump 
campaign during the 2016 election, as well as potential obstruction of justice by President 
Trump for firing FBI Director James Comey after Comey allegedly refused to end the 
investigation. Senators from both parties made clear that they would oppose such a move 
and that there was no room in the Senate calendar to consider a replacement for Sessions 
should the President fire him.421 Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) went so far as to say 
that “[i]f Jeff Sessions is fired there will be holy hell to pay.”422 The Senate then held pro 
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forma sessions to prevent President Trump from making such a move. Given the political 
circumstances surrounding President Trump and the Russia investigation, it is hard to 
imagine Congress allowing such an appointment to go unanswered. The difference 
between the two scenarios is clear: President Obama made recess appointments in order 
to fulfill his constitutional duty to enforce and administer the duly passed laws of the 
United States, whereas President Trump’s hypothetical recess appointment would be an 
attempt to obstruct an ongoing investigation.423 
On the other hand, the legal resolution in Noel Canning sanctioned the partisan 
obstruction of the appointments process by placing great emphasis on the Senate’s ability 
to determine its own rules. This legitimation, therefore, gave the Senate a free hand to act 
however it pleases while providing the President little recourse to make valid 
constitutional claims regarding the staffing of the executive branch in the face of 
obstruction by a Senate minority. Hence, the legal resolution of the issue disguised — 
even subverted — the political dynamics at play. Perversely, the President’s attempt to 
fulfill his constitutional duties was rendered an example of the imperial presidency while 
congressional abdication of its own prerogatives was elevated by the pretense of law. 
CONCLUSION 
         The recess appointments controversy illuminates how certain understandings of 
the Constitution can undermine it in the long term. The Court’s policing of the 
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Constitution’s formal boundaries certainly seems like a good approach because it 
ostensibly removes the messiness of politics from constitutional practice. The problem 
with this approach is that the legal line drawing does not remove politics from 
interbranch disputes. On the contrary, legal resolution pathologizes politics, 
subordinating other constitutional goods for the sake of legal certainty. 
         In the case at hand, the Court’s protection of the Senate’s power to advise and 
consent missed the fact that the deliberative process in the Senate had broken down due 
to partisan obstruction by a minority faction. The Court’s line drawing thus prevented the 
President from making a constitutional case that, absent the deliberative and majoritarian 
will of the Senate to the contrary, the government needed to continue running. Hence, a 
minority faction did not have to justify its own behavior because it hid behind the letter of 
the law. Political contestation between the branches, wherein each of the branches would 
be forced to make constitutional claims and justify their behavior to each other, would re-
open a deliberative space that was foreclosed by the Court’s intervention into the matter. 
The Court thus legitimized the partisan obstruction of the Senate’s prerogatives while 
preventing the President from ensuring the faithful execution of the laws. The legal 
parsing of the text to find the literal meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause, 
therefore, missed the underlying nature of the dispute and prevented the branches from 
engaging with each other politically. 
This is not to say that a political understanding of the Constitution’s separation of 
powers would solve the political problem of hyper-partisanship or would make politics 
less messy. But such an approach at least has the benefit of not doubling down on the 
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pathologies associated with hyper-partisanship, especially in the Congress where 
members seem particularly unwedded to the outlook and prerogatives of their own 
institution. The burden of politics, at the very least, forces political actors to make actual 
arguments unobscured by the pretense of law. The problem with considering the 
Constitution solely on a legal dimension, therefore, is that it flattens the relevant criteria 
for constitutional evaluation, neither considering constitutional ends nor how the 
Constitution establishes differing institutional structures to achieve those ends through 
conflict within and between competing institutions. In short, an overly legalized 
conception of separation of powers allows a letter-of-the-law reading of the Constitution 
to undermine the practice of constitutionalism. 
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Conclusion 
 The central claim of this dissertation is that disputes between the political 
branches regarding their textual boundaries should be left solely to the branches to work 
out, using the tools given to them by the Constitution, even when a dispute deals with a 
seemingly clear and determinate constitutional provision. This seems somewhat extreme, 
especially in a political culture that has largely accepted the fundamental notion of the 
Constitution as law. The premise that the Constitution is a legal instrument stems from 
the earliest days of the Republic when Chief Justice John Marshall construed the 
Constitution as such in Marbury v. Madison (1803) as he laid the predicate for the 
establishment of judicial review in that case. Over the course of the past 200 years the 
judiciary has increasingly gained in prominence up to the point of declaring itself the 
ultimate arbiter of constitutional meaning. For most of the Court’s history, however, it 
did not settle interbranch disputes regarding the boundaries of the political branches.424 
As discussed in the introduction, the boundaries between the political branches, as the 
political science of The Federalist maintains, are not easily subject to legal determination. 
Even so, during the latter half of the 20th Century the Court extended its judicial 
prerogatives to boundary disputes between the branches. Few today would deny that such 
boundary disputes are well within the purview of the judiciary. 
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The notion, then, that it is possible to deduce standards from the legal text such 
that a violation of the clear terms of a clause might be more constitutional than adherence 
to them — as argued perhaps most strikingly in the chapter on recess appointments — 
seems to devalue the Constitution’s legal status, amounting to law giving way to 
politics.425 Indeed, the Court (albeit with differing interpretations of the scope of the 
Recess Appointments Clause) ruled unanimously that President Obama had contravened 
constitutional limits by making appointments during Senate pro forma sessions. 
Moreover, there seemed little, if any, question that it was the judiciary’s prerogative to 
decide the case, especially since the case dealt with clear and determinate constitutional 
language. Given the clear constitutional commitment to make provision for appointments 
during congressional absence, the Court thus had to look to the text and to the intentions 
of the framers — as well as to historical usage and custom where the views of the framers 
failed to sufficiently illuminate  — to determine what counted as a recess for the purposes 
of the Clause. The rationale for the Court’s invalidation of the legislative veto was 
similar. The Presentment Clause presents a clear and determinate constitutional standard 
for lawmaking, clearly requiring that “Every order, resolution, or vote” comply with the 
Constitution’s requirement for bicameralism and presentment. By drawing a legal line, 
the Court merely enforced constitutional procedures, disallowing what it viewed as an 
unconstitutional shortcut through the Constitution’s legal framework. 
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And yet, there are many ways in which governmental practice — even since the 
time of the founding — departs from the Constitution’s specific assignments of power. 
Such departures, while subject to robust criticism at times, are not viewed as 
constitutionally illegitimate. This dissertation, for example, examined executive 
agreements and treaties. While the Constitution only provides one method for entering 
into international agreements, requiring ratification by the consent of two-thirds of the 
Senate, the vast majority of international agreements today are conducted as executive 
agreements. And, in fact, only a small percentage of executive agreements receive any 
post hoc approval by Congress. Although some scholars and practitioners worry about 
the level of congressional oversight of such agreements and have proposed reform 
mechanisms to ensure greater accountability through advanced oversight and 
transparency mechanisms, no such reform proposals advocate moving away from the 
widespread use of executive agreements.426 Executive agreements are viewed as essential 
mechanisms of modern government even if their constitutional pedigree is questioned by 
some (i.e. such agreements are justified by long-term practice and constitutional custom).  
War powers is another area in which modern governmental practice departs 
significantly from the strictures of the text. While the Constitution grants Congress the 
power to declare war, it has not formally done so since World War II, and this even as the 
United States has engaged in active warfare almost continually since that time in conflicts 
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in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, among other conflicts. Again, while many 
scholars and practitioners are highly critical of the ways in which modern practice has 
evolved and would, for example, demand that Congress take a more active role over war 
powers, very few, if any, would suggest that the United States cannot engage hostilities 
unless or until Congress formally declares war.427 To focus too narrowly on the literal 
letter of the law, in this way, would forego the institutional advantages the branches bring 
to the practical exercise of their war powers. Given the ostensible disconnect between the 
constitutional text and practice, scholars like Mariah Zeisberg instead seek to measure 
constitutional fidelity by analyzing how the branches wield their distinctive institutional 
capacities vis-a-vis each other in politics across time. If the branches do not abide by the 
literal strictures of the text — and, moreover, it would seem to be practically impossible 
to expect them to — this does not mean, in other words, that practice cannot be evaluated 
in any meaningfully constitutional sense.428 
Of course, much of the divergence in these issues concerns the fact that the two 
examples cited above relate to the government’s power in foreign affairs. The Court has 
developed a robust political questions doctrine for foreign affairs issues, recognizing that 
the foreign sphere is characterized by its unpredictability and volatility and that this 
context, generally speaking, is inappropriate for adjudication.429 This reluctance on the 
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part of the judiciary, moreover, has extended beyond adjudication of the substance of 
foreign affairs issues to constitutional procedures, even though the enforcement of 
constitutional procedures would not entail, at least necessarily, policy-making judgments 
by the judiciary.430 And yet, this dichotomy between the ways in which the judiciary 
allows the political branches to negotiate their textual boundaries in foreign affairs while 
more strictly construing their powers in the domestic context raises significant questions. 
The foreign affairs arena poses particular challenges to constitutional government, as 
discussed in the chapter on executive agreements. However, as argued in that chapter, the 
branches have at times negotiated these boundaries in salutary ways. Does the separation 
of powers require more legalization in the domestic context, especially if the political 
branches can be trusted to navigate the boundaries of their own respective power in 
foreign affairs? The reality is that while foreign affairs issues certainly stretch the 
constitutional order to its limits, the Constitution’s political architecture is the same in 
both foreign and domestic contexts and there is no significant reason why the Court 
should be more reluctant to intervene in foreign affairs than in domestic contexts.  
Noting the ways in which constitutional practice has already departed from the 
literal strictures of the text in important domains of constitutional practice cannot 
sufficiently answer the objection raised at the outset, especially insofar as that objection 
is ultimately motivated by the salutary attempt to maintain the fundamental character of 
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the constitutional order. To what extent can governmental practice depart from the text 
and yet the Constitution still be said to govern political practice in any meaningful sense? 
To answer that question, this dissertation has stressed the values and purposes illuminated 
by, although not reducible to, specific allocations of power in an attempt to demonstrate 
how those values can — and should — guide the branches in their political negotiations 
regarding their boundaries. While the necessities of the moment might require deviating 
from the literal strictures of the text, the Constitution — and its specific assignments of 
power — should still guide the branches’ political conflict. To use John Finn’s 
formulation, the Juridic Constitution (the Constitution as law) and the political 
Constitution should exist in a symbiotic relationship.431 An overemphasis on either law or 
politics can have deleterious effects. An overemphasis on law can make the constitutional 
structure too rigid and unadaptable to the needs of the moment. An overemphasis on 
politics, on the other hand, can make the branches inattentive to core constitutional 
commitments over time. 
This latter concern is borne out, to some degree, in the case study on executive 
agreements. While this dissertation argued that executive agreements are consistent with, 
and limited by, constitutional structure, the use of executive agreements has also led to 
serious problems, especially with regard to congressional oversight. Executive 
agreements are largely a response to the need for governmental efficiency in foreign 
affairs. Given the high volume of international agreements entered into by the United 
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States in the modern world, the branches have negotiated their boundaries such that the 
executive branch can enter into less consequential agreements without subsequent 
congressional involvement, as normally required by the Constitution. It is instructive to 
consider, for example, what benefits there could be from more strictly construing the 
Constitution such that the branches — absent perhaps a few exceptions — used the treaty 
mechanism for all international agreements, as the constitutional text would on its face 
require. There would be major inconveniences involved, of course, as the Senate would 
have to assent to high volumes of international agreements, including those that are 
seemingly insignificant and thus not generally deserving of substantial congressional 
involvement. But, on the other hand, it would be unthinkable that major international 
commitments such as the Iran Deal would be concluded by a mechanism other than a 
treaty — or that at least an agreement as consequential as the Iran Deal would go into 
force against the expressed will of a majority of both houses of Congress. While treaty 
exclusivity — or something close to it — would entail significant costs, constitutional 
structure would be maintained through the branches’ more thorough attentiveness to 
textual requirements.  
Of course, there are good examples of Congress demanding that more important 
international agreements be concluded with a higher threshold of post hoc 
authorization.432 But as executive agreements have become standard practice during the 
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course of the last half century there is substantial evidence of a generalized lack of 
concern on the part of Congress with regard to such agreements. Indeed, as executive 
agreements have become accepted as completely constitutional — and have become 
standard practice —Congress has become less concerned with such agreements and has 
not ensured that it is kept apprised of the agreements made by the executive branch. 
Without a record of executive agreements Congress lacks the relevant information to 
assert that certain agreements should have been concluded as treaties, and that Congress 
will demand such in the future.  
This digression is not intended as an argument against the use of executive 
agreements, especially since there are elements of modern practice that largely reflect 
constitutional commitments. Even so, it does demonstrate how inattention to the 
strictures of the Constitution can over time erode a commitment to the purposes of the 
Constitution if the branches get carried away by the conveniences of modern political 
practice. In other words, it is problematic if the branches are guided more by the way 
things are done or the exigencies of the moment than by the constitutional duties signified 
by the text. This, then, poses problems for those who would use history or long-time 
practice as a justification for the constitutionality of a particular way of doing things, as 
has often been the justification for executive agreements.433 There is usually a close 
connection between the constitutional text and its purposes, and departures from the text 
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can potentially frustrate the underlying purposes of the text. However, as argued above, 
treaty exclusivity would be practically impossible. Therefore, the branches would have to 
negotiate ways of handling international agreements which were capable of handling the 
required volume. For such an accommodation to be constitutional, however, it must be 
faithful to the underlying purpose and logic of the text, even as it departs from the literal 
strictures of the text. 
The answer to the objection raised at the outset against the proposition that it is 
possible to deduce standards from the text such that a clear violation can be considered 
the more constitutional action than strict adherence to the letter of the law is that such 
violations of the text should be circumscribed by the circumstances that give rise to them 
and the kinds of arguments advanced to justify such departures. Furthermore, when a 
branch violates the strictures of the legal text it is incumbent upon that branch to justify 
its actions. Such justification, moreover, should be forthcoming given the fact that the 
other branch, especially if it disagrees with the action taken, will contest the legitimacy of 
the action by pointing to the requirements of the law. Each branch, moreover, has 
determinate political tools it can wield to advance its arguments in politics. In other 
words, the strictures of the legal text generally provide a baseline for action and, 
consequently, departures from that baseline generally require significant justification. 
However, to leave the adjudication of the question solely to legal arguments — without 
attention to the political circumstances or the ways in which such actions are meant to 
achieve constitutional ends — risks undermining constitutional ends and obscuring the 
political dynamics at play.  
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Perhaps the most famous example of a departure from the strictures of the legal 
text and its subsequent, and generally accepted, justification is President Abraham 
Lincoln’s defense of his order to suspend Habeas Corpus, along with several other 
wartime measures that exceeded his normal powers, at the outset of the Civil War. At the 
outbreak of the Civil War, Lincoln acted decisively to meet the needs of the nation, 
believing that his oath to “take care that the Laws be faithfully executed” and to 
“preserve, protect, and defend” the Constitution required actions that would under normal 
circumstances be considered unlawful. The importance of vigorous executive action 
without legal sanction, moreover, was made all the more necessary by the fact that 
Congress was out of session and could not be safely convened in time to exercise its 
powers. Given congressional absence, Lincoln subsequently argued to a special session 
of Congress, that “no choice was left but to call out the war power of the government,” 
and that although some of the actions taken might not be “strictly legal” they were 
justified by “what appeared to be popular demand and public necessity, trusting then, as 
now, that Congress would readily ratify them.”434 Congress subsequently ratified most of 
the wartime measures Lincoln had already taken, but did not sanction the President’s 
suspension of Habeas Corpus for another two years, in large part due to concerns that to 
provide specific statutory authorization could undermine the flexibility and discretion the 
President needed to wield the power effectively by suggesting that the President did not 
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have the power in the first place.435 The President and Congress thus negotiated the limits 
of their respective powers to ensure that the powers of the national government could be 
exercised as effectively as possible given the dire circumstances. 
Chief Justice Taney, however, ruled in Ex Parte Merryman (1861) that Lincoln’s 
suspension of Habeas Corpus was unconstitutional because only Congress could suspend 
Habeas Corpus, noting that the suspension Clause is in Article I and that “[t]his article is 
devoted to the Legislative Department of the United States, and has not the slightest 
reference to the Executive Department.” Lincoln and Congress subsequently ignored the 
ruling. It is of course true that when Lincoln defended the suspension to Congress, he 
gave an exhaustive technical legal argument regarding the president’s power to suspend 
Habeas Corpus. But beyond the technical, and potentially contestable, legal argument, 
Lincoln provided a constitutional justification for his actions animated by a concern for 
overarching constitutional purposes and the concomitant duties of his office, asserting 
that the actions taken, even if violating the strict letter of the law, were necessary to 
preserve the constitutional order: 
The whole of the laws which were required to be faithfully executed were being 
resisted and failing of execution in nearly one-third of the states. Must they be 
allowed to finally fail of execution, even had it been perfectly clear that by the use 
of the means necessary to their execution some single law, made in such extreme 
tenderness of the citizen’s liberty that practically it relieves more of the guilty 
than of the innocent, should to a very limited extent be violated? To state the 
question more directly, Are all the law but one to go unexecuted, and the 
government itself go to pieces lest that one be violated? Even in such a case, 
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would not the official oath be broken if the Government should be overthrown 
when it was believed that disregarding the single law would tend to preserve it?436 
 
 Lincoln thus argued the constitutional merits of his case before Congress and the 
public, providing publicly accessible reasons for why a violation of the strict letter of the 
law, if it could be so construed that the law in fact had been violated, was justified by the 
particular circumstances that gave rise to the suspension. To put it another way, the fact 
that there is a Habeas Corpus suspension clause in the first place points to the fact that the 
framers recognized that there might be times when the government needs to effectively 
wield this power, especially when courts of law cannot properly function. After 
determining that such a power, in certain defined circumstances, is necessary, it is then 
important, as a second-order consideration, to decide which branch is best suited, 
generally-speaking, to exercise such a power. There are of course good reasons why the 
legislature, as the most broad-based, publicly accountable body, should have the power, 
making it less likely that such a power could be abused by executive discretion. But, as 
Lincoln queried, should the government be prevented from exercising an essential 
constitutional power if the branch formally granted the power cannot meet to exercise it 
to the detriment, even destruction, of the constitutional order itself?  
 The Habeas Corpus suspension case is instructive because it demonstrates how 
the branches can negotiate their respective boundaries in politics, motivated by the 
constitutional principles at stake and constrained by the relevant circumstances. While the 
president exercised a power that he conceded he might not have under normal 
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circumstances (even as he argued that, in a technical sense, he did in fact have that 
power) he subjected his actions, and his arguments on behalf of them, to post hoc 
congressional scrutiny. Congress, in its turn, after deliberating on the appropriate scope 
of the president’s authority, recognized the legitimacy of those actions in light of the 
circumstances. Legal analysis concerning which branch appropriately has the power 
could not ultimately answer the question of whether the president’s action was 
constitutionally legitimate. This is true regardless of how the Court decided the case. 
Indeed, had the Court provided judicial sanction of the president’s action (finding that the 
president does in fact have the power in a legal sense) this could provide legal cover for a 
future president to wield the power in circumstances less appropriate or dire without 
having to similarly make constitutional justifications to Congress and to the public, 
relying instead on judicial precedent for support. By leaving the issue to politics (and in 
this case refusing to defer to the judiciary’s pronouncement on the matter) the political 
branches argued about the constitutional purposes undergirding the text, making 
politically contestable claims to each other that could be evaluated by each other, and, of 
course, ultimately by the public. The fact that Lincoln, at least ostensibly, violated the 
letter of the law compelled him to justify his actions, but to do so not based solely on 
technical legal reasoning but with regard to the purposes his actions were meant to fulfill. 
These claims, moreover, were contestable and could have been subsequently repudiated 
by Congress.437  
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 This example stands in stark contrast to the two case studies in this dissertation 
wherein the judiciary intervened. In both of those cases — recess appointments and the 
legislative veto — the legal resolution greatly distorted the actual political dynamics 
between the branches, especially insofar as the judicial frame, focused as it was on the 
constitutional text, was inattentive to larger constitutional purposes. Moreover, this 
inattentiveness to larger constitutional purposes and the ways in which the political 
branches could have negotiated their boundaries in politics (and, in fact, had so 
negotiated in the case of the legislative veto) led to the subversion of constitutional 
purposes. A literal focus on the constitutional text, in other words, led to outcomes that 
were less constitutional even as these legal resolutions were imbued with the pretense and 
high-mindedness of law.  
In the case of the legislative veto, Congress and the president had negotiated a 
decades-long constitutional settlement wherein Congress delegated its legislative power 
to the executive branch while retaining post hoc oversight and accountability for its 
delegated lawmaking power. Congress thus greatly empowered the executive branch as it 
delegated its lawmaking prerogatives to the president and other executive branch 
departments and agencies, making, in many respects, the president, and his subordinates, 
legislator-in-chief. What is particularly striking about the negotiated settlement between 
 
go too far. Indeed, given the contestable nature of the President’s actions he was thus compelled to place 
himself on the firmest constitutional foundation possible. Thus, he made arguments both legal and 
constitutional. The constitutional arguments, however, were crucial to the public deliberations on the matter 
because those arguments could be used to justify the constitutional necessity of his actions regardless of 
whether they were technically legal. The fact that Lincoln was induced to make such substantial 
justifications of his actions points to the fact that violations of the letter of the law compel significant 
justifications. 
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the branches is the ways in which Congress, in particular, was concerned about its larger 
constitutional purpose (to ensure that laws are based on the deliberative will of the 
majority expressed through the institution designed to make provision for its expression) 
even if it was not completely self-conscious of this. Indeed, when Congress first 
delegated legislative power to the president subject to a legislative veto it engaged in days 
of sustained and heated deliberations about whether the delegation of its lawmaking 
power was constitutionally appropriate or whether it amounted to abdication of its 
constitutional duties to ensure that laws reflect the deliberative will of the majority 
expressed by the institution designed to make provision for this political perspective. The 
legislative veto was adopted with far less fanfare as it was merely an attempt by Congress 
to achieve the aims sought by the delegation in the first place without abdicating its 
constitutional function through the delegation of its power.  
The branches’ negotiated settlement regarding their roles in the lawmaking 
process remained largely confined to the realm of politics, in which negotiation was 
animated both by concerns for achieving important and legitimate governmental ends and 
with maintaining constitutional structure. It is true that presidents at times characterized 
the legislative veto as a congressional usurpation of their executive power — though, of 
course, it is not all that surprising that presidents would attempt to construe their power 
broadly in an attempt to get Congress to delegate with no strings attached. Presidents 
acquiesced, however, when faced with the choice of a legislative veto or congressional 
refusal to delegate power at all. In short, the branches negotiated a settlement that greatly 
empowered the executive while retaining legislative oversight of its delegated 
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prerogatives, and both branches accepted the settlement in practice, especially insofar as 
both branches stood to gain from their negotiated settlement. Ambition thus served to 
counteract ambition, the wedding of institutional prerogatives to the ambition of 
officeholders serving to sustain constitutional structure even as the branches adapted their 
institutions to meet the needs of changed circumstances. This political negotiation, of 
course, contravened the literal letter of the Presentment Clause, but it preserved the larger 
purposes by ensuring the substantive involvement of both branches in the lawmaking 
process.  
As shown in the case study, however, the judicial invalidation of the legislative 
veto was inattentive to the larger purposes the branches were trying to achieve through its 
use (the preservation of constitutional structure as the branches met the challenges of 
modern governance). By focusing on the literal strictures of the law, the Court thus 
undermined the constitutional structure it purported to protect, especially since the 
Court’s ruling did not even acknowledge how the veto fit within the backdrop of 
delegation. Hence, the Court continued to allow widespread delegation — and the 
concomitant blending of legislative and executive power in the executive branch and the 
administrative state — while cutting Congress off from its delegated functions. The 
larger purposes of the separation of powers — which the branches had successfully 
maintained through their own political interactions — were thus undermined by the 
judiciary’s overly literal rendering of the Presentment Clause without attention to the 
larger purposes of that Clause and how the relevant political circumstances led the 
branches to work in politics to achieve governmental ends while maintaining the 
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substantive involvement of both branches in lawmaking. It is of course true that some 
critics of the legislative veto — such as the late Antonin Scalia, prior to his appointment 
to the Court — viewed its invalidation as a first step towards rolling back widespread 
delegation, especially insofar as the legislative veto made it easier for Congress to 
delegate.438 While there might be good reasons for Congress to take more ownership of 
its legislative prerogatives — as Jessica Korn, for example, has argued — this is a 
prudential objection rather than a principled constitutional one.439 Indeed, if the branches 
in their political negotiations determine that the only way to effectively accomplish some 
governmental objective is through delegation, then it is incumbent upon the branches to 
determine how to accomplish that goal while also ensuring that such delegation is 
reconciled to constitutional structure. The legislative veto, in this way, is a primary 
example of the ways in which the constitutional order — as The Federalist argued — is 
adaptable to the various crises and exigencies of unforeseen circumstances while 
maintaining its structure through the political negotiation of the branches. Moreover, the 
judicial resolution, based on the literal meaning of the Clause, feeds the view that the 
Constitution is the enemy of good and effective government because it is too static and, 
therefore, unadaptable to the needs of contemporary government. 
Similarly, with recess appointments, the judicial resolution of the issue — based 
on the technical meaning of recess — was not attentive to the larger purposes signaled by 
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the Clause: that the president needs to staff the government to keep it functioning when 
Congress is unable to fulfill its constitutional obligations. The Court’s resolution of the 
Clause based on its literal meaning — the question thus turning on what constitutes a 
recess for valid recess appointments — did not take into account the larger political 
context that gave rise to the challenged recess appointments in the first place: partisan 
obstruction by a minority faction, wielding institutional procedures to grind the 
government to a halt, and perpetually frustrating the will of the majority which would 
have easily confirmed the recess appointed nominees. Given that the recess appointments 
were, in fact, technically made during a Senate session, the legal resolution made it 
appear that the president had acted lawlessly, unconstitutionally encroaching upon 
congressional prerogatives. The legal resolution of the issue thus meant that the 
government was not staffed as hyper-partisanship in Congress prevented it from fulfilling 
its constitutional duties, and as the president was prevented from responding in politics to 
this congressional abdication. The judiciary’s parsing of the legal text thus preempted 
political conflict that, while mediated by the text, could have underscored the 
Constitution’s positive purposes in light of the particular circumstances.  
The argument here is not that the Court should have decided the case but resolved 
it in the other direction. Rather, legal line drawing in either direction — to sustain the 
appointments or to preclude them — would prove problematic insofar as such line 
drawing is inattentive to the political circumstances that could give rise to and justify 
such recess appointments — or could make such appointments constitutionally invalid. 
The Court’s invalidation, as demonstrated in the case study, was deeply problematic 
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insofar as it precluded the President from responding to the obstruction of a partisan 
minority in Congress. If the Court had decided the case in favor of the president, on the 
other hand, future presidents might rely on the Court’s precedent sustaining a broad 
construction of the Recess Appointments Clause in cases where the political 
circumstances do not warrant or justify such appointments. In such a case the president 
could more easily rely on judicial precedent rather than having to press a constitutional 
argument.  
The Federalist, time and again, explains how the Constitution is designed to 
achieve certain ends, not merely to restrain the power of government in advance of 
unforeseen circumstances. In both of these cases, on the other hand, larger constitutional 
objectives were obscured and undermined by a narrow focus on the literal strictures of 
the law. The focus on the text, in other words, was divorced from the larger purposes of 
the constitutional order, those purposes signaled by but not reducible to their textual 
instantiations. Political contestation, on the other hand, enables, even requires, the 
branches to advance arguments about their respective behavior in light of the political 
and constitutional aims they seek to achieve, embedded within particular circumstances 
that constrain and limit the range of acceptable actions and arguments on behalf of those 
actions. Brightline, legalistic rules, in other words, provides no space for constitutional 
adaptation to the contingencies that are endemic to politics. 
*****  
This latter point bears some elaboration even if to do so is merely to nuance and 
emphasize aspects of the above explication. Indeed, the type of arguments the branches 
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make in constitutional conflict regarding their powers are not necessarily self-consciously 
constitutional in the way such reasoning is typically understood. This is an important 
point to briefly elaborate on because the case studies shed light on how the political 
branches reason (or should reason) about the Constitution differently than the judiciary. It 
is typical to think of constitutional reasoning in legal terms even when discussing the 
political branches’ role in constitutional interpretation. For example, while 
departmentalists —similarly to the argument of this dissertation — encourage 
officeholders in each branch to interpret the Constitution for themselves rather than to 
submit to the Supreme Court’s interpretations, such interpretive pluralism is still, at least 
generally speaking, conceived in the same way as the Court reasons about the text, or is 
concerned with how the branches respond to the issues that are before the Court.440 The 
political branches, in this view, are encouraged to offer competing perspectives on and 
arguments about constitutional meaning rather than to submit to the Court as the sole or 
final interpreter of the text. Lincoln is thus held up as an exemplar of constitutional 
reasoning for his opposition to the Supreme Court’s Dred Scott decision insofar as he 
publicly argued why the Court had wrongly decided the case and, therefore, why the 
Court’s decision should have no precedential value, only applying to the parties in the 
case.441 Similarly, others have positively characterized the ways in which the political 
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branches challenged the Roe v. Wade decision, especially as Congress held hearings in 
the 1980s on how the Constitution should be rightly understood on this issue.442 Such 
interpretive pluralism is thus seen as increasing the deliberative space for contesting and 
constructing constitutional meaning over time, involving a broader swath of the people in 
conversation about what the Constitution means.443 
In the kind of disputes regarding the political branches’ powers vis-a-vis each 
other examined in this dissertation, on the other hand, discourse is not necessarily as self-
consciously constitutional — i.e. tied to textual interpretation. It is true that the text 
guides and constrains the branches’ political deliberations about the limits of their powers 
vis-a-vis each other. But beyond this, the branches are (or should be) motivated by the 
purposes and duties of their institutions. So, for example, when the legislative veto was 
adopted Congress did not debate its textual merits so much as see it as a way to both 
achieve constitutional ends without abandoning its constitutional role. The veto was thus 
a way in which members of Congress were induced to care for the prerogatives of 
Congress as the lawmaking institution. Similarly, presidents accepted such vetoes in 
order to gain more power insofar as the legislative veto merely conditioned power that 
Congress could otherwise retain if the president objected. In this way, the negotiations on 
the part of both branches were animated by the political ambition of officeholders, that 
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ambition inextricably wedded to the purposes and prerogatives of the institutions they 
inhabited.  
In the recess appointments case, President Obama did not make a self-consciously 
constitutional argument when he made the controversial appointments. Rather, he 
asserted that pro forma sessions hardly constituted a legitimate session of the Senate 
insofar as a single senator entered the chamber every few days to gavel it in and out of 
session even as Congress conducted no official business for over a month. The action, 
and the argument justifying it, called into question congressional behavior, but not in a 
highly technical and legal way (until the Court intervened and induced the branches onto 
the legal plane). Left to political contestation, the President could have persisted in 
making the claim that Congress was not exercising its authority in an appropriate fashion 
and that congressional abdication justified the administration’s extraordinary actions. 
Moreover, a president would be limited in the kinds of arguments he could make if such 
appointments were made to defy or circumvent the deliberative and majoritarian will of 
Congress. And in such a case, moreover, it would be difficult for the president to get 
away with such appointments given that Congress could defend the majoritarian 
judgments of its institution. 
Finally, while Congress utilized an approval mechanism for the Iran Deal that did 
not ultimately realize the positive purposes of the Treaty Clause’s inclusion of Congress 
in the first place, Congress’s political intervention was, at least rhetorically, premised on 
the notion that such a deal would not prove to be durable without congressional buy-in. 
As discussed extensively in the case study, the framers included the Senate in order to 
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buttress and solidify American foreign policy commitments in light of the fact that, 
without such institutional provision, the mutability of the law more likely to occur in 
republican forms of government could undermine the trust of foreign nations due to a 
lack of consistency. While President Obama had a plausible legal argument regarding his 
authority to unilaterally enter into the Iran Deal, Congress contested that legal claim with 
a political argument that reflected fundamental constitutional commitments. The extent to 
which Congress followed through on this claim is irrelevant to the fact that Congress was 
in fact motivated by what appears to be a constitutional concern about the purposes of 
having Congress involved in international agreement-making in the first place.  
The essential point here is that the officeholders in the different branches are 
motivated by the prerogatives and duties of their offices as much as they are by the text 
itself. Moreover, the text points to constitutional commitments that guide and constrain 
political contestation even as the branches’ political arguments move beyond the literal 
strictures of the text. Insofar as the branches are motivated by their political prerogatives 
— those prerogatives shaped by the branches’ differentiated structures, tasks, and duties 
— the constitutional text provides resources for argumentation as they engage in politics. 
Political contestation, moreover, is likely to result in robust reason-giving and a more 
candid exchange about the motives behind institutional actions. The president can persist 
in refusing to abide by the will of Congress. Congress, on the other hand, has powers up 
to and including impeachment to weigh and balance the president’s claims vis-a-vis its 
own deliberative perspective. The iterated political arguments made by the branches in 
different stages of political contestation thus move the branches off their legal scripts to 
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more thoroughly justify their actions in light of the other branch’s counterclaims, 
especially as political contestation moves from a low to a high level of intensity. In this 
way, conflict between the branches induces candor because the branches, in their public 
cross-examination of each other, are moved to justify their actions and behavior, 
submitting the merits of their actions and arguments to a dynamic political process that 
can end with impeachment. Jeffrey Green argues that political conflict can induce candor. 
For example, a cross-examination between candidates on stage — as opposed to an 
audience Q&A or questions from a moderator — pushes candidates away from their pre-
written script insofar as they are faced with pushback in the moment.444 The argument 
here is similar. In the back-and-forth of politics, that political contestation structured by 
determinate constitutional tools the branches can wield to advance their arguments vis-a-
vis the other branch, it is more likely that a branch hiding behind a valid assertion of legal 
power, in a technical sense, might be revealed for using that power inappropriately. 
Recourse to legal adjudication cannot illuminate this as thoroughly as legitimate 
contestation that calls those motives into question. Settling the dispute based on a literal 
interpretation of the text precludes this robust reason-giving enabled and fostered by the 
back-and-forth of political contestation, and can hide the ways in which a branch might 
wield a valid legal argument to otherwise obscure an arguably improper use of that power 
— as illuminated in the recess appointments case study.  
***** 
 
444 Jeffrey E. Green, The Eyes of the People: Democracy in an Age of Spectatorship (Oxford ; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2010), 185. 
 255 
It is worth briefly dwelling on whether the political contestation between the 
branches is sufficient to prevent abuses of power such that judicial intervention would 
provide better constitutional outcomes. Leaving boundary disputes to the political process 
no doubt provides opportunities for improper uses of power. Indeed, the concern with 
enforcing the law in such interbranch conflicts is often motivated by the salutary concern 
that political contestation is about whatever the branches can get away with. In politics, 
however, an improper use of power is less easily defended by recourse to viable 
constitutional arguments, especially since the other branch has plenty of institutional 
tools it can use to advance its competing perspective in politics, pressing the first branch 
to justify its actions.445 It is possible, however, that the political process might not always 
constrain abuses of power. For example, if Congress impeaches a president after he 
refuses to spend appropriated funds in the manner specified by Congress (or refuses to 
allow any member of his staff to testify before Congress), what is to keep the president 
from, say, dispatching troops to surround Congress, thus ending the argument?446 This is 
perhaps an extreme example, but the answer to this objection is that a president that 
refuses to submit to the political judgment of Congress — backed up by the viable threat 
of impeachment — has no more incentive to abide by a ruling of the Supreme Court 
curtailing the president’s power. In fact, Congress has far greater tools to constrain 
executive abuse with its power of the purse, its investigative tools, and its power to 
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impeach than does the Court with its mere power of judgment.447 If the Constitution were 
to fail entirely — insofar as the branches decide to ignore constitutional strictures up to 
the point of refusing to leave office — then it is true that a political conception of the 
separation of powers might be insufficient to preserve core constitutional commitments. 
But neither is the Court likely to restrain such brazen abuses of power with its rulings. In 
other words, the argument of this dissertation has been that in the ordinary practice of 
constitutional government, leaving interbranch disputes to be worked out between the 
branches works better than legal settlement insofar as legal settlement is inattentive to the 
political goods that can be pursued in interbranch conflict. 
Leaving such extreme scenarios to the side, the political conception of separation 
of power articulated in this dissertation better preserves constitutional structure than an 
overly legalized conception because, left to politics, the branches are induced to embrace 
a more capacious conception of their powers, channeling the purposes to which their 
powers are directed based on the concomitant duties of their offices. If the branches are 
induced to legalize their disputes however, they can potentially lose the capacity to 
reason politically about the purposes underlying the text as opposed to understanding 
their powers solely in legal terms. In this way, a robust political conception of separation 
of powers tends to the overarching commitments of the constitutional order in a way that 
a narrow emphasis on law can obscure and potentially undermine — as shown in the case 
studies.  
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Indeed, today certain conflictual possibilities are completely off the table insofar 
as officials within both of the political branches — or, for that matter, the public at large 
— would not have the political, or constitutional, imagination for them. So, for example, 
when Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell and Senate Republicans refused to hold 
hearings, or even meet with Supreme Court nominee Merrick Garland, President Obama 
had no recourse but to allow the Senate to kill a nomination without any substantive 
debate about the merits or qualifications that would render such a choice worthy or 
unworthy for the Supreme Court. The Senate Republicans thus pushed the decision to the 
electorate, claiming that the People would decide who the next Supreme Court justice 
ought to be. This decision by the people, however, would have to be made without 
reference to any substantive Senate deliberations that could guide the public on the 
salient issues of the choice.  
In a political culture that understands the ways in which the branches share power 
to provide certain political goods, as opposed to mere power politics and checking and 
balancing, the President might have been able to issue an ultimatum, threatening to install 
Merrick Garland on the Supreme Court if the Senate refused to deliberate. Indeed, the 
President could claim that the Senate had refused to hold hearings or meet with the 
nominee because they were afraid his virtues as a nominee would be made so manifest in 
that deliberative process that the Senate would have no choice but to confirm him 
(especially as fair-minded and moderate Republican Senators peeled away and agreed to 
vote to confirm). By claiming that Senate silence on the issue could not prevent the 
nomination (or that such silence represented tacit consent), the President could have thus 
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induced substantive political conflict about the nature of the branches’ respective powers 
in the nomination process — that such powers are marked by duties, not just checks — as 
well as about the nature of the particular choice. It is not hard to see, however, why such 
a choice was never publicly contemplated, or to see how such a move would be viewed 
as outside the scope of acceptable actions, even as, in theory, such a move would, 
arguably, have been no less constitutional than Congress’s willful abandonment of its 
own constitutional duties based on a narrow conception of its powers 
The point here is to show how an overly literal notion of the branches’ shared 
powers — and a focus solely on the checking function of institutions — deprives the 
political branches, and the public, of the imagination for how conflict between the 
branches can serve positive ends and how assertions of legal power, as opposed to 
political conflict, enervates political life of the reason-giving and argumentation 
necessary for informed political decision-making. In other words, if separation of powers 
is understood purely in terms of constraint, then what was actually an abdication of 
constitutional duties by the Senate is viewed as constitutionally legitimate even though it 
deprived the constitutional order of the political goods that come from involving the 
Senate in the process in the first place. In short, in the ordinary practice of politics, a 
more political conception of the purposes of separation of powers — and institutional 
conflict appropriate to that conception — feeds a robust political life that is undermined 
by too narrow a focus on law. Over time, that narrow focus erodes the ability of the 
branches to engage in substantive political conflict, which, in turn, erodes a conception of 
the positive functions the branches serve in the constitutional order. As Jeremy Waldron 
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writes, separation of powers as a constitutional way of bringing about positive goods 
through the practice of government becomes enervated of any content that would give 
meaning to political life such that today it is perhaps only possible to speak elegiacally 
about the separation of powers as a concept.448 
***** 
It is also worth noting the ways in which a political conception of separation of 
powers enhances democratic accountability by inducing the branches to contest their 
boundaries in language that is accessible to ordinary voters. This, of course, is a related 
point to what has already been written, and so it does not warrant much elaboration. The 
link between the governing apparatus and the people should not be overlooked. 
Ultimately, the public votes in regularly sequenced elections, evaluating and holding the 
government accountable. It is essential, therefore, that the public be adequately informed 
about the nature of the political disputes occurring within and between the political 
institutions of the national government. Insofar as the branches recur to overly legalistic 
conceptions of their power in their political disputes — induced by the judiciary, or 
otherwise, to focus on the literal instantiations of their power without recourse to the 
broader purposes illuminated by those powers  — public discourse takes on the technical 
and specialized language of the legal profession, thus making politics the province of 
lawyers and legal experts. It is not hard to see how this can leave the public uninformed 
and disaffected by politics.  
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This was perhaps borne out most clearly in the recess appointments case study 
wherein the branches were induced to make technical legal arguments about what 
constitutes a recess in ways that obscured the actual political dynamics at play, 
precluding publicly accessible reasons that could have been made to justify a departure 
from the legal text in that particular instance. Most citizens could have understood 
arguments about the purpose of the Clause — that duly constituted offices need to be 
filled, even when Congress cannot act — and the source of the problem — that a 
minority in the Senate was endlessly preventing consideration of appointments. Only a 
few experts, however, would be able to take the time to understand or fairly evaluate the 
complex legal and historical claims which were the basis of the Court’s decision. Broader 
political discourse was enervated of the vocabulary that would be publicly accessible and 
thus more easily evaluated by voters. Even more problematically, the legal resolution 
provided an apparently simple narrative — that the President was subverting the 
Constitution — which obscured and distorted the actual political dynamics animating the 
conflict in the first place. Thus, the legalization of the conflict not only shut voters out of 
the reasoning behind the Court’s decision, but also distorted their understanding of the 
political conflict. Leaving such disputes to be worked out between the branches, on the 
other hand, opens space for a publicly accessible politics that leaves the electorate better 
informed about the nature of interbranch disputes, thus enabling them to better perform 
their electoral duties in regularly sequenced elections.  
****** 
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 The purpose of this dissertation has been to illuminate the type of politics 
signified by the text but not reducible to the literal instantiation of its textual 
commitments. The argument elucidated above and in the case studies is that the branches 
should negotiate their textual boundaries through political conflict and negotiation, that 
conflict structured and animated by the purposes underlying assignments of power. In 
other words, the type of constitutional reasoning appropriate to the judiciary is 
inappropriate for the political branches in their own interactions regarding their textual 
boundaries because legal reasoning is about drawing bright-line rules that settle the 
meaning of the constitutional text. Legal settlement, however, is problematic when it 
comes to disputes between the branches because a focus on the literal strictures of the 
text may not be attentive to the particularities of the situations that give rise to, and 
circumscribe, departures from the text. Given that both branches have determinate 
political tools to contest the other branch, moreover, there is often no need to have a 
referee intervene in the dispute, especially insofar as legal resolution cannot weigh and 
balance the branches’ competing claims as effectively as the branches can in politics.  
For example, as briefly mentioned in the introduction, it is impossible to 
determine through adjudication what the scope of executive privilege should be in any 
meaningful sense. Indeed, both branches have potentially legitimate claims to 
information. The president might have a legitimate claim to withhold information for 
national security reasons, worrying that the information, sensitive as it is, might be too 
easily leaked by members of Congress. Conversely, Congress can hardly do its job 
without information about how the executive branch uses its discretionary authority. Its 
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investigatory powers, in other words, are essential mechanisms so that when Congress 
legislates it can do so in light of the actual facts on the ground. Congress, therefore, has 
potentially legitimate claims to information that it can press against the president’s 
purported need to withhold such information. While presidents might at times have 
legitimate claims to withhold information, a president who categorically refuses to 
provide any information to Congress in any situation might well be impeached. 
Ultimately, different situations — and the kinds of arguments that the branches can make 
in light of those circumstances — will naturally result in different accommodations 
between the branches in different instances as they press their claims against each other 
in politics. It would be difficult, on the other hand, for the judiciary to intervene given the 
politically sensitive nature of these competing claims from the branches.449 Rather, the 
best test of the branches’ competing claims is how far each branch is willing to go to 
advance its argument, up to and including impeachment. Legal resolution cannot serve as 
an adequate measure for how far a branch is willing to go to press its case in front of the 
public from a low to a high scale of political conflict.  
This does not mean, however, that the judiciary should never intervene in 
separation of powers disputes. In United States v. Nixon (1974), the Court acknowledged 
that there was no legal principle that could determine when executive privilege is 
constitutionally legitimate but nevertheless ruled that in the particular instance President 
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Nixon had to turn over tapes because they were relevant to ongoing criminal proceedings 
and thus implicated the prerogatives of the judiciary and the rights of individuals to have 
a fair and speedy trial with the relevant evidence available. Such a determination by the 
Court, however, was not a bright-line rule settling the general boundaries between the 
political branches in ways that undermined the core political prerogatives of the branches 
to weigh and balance competing claims in different political disputes wherein the merits 
of the claims could result in different outcomes. Rather, the Court intervened on behalf of 
its own prerogatives but did so in a narrowly circumscribed manner given the politically 
contentious nature of the dispute. 
The legislative veto case study similarly illuminates what would have been an 
acceptable judicial intervention in the case. As argued in that case study, the specific veto 
at issue in the Chadha case was illegitimate because it altered the rights of individual 
citizens in particular circumstances. Even if the government had gone through the full 
legislative process, with a bill to deport Jagdish Rai Chadha passed through Congress and 
presented to the president for his signature, this could have been struck down as a bill of 
attainder.450 In other words, the Court was right to invalidate this particular use of 
governmental power. The Court, however, failed to distinguish the particular legislative 
veto in the case from those merely conditioning Congress’s delegated legislative power. 
By failing to so distinguish, the Court cast aside hundreds of laws in a breathtakingly 
broad decision.  
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The distinction thus made in the discussion of both executive privilege and 
legislative veto suggests that the Court’s interventions should be directed to the ways in 
which governmental policy applies to citizens rather than to policing the boundaries of 
the political branches in general. In other words, if the political branches, generally 
speaking, have the power to do something, it would be inappropriate for the Court to 
intervene in disputes regarding which branch should have appropriately exercised the 
power.451 As amply demonstrated, the branches have determinate political tools to 
negotiate their boundary disputes in such general circumstances. Beyond such narrowly 
defined circumstances, however, the judiciary should largely refrain from interfering in 
such disputes, treating separation of powers conflicts across the board as it generally has 
done in the foreign affairs arena. Indeed, the Court has been reluctant to interfere in 
foreign affairs disputes — even to enforce ostensibly clear and determinate constitutional 
language — due to what it takes to be the political nature of foreign affairs, noting its 
lack of institutional competence to enforce textual boundaries without upsetting the 
political wisdom exhibited by the branches in their own negotiations. As argued above, 
however, such adjudication similarly frustrates the negotiation of the branches in the 
domestic context as well. Insofar as the rights of citizens are not affected by a 
problematic application of governmental power, political disputes between the branches 
are best left to their own negotiation or conflict. 
***** 
 
451 Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process. 
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 In concluding this dissertation, it is worth returning to some of the themes from 
the introduction, especially regarding the nature of the separation of powers system 
embodied by the Constitution. The central argument of this dissertation has been that the 
separation of powers system is not reducible to a set of legal provisions to be parsed by 
jurists. Rather, the Constitution set into motion a dynamic political order in which the 
branches should determine the limits of their respective powers in politics. While the 
constitutional text constrains action, its constraints are better understood as channeling, 
shaping, and directing behavior rather than merely placing a priori limits. This argument 
is based on Tulis and Mellow’s account of how the constitution departed from separation 
of powers as it had been traditionally understood — as a strict division of legislative, 
executive, and judicial power — and replaced it with a fundamentally new political 
system wherein the branches would work in politics to adapt the constitutional 
framework to the exigencies of times to come. The case studies demonstrate how 
understanding the Constitution primarily in terms of its legal assignments of power — 
and thus enforcing textual boundaries based on their most literal terms — misunderstands 
the nature of the constitutional design and, consequently, undermines the purposes of the 
constitutional order. In this view, textual boundaries themselves are subject to political 
contestation insofar as legally enforcing interbranch disputes regarding such boundaries 
can undermine the higher order commitments of the regime.  
 But if the constitutional design was intended to be a political architecture 
fundamentally different from separation of powers as it had been traditionally understood 
prior to the founding, then why has this conception been largely misunderstood? The 
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answer to this question is not obvious. Part of the answer, however, is that the argument 
of this dissertation is not originalist per se. An examination of the intellectual history 
regarding the separation of powers idea as well as the records of the Constitutional 
Convention and subsequent ratification debates certainly does not provide conclusive 
evidence for the political architecture conception of the separation of powers system 
articulated here. Indeed, John Manning notes how little consensus there was both prior to 
and during the framing of the Constitution on what an adequate separation of powers 
design requires.452 The constitutional design, in his characterization of it, is merely a 
series of various textual provisions that are each the result of considerable compromise. 
But, Manning argues, there is no overarching separation of powers principle at the heart 
of American constitutionalism beyond these various and distinct compromises that 
together constitute the whole enterprise.453 
This dissertation thus relied on The Federalist for what could be taken to be the 
best account of the system irrespective of the specific views and intentions of the framers. 
And, indeed, given that The Federalist was not widely read outside of New York during 
the ratification debates, the account it offers of the constitutional design cannot 
necessarily be seen as indicative of the views or specific intentions of the framers as a 
group. Even so, as Herbert Storing notes, the authors of The Federalist, in providing an 
account of the nature of the Constitution, saw better and farther, drawing attention to 
 
452 John F. Manning, “Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation,” Harvard Law Review 124, no. 8 
(2011): 1993–2005. 
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what was “fundamental” about the design rather than merely expressing how that design 
was commonly understood at the time.454 For this reason, The Federalist has proven to be 
an enduring and widely-read interpretive guide to the Constitution. 
However, The Federalist never explicitly, or even self-consciously, lays out the 
political architecture view of the separation of powers system relied upon in this 
dissertation. And, in fact, its rhetoric at times seems to endorse the constraints-oriented 
conception critiqued here, especially in the essays devoted specifically to explaining the 
nature of the Constitution’s separation of powers. Indeed, in contesting the critiques of 
the Anti-Federalists who asserted that the proposed Constitution violated separation of 
powers and would thus be unsafe repository of the people’s trust, Madison responded by 
arguing that the new design did not repudiate separation of powers principles so much as 
improve upon them. Indeed, by granting the branches’ partial agency in each other’s 
powers, separation of powers would become a workable form of government on its own 
terms, something that pure legal separation could not accomplish insofar as the most 
powerful branch would subsume the powers of the other branches. The Federalist thus 
defends the new separation of powers system in the terms of the older conception that it 
was meant to replace, claiming that the addition of checks and balances would better 
limit the power of the government than it could as a mere legal doctrine. The emphasis on 
constraints is perhaps most obvious in the paradigmatic separation of powers essay, 
 
454 Herbert J. Storing, The Complete Anti-Federalist (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), I:6; 
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Number 51, wherein Madison writes that separation of powers and its concomitant 
checks and balances is necessary to prevent abuses of power because men are not angels. 
The exercise of governmental power is thus made more difficult through what is 
described ostensibly as merely mechanical checking and balancing. Separation of powers 
— and federalism — thus provide a “double security” to the rights of the people. The 
emphasis on constraints is particularly evident in the discussion of bicameralism in 
Federalist 51, wherein the purpose of bicameralism is explained solely in terms of 
restraining the power of the branch the framers presumed would become the most 
powerful given its proximity to the people. Given the emphasis on constraint in these key 
papers it is hardly surprising that the Constitution’s separation of powers design has been 
characterized and understood primarily in these terms rather than in terms of positive 
purposes. 
Even so, The Federalist explains in other places, as alluded to throughout this 
dissertation, that the Constitution is designed to achieve certain ends and to be adaptable 
to the various exigencies of unforeseen circumstances.455 And, moreover, it points to the 
fact that the boundaries between the branches — at least at the margins — are not easily 
distinguished on the basis of a legal principle (though this point is not made in the essays 
specifically devoted to explaining and justifying the Constitution’s separation of powers 
framework).456 The last third of The Federalist, then, provides an account of how the 
branches accomplish their governing tasks not on the basis of a legal principle but in 
 
455 See, for example, Federalist 23 and 41. 
456 Federalist 37. 
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terms of how their independent grants of power and differentiated structural design 
features advance the positive purposes of the constitutional order, as briefly outlined in 
the introduction.  
What is to explain the disconnect, then, between the canonical description of the 
separation of powers in Federalist 47-51 and the account offered here, which itself is 
based on what is purportedly a more holistic reading of The Federalist? Tulis and Mellow 
have argued, in answer to this question, that the canonical separation of powers essays in 
The Federalist reflect a sophisticated rhetorical strategy intended to downplay the novelty 
of the new constitutional design in order to secure ratification.457 The actual theory of the 
new constitutional design — the move away from separation of powers, as it had been 
commonly understood, to a complex political system wherein the branches would 
negotiate the limits of their respective powers in politics as they advance political and 
constitutional aims — was never explicitly announced as such even as all of the core 
features of such a conception can be inferred from the account taken as a whole. 
Regardless of whether this is the correct interpretation of the nature of the 
separation of powers as presented in The Federalist, the text itself does not provide 
conclusive and definitive evidence for the conclusions drawn here. Even so, the 
superiority of the political conception articulated in this dissertation — compared to its 
constraints-oriented, legalistic counterpart — is borne out by the case studies. In other 
words, regardless of the correct interpretation of The Federalist with regard to separation 
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of powers, the political conception is the best understanding of the Constitution's 
assignments of power. Indeed, this dissertation has shown how a narrow focus on the 
legal strictures of the text is inattentive to larger constitutional ends, and, consequently, 
how such a focus can frustrate, even undermine, core constitutional commitments. 
Indeed, as argued above, attention to the legal strictures of the text, in many cases, helps 
to promote the purposes of the text. However, an overly legalistic conception of the text 
would require committing to the view that legal strictures should trump underlying 
purposes in every case in which they come into conflict. The case studies have shown 
that in instances where the particularities of certain situations create conflict between the 
literal strictures of the text and its underlying purposes, the political architecture view 
provides more resources for responding to the particularities of the situation in a 
constitutional way — and more resources to constitutionally evaluate such departures.  
Hence, the branches worked together to achieve a way of maintaining the 
Constitution’s structure (through the legislative veto) when both branches agreed that 
delegation was necessary to accomplish certain governmental tasks that could not be 
achieved through the regular legislative process, for whatever reason. The legalistic 
frame adopted by the Court undermined this constitutional adaptation agreed to by the 
branches, thus undermining separation of powers values — even on the legalistic 
conception’s account — by cutting off Congress from its delegated legislative power 
even as it allowed the consolidation of power in the executive branch and bureaucratic 
agencies. Similarly, the architectonic view provides a way to both understand how 
executive agreements are not merely a constitutional rupture (no matter how necessary) 
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but the product of a principled division of labor and the logical outworking of 
institutional logics ultimately negotiated in practice by the political branches. The 
Constitution, in this view, is both elastic insofar as it can generate what appears, at first 
glance, to be a great deal of change and static insofar as the text itself constrains 
departures from the text, providing rhetorical resources for political negotiation. Finally, 
the political account, as demonstrated most thoroughly in the case on recess 
appointments, requires that the branches engage each other at the level of politics, 
providing arguments about their respective behavior. This kind of engagement is more 
likely to occur in political contestation — wherein the branches engage in iterated 
political arguments, justifying themselves publicly vis-a-vis each other — than if the 
branches are encouraged to judicialize their disputes, a process which both potentially 
obscures the actual political dynamics at play in the dispute and shrouds the debate in the 
technical jargon of the legal profession. In this way, leaving such disputes — even about 
determinate and clear constitutional provisions that bring the branches into conflict — to 
be contested politically enhances democratic accountability as interbranch arguments are 
animated by publicly accessible reasons that aid the public in their evaluations of politics. 
This dissertation began by noting the ways in which separation of powers is 
viewed today as a “relic” of the past,458 as “suffering through an enfeebled old age.”459 
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Such diagnosis, although recurrent throughout American history,460 misunderstands the 
nature of the separation of powers insofar as it is inattentive to the fact that the 
Constitution was neither written nor intended as a prolix legal code but, rather, set into 
motion a dynamic political order that can adapt itself over time while maintaining the 
fundamental shape of the constitutional design through structured political conflict within 
and between governmental institutions. The political conception of the separation of 
powers articulated here and in the case studies allows for and fosters a government that is 
responsive to the needs of the moment insofar as the Constitution and its overarching 
commitments guide the political branches as they negotiate their boundaries in politics. 
The problem has not been that the branches are incapable of such constitutional 
adaptation — as demonstrated in both the chapters on the legislative veto and executive 
agreements. The problem has been inattentiveness to the higher order principles induced 
by an overly legalized conception of the Constitution’s assignments of power, especially 
as such a conception has been incorporated into Supreme Court jurisprudence during the 
last half century. There is no panacea which can solve all of the complex problems of 
modern government. Nevertheless, this dissertation has shown that judicial deference to 
the political branches in their boundary negotiations, and greater attention by the 
branches to their own prerogatives, duties, and particular modes of constitutional 
reasoning, could produce a government which is at once more adaptable to modern 
demands and more faithful to the animating purposes of the constitutional order.
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